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August  2004 Abstract 
Selective  attention  is  widely  regarded  as  a  crucial  component  of  human  perception. 
In  the  visual  domain,  attentional  mechanisms  have  been  implicated  in  stimulus 
encoding,  implicit  recognition,  conscious  perception  and  goal-directed  behaviour. 
To  date,  however,  the  role  of  attention  in  face  processing  has  been  largely 
overlooked.  This  is  remarkable  given  the  social  and  biological  importance  of 
faces,  and  the  wealth  of  psychological  research  that  has  focused  on  faces  as 
stimuli.  Moreover,  if  we  are  to  better  understand  how  the  human  brain  processes 
faces,  then  this  would  also  require  an  insight  into  the  interaction  between  attention 
and  face  processing.  The  experiments  in  this  thesis  addressed  the  relation  of 
attention  and  face  processing  directly  by  assessing  the  consequences  of  various 
attentional  manipulations  in  response-competition  and  repetition  priming  tasks. 
The  first  line  of  enquiry  examined  observers'  ability  to  attend  selectively  to  facial 
expression  and  identity,  and  whether  attention  is  required  for  the  integration  of 
these  types  of  information  into  a  multi-dimensional  face  percept.  Subsequent 
experiments  examined  capacity  limits  in  face  processing  and  attention  biases  to 
faces  and  nonface  comparisons.  The  main  findings  indicate  that  face  processing  is 
capacity  limited,  such  that  only  a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time,  and  that 
faces  are  particularly  efficient  at  retaining  and  engaging  visual  attention  in 
comparison  to  nonface  objects.  However,  while  face  processing  limits  appear  to 
proceed  independent  of  a  general  capacity,  attention  biases  to  faces  may  reflect 
processing  stages  that  are  shared  with  other  stimuli.  These  findings  are  discussed 
in  relation  to  existing  research  on  faces  and  attention. 
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6 Chapter  1  General  Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
There  are  a  range  of  selective  issues  implicated  in  human  perception  that  come 
under  the  umbrella  term  attention  (Driver,  2001;  Styles,  1997).  Thus  it  is  widely 
held  that  attentional  mechanisms  afford  the  selection  of  information  from  our 
senses  for  conscious  perception  and  goal-directed  behaviour  (e.  g.  Broadbent, 
1958),  but  also  for  implicit  recognition  (e.  g.  Lavie,  1995)  and  for  the  rudimentary 
encoding  of  stimuli  (e.  g.  Treisman  &  Gelade,  1980).  Although  a  great  deal  is  now 
known  about  selective  attention  (e.  g.  Baddeley  &  Weiskrantz,  1993;  Pashler, 
1998;  Styles,  1997),  rather  little  is  understood  about  how  visual  attention  and  face 
processing  interact.  This  is  remarkable  as  there  is  probably  no  other  class  of  visual 
stimuli  that  can  match  the  social  and  biological  importance,  and  that  has  been 
studied  as  extensively  as  the  human  face  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Young,  1998;  Young, 
1998).  This  is  also  unfortunate  as  the  role  of  attention  may  be  imperative  in 
understanding  how  the  human  brain  processes  faces.  Similarly,  the  study  of  visual 
attention  might  benefit  from  considering  stimuli  of  immense  intrinsic  significance 
such  as  faces. 
This  thesis  explores  the  interaction  of  attention  and  face  processing  across  four 
themes  by  measuring  task-irrelevant  processing  in  response-competition  and 
priming  tasks.  The  first  theme  concerns  the  ability  to  attend  selectively  to  different 
types  of  facial  information.  The  second  theme  explores  the  role  of  attention  in 
integrating  these  types  of  facial  information  into  multidimensional  percepts  during 
early  visual  processing.  The  third  theme  concerns  the  limit  of  the  number  of  faces 
7 that  can  be  processed  simultaneously.  The  final  theme  focuses  on  late  visual 
processes  involved  in  awareness  and  response,  by  examining  whether  faces  are 
particularly  efficient  in  affecting  responses  to  a  target  in  comparison  with  other 
stimulus  classes.  I  begin  by  outlining  the  relevant  principles  of  attention.  This  is 
followed  by  a  review  of  what  is  currently  understood  about  the  relation  of 
attention  and  face  processing.  I  end  this  chapter  by  describing  the  general 
methodological  approach  of  the  current  work. 
1.2  Principles  of  attention 
1.2.1  SELECTIVITY  AND  CAPACITY  LIMITATION 
Two  principles  that  have  dominated  the  study  of  visual  attention  are  selectivity  and 
capacity  limitation.  Selectivity  is  apparent  in  most  human  behaviour  and  refers  to 
the  observation  that  we  continually  assign  priority  to  only  a  part  of  our  entire 
sensory  input.  For  example,  when  reading  we  focus  on  a  small  set  of  words  at  a 
time  even  though  a  page  usually  contains  other  words  that  we  could  also  read. 
Selectivity  is  closely  related  to  the  principle  of  capacity  limitation,  which  refers  to 
the  notion  that  attention  is  a  finite  resource  that  can  only  be  devoted  to  a  subset  of 
the  total  sensory  input.  Consequently,  selectivity  and  capacity  limitation  are  often 
portrayed  as  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  whereby  selectivity  prioritizes  limited 
attentional  resources  to  enhance  the  processing  of  important  stimuli. 
A  long-standing  issue  within  the  attention  domain  has  been  the  locus  of  selectivity. 
Early  selection  theorists  suggest  that  some  basic  physical  attributes  of  all  sensory 
inputs  are  analyzed  independent  of  their  attentional  status  at  an  early  processing 
stage,  but  only  attended  stimuli  are  processed  to  identification  and  beyond  (e.  g. 
Broadbent,  1958).  Late  selection  theorists,  on  the  other  hand,  propose  that 
8 selective  processing  only  begins  after  the  analysis  of  all  stimuli  is  completed. 
Thus,  the  identity  of  attended  and  unattended  stimuli  is  computed  alike  in  a 
capacity-unlimited  analysis  and  selection  only  occurs  after  full  perception  to  gain 
access  to  systems  required  for  awareness,  memory,  and  response  (e.  g.  Deutsch  & 
Deutsch,  1963;  Duncan,  1980;  Norman,  1968).  The  issue  of  early  versus  late 
selection  is  therefore  a  debate  about  the  extent  to  which  unattended  stimuli  are 
processed. 
In  the  visual  domain,  attention  researchers  have  employed  many  variations  of  a 
rather  modest  number  of  tasks  to  investigate  the  locus  of  selection,  such  as 
response-competition  and  distractor-priming  tasks.  In  response-competition, 
subjects  are  typically  instructed  to  make  two-alternative  speeded  responses  to  a 
target  item  while  ignoring  distractor  items  in  the  display.  Distractor  processing  can 
then  be  assessed  via  their  congruency  on  target  response  times  (RTs).  To  the 
extent  that  the  distractors  are  processed,  RTs  are  slowed  when  the  distractors  and 
the  target  belong  to  opposite  response  categories  (the  incongruent  condition) 
relative  to  when  distractors  belong  to  the  same  response  category  as  the  target  (the 
congruent  condition).  Using  this  type  of  paradigm,  Eriksen  &  Eriksen  (1974) 
asked  subjects  to  classify  a  central  letter  while  ignoring  flanking  letter  distractors. 
Each  response  category  consisted  of  two  letters  (e.  g.  A  and  U  to  be  responded  to 
with  one  hand,  and  M&K  with  the  other  hand),  and  the  distractors  could  belong 
to  the  same  or  the  opposite  response  category  (e.  g.  AAUAA  or  MMUMM).  They 
found  that  the  distractor  letters  influenced  target  responses,  with  slower 
classification  times  in  the  incongruent  condition.  This  is  consistent  with  the  central 
claim  of  late  selection  that  attended  and  unattended  stimuli  are  processed  to 
identification  (see  also  e.  g.  Logan,  1980;  Eriksen  &  Schultz,  1979;  Miller,  1987). 
9 However,  Eriksen  &  Hoffman  (1972,1973)  also  obtained  results  with  a  response- 
competition  task  that  are  difficult  to  integrate  into  strict  late  selection  accounts. 
They  presented  circular  displays  subtending  2°  of  visual  angle  in  diameter  and 
containing  12  letters,  one  of  which  was  marked  as  a  target  by  a  short  arrow-cue. 
As  in  Eriksen  &  Eriksen's  (1974)  study,  target  RTs  were  slowed  on  incongruent 
relative  to  congruent  trials,  but  these  congruency  effects  were  eliminated  when  the 
distractors  appeared  more  than  1°  from  the  target.  In  a  similar  way,  Yantis  & 
Johnston  (1990)  found  that  letter  distractors  only  produced  interference  when  they 
were  presented  next  to  the  target  or  separated  by  one  response-neutral  item,  but  not 
for  more  remote  distances. 
In  another  twist  of  the  selection  debate,  Tipper  and  associates  first  produced 
another  measure  for  the  processing  of  unattended  visual  stimuli  and  showed  later 
that  distractors  can  still  be  processed  in  the  absence  of  response-competition  with  a 
target.  Tipper  (1985)  presented  subjects  with  superimposed,  different-coloured  line 
drawings  of  two  objects  and  asked  them  to  name  the  object  in  a  specified  colour, 
but  to  ignore  the  other.  Importantly,  the  relationship  between  ignored  and  attended 
objects  was  manipulated,  so  that  the  ignored  object  on  one  trial  was  occasionally 
presented  as  the  target  object  on  a  subsequent  trial.  In  these  instances,  Tipper 
(1985)  obtained  slower  target  naming  times  (a  phenomenon  that  Tipper  termed 
`negative  priming'),  even  though  subjects  were  incapable  of  reporting  the  identity 
of  the  unattended  stimuli.  Moreover,  this  effect  occurred  between  letters  of  the 
same  identity  but  a  different  shape  (Tipper  &  Cranston,  1985)  and  pictures  and 
names  of  objects  sharing  a  semantic  category  (e.  g.  CAT-DOG,  Tipper,  1985; 
Tipper  &  Driver,  1988),  showing  that  the  unattended  stimuli  were  subject  to 
considerable  processing. 
10 Subsequently,  Driver  &  Tipper  (1989)  examined  whether  distractors  give  rise  to 
negative  priming  even  when  they  do  not  interfere  with  target  classification. 
Subjects  were  asked  to  count  the  number  of  red  items  in  a  display,  while  ignoring 
black  distractor  digits  that  could  be  congruent  or  incongruent  with  the  correct 
counting  response.  The  black  digits  did  not  appear  to  interfere  with  task-relevant 
processing.  However,  when  this  was  followed  by  an  interference  display  in  which 
the  red  target  items  were  congruent  with  the  numerical  value  of  the  preceding 
distractors,  negative  priming  was  found.  It  appears  then  that  even  non-interfering 
distractors  can  be  processed  to  identification. 
Nevertheless,  some  researchers  urge  caution  in  interpreting  negative  priming  as  an 
unequivocal  measure  of  late  selection  (Lavie  &  Tsal,  1994).  One  possibility,  for 
example,  is  that  the  distractor  may  only  be  subject  to  `raw'  processing  on  trial  n, 
but  may  then  be  fully  primed  by  the  related  target  on  trial  n  +1.  It  is  also  uncertain 
what  negative  priming  theorists  would  predict  in  situations  in  which  only  a 
proportion  of  distractor  stimuli  produce  interference  (e.  g.  Eriksen  &  Hoffman, 
1972,1973;  Yantis  &  Johnston,  1990).  Indeed,  Driver  (2001)  argues  that  a 
position  that  is  often  overlooked  in  this  debate  is  that  many  effects  do  not  fit  into 
strict  early  or  late  selection  accounts,  but  may  be  driven  by  only  partial  processing 
along  a  continuum  between  early  and  late  selection. 
1.2.2  PERCEPTUAL  LOAD 
Lavie  (1995)  offered  an  explanation  of  how  early  and  late  selection  theories  might 
combine  along  a  continuum.  According  to  her  perceptual  load  theory  of  selective 
attention,  the  most  important  determinant  whether  stimuli  within  the  visual  field 
11 are  processed  is  the  perceptual  load  of  attended  and  unattended  items.  A  major 
assumption  of  this  theory  is  that  processing  resources  cannot  be  voluntarily 
withheld,  but  that  visual  analysis  of  relevant  and  irrelevant  stimuli  proceeds 
automatically  until  available  capacity  is  exhausted.  Consequently,  to-be-ignored 
distractor  stimuli  are  only  excluded  from  analysis  when  the  perceptual  load  of  the 
relevant  task  requires  all  available  capacity.  If  relevant  stimuli  do  not  exhaust  this 
capacity,  excess  processing  resources  automatically  spill  over  to  irrelevant  stimuli, 
thus  enabling  their  processing. 
In  a  review  of  past  findings,  Lavie  &  Tsal  (1994)  integrate  a  wealth  of  existing 
data  in  support  of  a  perceptual  load  account,  and  since  then  considerable  evidence 
has  also  been  accumulated  (Lavie,  1995,2000,2001;  Lavie  &  Cox,  1997;  Lavie  & 
Fox,  2000;  Rees,  Frith  &  Lavie,  1997).  For  example,  Lavie  (1995)  showed 
subjects  displays  consisting  of  one  of  two  possible  target  letters  and  an  additional 
task-irrelevant  distractor  letter,  which  could  be  congruent  (i.  e.  the  same  letter  as 
the  displayed  target)  or  incongruent  (the  same  letter  as  the  alternative  target)  with 
the  target  response.  Perceptual  load  was  manipulated  by  presenting  only  the  target 
and  distractor  (the  low  load  condition),  or  by  embedding  the  target  in  a  horizontal 
string  of  response  neutral  letters  (the  high  load  condition).  Lavie  (1995)  predicted 
that  distractor  interference  would  depend  on  task-relevant  load,  so  that  it  would  be 
reduced  in  the  high-load  compared  to  the  low  load  condition.  This  was  confirmed 
by  the  results,  which  showed  that  distractor  congruency  effects  were  only  found 
under  low  load. 
12 1.2.3  FEATURE  INTEGRATION 
Although  Lavie's  perceptual  load  theory  suggests  a  continuum  between  early  and 
late  selection,  it  also  implies  that  perception  occurs  in  an  all-or-nothing  manner 
such  that  task-irrelevant  distractor  stimuli  either  are  or  are  not  processed.  In 
contrast,  Treisman's  feature  integration  theory  (FIT)  suggests  that  task-irrelevant 
stimuli  always  undergo  some  processing  even  if  they  are  not  identified  by  the 
perceptual  system  (e.  g.  Treisman,  1988,1993;  Treisman  &  Gelade,  1980; 
Treisman  &  Schmidt,  1982).  According  to  FIT,  different  stimulus  attributes,  such 
as  colour,  size,  or  orientation  are  registered  separately  by  the  perceptual  system 
without  any  attentional  effort,  but  are  integrated  into  multidimensional  percepts  by 
visual  attention.  Attention  is  thus  portrayed  as  a  type  of  glue  that  binds  different 
features  together. 
One  source  of  support  for  FIT  comes  from  visual  search  tasks,  in  which  subjects 
are  required  to  detect  a  target  in  an  array  of  distractor  items.  Target  search  times 
are  seemingly  unaffected  by  increasing  the  number  of  distractors  in  a  display, 
provided  that  all  distractors  are  identical  and  differ  from  the  target  in  terms  of  a 
single  dimension  such  as  shape  or  colour  (e.  g.  Smith,  1962;  Treisman  &  Gelade, 
1982).  This  pattern  of  results  is  often  referred  to  as  perceptual  `pop-out'  and  is 
interpreted  as  capacity-free  parallel  search.  However,  search  times  generally 
increase  with  display  size  when  targets  and  distractors  consist  of  feature 
conjunctions,  such  as  colour  and  shape  (e.  g.  Heathcote  &  Mewhort,  1993; 
Treisman  &  Gelade,  1980),  a  serial  search  pattern  that  implies  that  target  and 
distractor  processing  requires  focused  attention.  Thus  it  seems  that  feature 
integration,  unlike  feature  perception,  is  attentionally  demanding. 
13 This  interpretation  has  not  gone  unchallenged  as  visual  search  for  conjunction 
targets  seems  relatively  easy  when  the  distractors  can  be  grouped  into  a  common 
shape  (e.  g.  Duncan  &  Humphreys,  1989;  Humphreys,  Quinlan  &  Riddoch,  1989; 
Wolfe,  1994).  One  can  also  question  the  extent  to  which  feature  search  proceeds 
without  attention  as  subjects  are  always  looking  deliberately  at  search  displays  to 
locate  the  target.  However,  FIT  also  receives  support  from  reports  that  conjunction 
information  appears  sometimes  unavailable  in  unattended  stimuli.  For  example, 
Lavie  (1997)  showed  that  response-competition  effects  with  a  colour-shape 
conjunction  target  (e.  g.  a  purple  cross)  are  equivalent  for  conjunctive  distractors, 
in  which  critical  colour  and  shape  information  is  combined  within  one  of  two 
distractors  (e.  g.  a  purple  cross  and  a  blue  triangle,  where  `blue'  and  `triangle'  are 
response-neutral  features),  and  disjunctive  distractors  (e.  g.  a  purple  triangle  and  a 
blue  cross).  In  accordance  with  FIT,  this  suggests  that  correct  conjunction 
information  was  unavailable  under  conditions  of  inattention.  In  addition,  FIT 
receives  some  support  from  neuropsychological  patients  who  can  describe  the 
colours  and  shapes  of  objects  quite  accurately,  but  have  difficulty  in  reporting  their 
correct  conjunctions  (Friedman-Hill,  Robertson  &  Treisman,  1995;  Humphreys, 
Cinel,  Wolfe,  Olson  &  Klempen,  2000). 
1.2.4  ATTENTION  BIASES 
The  feature  integration  theory  and  the  perceptual  load  theory  meet  on  the  principle 
that  the  allocation  of  attention  is  vital  for  full  perception.  A  crucial  question  then 
concerns  the  extent  to  which  this  allocation  can  be  controlled  by  an  observer.  What 
we  see  often  depends  on  where  we  choose  to  attend  in  our  environment,  such  as  a 
task-relevant  target  in  an  experiment.  Selection  of  the  focus  of  attention  can  thus 
undoubtedly  occur  in  a  voluntary,  goal-directed  manner,  even  if  spare  attentional 
14 capacity  may  inevitably  spill  over  to  other  task-irrelevant  stimuli  (e.  g.  Lavie,  1995, 
2000). 
Focused  attention  may  also  be  driven  in  an  involuntary  manner  so  that  stimuli 
receive  priority  even  when  they  oppose  an  observer's  intentions.  For  example, 
Posner,  Snyder  &  Davidson  (1980)  showed  that  responses  to  a  peripheral  target 
could  be  cued  by  an  immediately  preceding  illumination  in  one  of  the  possible 
target  locations,  resulting  in  faster  responses  to  validly  compared  to  invalidly  cued 
targets.  Intriguingly,  these  effects  were  observed  even  when  the  cues  were  only 
valid  on  a  minor  proportion  of  all  trials,  so  that  it  would  have  been  advantageous 
to  ignore  them  as  most  of  the  time  they  would  have  been  misleading.  This  suggests 
that  the  cues  captured  attention  in  an  involuntary  bottom-up  manner,  independent 
of  the  subjects'  intentions. 
In  addition  to  abrupt  visual  onsets  (e.  g.  Posner  et  al,  1980;  Jonides,  1981; 
Remington,  Johnston  &  Yantis,  1992),  attentional  capture  is  also  invoked  by  the 
salience  of  a  stimulus.  Thus,  visual  search  for  a  uniquely  shaped  target  is  slowed  if 
one  of  the  distractors  is  printed  in  a  salient  colour,  for  example  a  red  item  in  an 
otherwise  green  array.  Similarly,  search  for  a  colour  target  is  disrupted  by  the 
presence  of  a  differently  shaped  distractor  (e.  g.  Theeuwes,  1991,1992,1994). 
Consequently,  bottom-up  capture  is  held  to  operate  on  early  visual  processing, 
most  probably  at  the  level  of  feature  perception  in  Treisman's  feature  integration 
theory  (Styles,  1997).  However,  although  impossible  to  eliminate,  capture  effects 
are  reduced  when  observers  are  aware  of  the  exact  target  shape  and  distractor 
colour  prior  to  the  experiment  (e.  g.  Theeuwes,  de  Vries  &  Godijn,  2003).  This 
15 indicates  that  there  are  also  top-down  processes  that  determine  the  extent  to  which 
attention  may  be  retained  by  a  distractor  stimulus. 
Comparable  attentional  effects  have  also  been  observed  with  more  meaningful 
stimuli  than  with  colours  and  simple  shapes.  Wolford  &  Morrison  (1980)  showed 
that  responses  regarding  the  parity  of  two  peripheral  digits  (e.  g.  both  odd  or  even 
versus  one  of  each)  were  slowed  more  when  a  subject's  own  name  was  presented 
as  a  distractor  than  by  control  words.  Shapiro,  Caldwell  &  Sorensen  (1997)  also 
found  that  own  names  are  detected  more  often  in  a  rapid  stream  of  visual  stimuli 
than  words  that  are  of  no  particular  significance  to  an  observer.  In  addition,  Mack 
&  Rock  (1998)  report  that  visual  search  times  for  own  names  in  1,6,  or  12  word 
displays  do  not  increase  with  display  size.  In  contrast,  search  slopes  for  control 
names  increased  at  an  average  rate  of  51  ms/item.  Moreover,  these  search  slopes 
rose  to  81  ms/item  when  subjects'  own  names  rather  than  words  were  used  as 
distractors.  Thus,  these  studies  show  that  task  performance  is  facilitated  when  own 
names  are  used  as  visual  targets  and  impaired  when  they  are  presented  as 
distractors,  indicating  that  attention  is  drawn  to  this  stimulus  class. 
Note  that  some  reports  also  challenge  this  interpretation.  For  example,  Bundesen, 
Kyllingsbaek,  Houmann  &  Jensen  (1997)  found  that  own  names  are  no  more 
potent  as  distractors  during  a  matching  task  than  other  names,  but  are  reported 
more  accurately,  which  implies  that  names  might  not  capture  attention  but  are 
simply  more  recognizable.  This  receives  support  from  claims  that  own  names  are 
reported  more  quickly  in  visual  search  than  other  targets  but  not  in  the  capacity- 
free  fashion  reported  by  Mack  &  Rock  (1998),  and  are  not  particular  potent 
distractors  (Harris,  Pashler  &  Coburn,  2004;  Harris  &  Pashler,  2004).  Nonetheless, 
16 attentional  biases  have  also  been  observed  with  negatively  charged  emotional 
words,  particularly  in  anxiety-prone  individuals  (e.  g.  Broadbent  &  Broadbent, 
1988;  MacLeod,  Mathews  &  Tata,  1986;  Williams,  Mathews  &  MacLeod,  1996). 
For  example,  MacLeod  et  al  (1986)  found  that  anxious  individuals  detect  a  dot 
probe  faster  when  its  location  is  validly  cued  by  an  emotionally  threatening  word 
(e.  g.  PANIC)  than  a  non-emotional  word  (e.  g.  FLUTE).  Since  these  studies 
employed  a  variety  of  emotionally  charged  and  neutral  words,  it  is  improbable  that 
these  biases  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  recognizability.  Indeed,  similar  biases 
have  also  been  observed  for  substance-related  cues  such  as  cigarettes  and  bottles 
of  alcohol  in  smokers  and  heavy  drinkers  (e.  g.  Jones,  Jones,  Smith  &  Copley, 
2003;  Waters,  Shiffman,  Bradley  &  Mogg,  2003),  which  are  items  that  are 
generally  effortlessly  recognizable.  This  suggests  that  attentional  capture  does  not 
depend  on  recognizability  but  on  the  meaning  that  particular  stimuli  hold  for  an 
individual. 
A  number  of  studies  suggest  that  some  meaningful  stimuli  are  also  effective  at 
retaining  attention,  particularly  in  anxious  individuals.  For  example,  Amir,  Elias, 
Klump  &  Przeworski  (2003)  used  threatening  or  neutral  words  to  cue  the  locations 
in  which  a  target  could  appear.  Subjects  were  generally  slower  to  respond  to 
invalidly  cued  than  validly  cued  targets.  However,  subjects  with  social  phobia 
showed  significantly  slower  response  latencies  on  invalid  trials  than 
psychologically  normal  participants,  but  only  when  threatening  cues  were  used. 
Others  have  shown  similar  biases  for  threatening  words  in  state-anxious 
individuals  (e.  g.  Fox,  Russo,  Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001)  and  for  threatening  pictures 
in  trait-anxious  subjects  (Yiend  &  Mathews,  2001),  which  implies  that  these 
groups  have  difficulty  in  disengaging  attention  from  threatening  material. 
17 Attentional  capture  and  disengagement  effects  by  meaningful  stimuli  are  evidently 
dependent  on  stimulus  identification  and  must  therefore  build  on  earlier  selection 
processes  such  as  feature  integration  and  perceptual  load.  Moreover,  these 
attention  biases  are  clearly  different  from  distractor  interference  in  response- 
competition  tasks  (e.  g.  Eriksen  &  Eriksen,  1974;  Eriksen  &  Hoffman,  1972,1973), 
as  they  do  not  depend  on  target-distractor  congruency.  This  suggests  that  they  are 
not  located  at  the  level  at  which  task-relevant  responses  are  activated,  but  reflect  a 
stimulus's  ability  to  control  action  regardless  of  task  demands.  The  next  question 
is  how  mechanisms  such  as  feature  integration,  capacity  limitation  and  attention 
biases  relate  to  face  processing.  Moving  from  early  to  late  visual  processing,  I 
begin  with  the  role  of  attention  in  holistic  face  encoding. 
1.3  The  role  of  attention  in  holistic  face  encoding 
1.3.1  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  HOLISTIC  INFORMATION 
Although  faces  are  often  described  in  terms  of  the  features  for  which  we  have 
particular  lexical  values  (e.  g.  eye,  nose,  mouth),  considerable  evidence  suggests 
that  faces  are  processed  in  a  holistic  fashion  that  is  dependent  on  the  spatial 
configuration  of  these  features,  rather  than  the  features  themselves.  Thus,  Harmon 
(1973)  showed  that  configural  information  is  sufficient  for  person  recognition 
when  high-frequency  information  from  individual  features  is  disrupted  with  a 
blurring  technique.  Others  have  shown  that  face  parts  are  recognized  more 
accurately  in  the  context  of  a  studied  face  than  when  they  are  presented  in 
isolation,  a  whole-to-part  advantage  that  suggests  that  faces  are  not  encoded  as 
individual  features  (Tanaka  &  Farah,  1993).  Face  recognition  is  also  impaired  by 
manipulations  of  configural  information,  such  as  stimulus  inversion  (e.  g.  Carey  & 
18 Diamond,  1977;  Diamond  &  Carey,  1986;  Valentine  &  Bruce,  1986,  Yin,  1969) 
and  changes  in  the  internal  spacing  of  facial  features  (e.  g.  Haig,  1984;  Tanaka  & 
Sengco,  1997).  In  addition,  Young,  Hellawell  &  Hay  (1987)  found  that  subjects 
experienced  great  difficulty  in  naming  either  the  top  half  of  one  face  or  the  bottom 
half  of  another,  when  both  halves  were  closely  aligned  to  form  a  `chimeric'  face 
composite.  This  composite  effect  has  been  attributed  to  interference  from  the  novel 
configuration  of  the  aligned  halves,  which  does  not  match  the  configural 
information  of  either  of  the  original  faces. 
Several  researchers  have  also  made  the  stronger  claim  that  face  processing  is  more 
dependent  on  holistic  processing  than  other  stimulus  categories  (e.  g.  Carey  & 
Diamond,  1977;  Diamond  &  Carey,  1986;  Scapinello  &  Yarmey,  1970;  Tanaka  & 
Farah,  1993;  Valentine  &  Bruce,  1986;  Yarmey,  1971;  Yin,  1969,1970).  For 
example,  Yin  (1969,1970)  found  that  the  recognition  of  airplanes,  houses,  stick 
figures,  bridges  and  costumes  is  less  affected  by  inversion  than  the  recognition  of 
faces.  Furthermore,  Tanaka  &  Farah  (1993)  and  Tanaka  &  Sengco  (1997)  showed 
that  inverted  faces  and  houses  are  recognized  equally  well  as  whole  items  as  from 
isolated  parts,  a  result  that  contrasts  the  whole-to-part  recognition  advantage  for 
faces  (although  a  whole-to-part  advantage  has  been  reported  for  some  artificially 
generated  objects,  e.  g.  Gauthier  &  Tarr,  1997;  Gauthier,  Williams,  Tarr  &  Tanaka, 
1998). 
Some  researchers  also  argue  for  the  existence  of  face-specific  neural  mechanisms 
that  are  responsible  for  the  holistic  processing  of  upright  faces.  These  are  held  to 
operate  to  some  extent  independently  of  a  general-purpose  object  recognition 
system,  which  processes  inverted  faces  and  nonface  objects.  Although  this  issue 
19 remains  controversial  (see  e.  g.  Kanwisher,  2000;  Gauthier  &  Logothetis,  2000), 
evidence  for  such  a  division  has  accrued  from  brain-imaging  studies  of  normal 
subjects  (e.  g.  Haxby,  Hoffman  &  Gobbini,  2000;  Haxby  et  al,  1999;  Kanwisher, 
McDermott  &  Chun,  1997),  neuropsychological  patients  with  selectively  impaired 
face  processing  abilities  (e.  g.  Farah,  Levinson  &  Klein,  1995;  Farah,  Wilson, 
Drain  &  Tanaka,  1995;  McNeill  &  Warrington,  1993;  Sergent  &  Signoret,  1992a) 
or  selectively  impaired  object  processing  abilities  (e.  g.  Humphreys  &  Rumiati, 
1998;  Moscovitch,  Winocur  &  Behrmann,  1997;  Rumiati  &  Humphreys,  1997), 
and  reports  that  newborn  infants  prefer  intact  face  stimuli  to  scrambled  faces  and 
nonface  objects  (e.  g.  Johnson,  Dziurawiec,  Ellis  &  Morton,  1991;  Morton  & 
Johnson,  1991). 
1.3.2  HOW  DOES  ATTENTION  RELATE  TO  HOLISTIC  FACE  PROCESSING? 
The  importance  of  holistic  information  for  face  processing  has  led  researchers  to 
investigate  whether  facial  features  are  coded  into  holistic  representations  by 
focused  visual  attention,  an  approach  that  originates  from  Treisman's  feature 
integration  theory.  In  the  first  of  these  studies,  Reinitz,  Morrissey  &  Demb  (1994) 
asked  subjects  to  study  line-drawn  faces  under  full  attention  or  in  a  divided- 
attention  condition,  in  which  they  were  required  to  count  a  rapid  sequence  of  dots 
that  were  alternating  between  the  top  and  bottom  half  of  each  face.  Counting  the 
dots  affected  the  ability  to  remember  the  study  faces  at  a  subsequent  test  phase  so 
that  participants  classified  the  original  faces  and  conjunction  faces,  which  were 
constructed  by  combining  an  eye-nose  set  from  one  studied  face  with  a  mouth-hair 
set  from  another  studied  face,  as  old  equally  often.  Moreover,  the  faces  in  both 
these  conditions  were  classified  as  old  more  frequently  than  completely  new  faces 
and  conjunction  stimuli  made  from  an  old  and  a  new  face.  This  led  Reinitz  et  al 
20 (1994)  to  conclude  that  faces  require  attention  for  the  holistic  encoding  of  their 
constituent  features. 
However,  the  results  of  a  subsequent  study  are  inconsistent  with  these  conclusions. 
Reinitz,  Bartlett  &  Searcy  (1997)  employed  the  same  full  and  divided  attention 
conditions  as  Reinitz  et  al  (1994),  but  presented  participants  with  a  same/different 
test  immediately  after  viewing  each  study  face.  At  test  participants  could  be  shown 
a  featurally  altered  face  in  which  one  feature  (e.  g.  nose,  mouth  or  eyes)  was 
replaced  by  a  different  exemplar  of  the  same  type,  or  a  configurally  altered  face  in 
which  eye-mouth  distance  was  manipulated,  or  an  identical  face.  In  contrast  to 
Reinitz  et  al  (1994),  this  paradigm  produced  a  greater  deficit  for  featurally  altered 
faces  than  configurally  altered  faces  under  divided  attention,  suggesting  that 
holistic  processing  was  now  actually  less  attentionally  demanding  than  feature 
perception. 
While  Reinitz  et  al  (1997)  argue  that  attention  may  affect  face  encoding  differently 
in  memory  and  perception,  there  might  be  other  reasons  for  these  contradictory 
results.  First,  Reinitz  et  al  (1997)  used  images  of  real  colour  faces  while  the  earlier 
study  employed  line-drawn  stimuli.  However,  although  the  processing  of  real  face 
stimuli  is  particularly  dependent  on  configuration,  this  type  of  information  appears 
less  important  for  the  processing  of  artificial  face  stimuli  (Leder,  1996).  Second,  it 
has  been  questioned  whether  it  is  reasonably  possible  to  manipulate  featural  and 
configural  information  independently  (e.  g.  Bruce,  1988;  Rhodes,  Brake  & 
Atkinson,  1993),  as  replacing  one  feature  with  another  exemplar  will  inevitably 
produce  a  concurrent  change  to  a  face's  configuration.  This  problem  may  be 
compounded  by  the  use  of  different  feature-configuration  manipulations  in  these 
21 studies.  Lastly,  the  dot-counting  task  of  the  divided  attention  conditions  may  have 
affected  face  encoding  by  forcing  subjects  to  alternate  between  the  top  and  bottom 
halves  of  the  study  faces.  This  could  potentially  disrupt  holistic  encoding  or 
feature  perception  or  even  both,  by  directing  attention  away  from  relevant  face 
information. 
More  recently,  Boutet,  Gentes-Hawn  &  Chaudhuri  (2002)  re-examined  the  role  of 
attention  in  holistic  face  encoding  with  a  variation  of  the  composite  effect  (see 
Young  et  al,  1987).  In  one  experiment,  stimuli  were  composed  of  a  face 
superimposed  on  a  house  and  subjects  were  asked  to  focus  on  just  one  of  these 
images  during  encoding  to  manipulate  attention  towards  or  away  from  the  face.  In 
another  experiment  with  an  analogous  attention  manipulation,  a  stream  of  letters 
was  continuously  scrolled  across  a  face  and  subjects  were  asked  to  decipher  any 
words  within  this  stream  or  ignore  the  letters  altogether.  Face  encoding  during 
these  tasks  was  then  assessed  with  stimuli  constructed  from  the  top  and  bottom 
halves  of  either  two  attended  faces,  two  unattended  faces,  or  two  new  faces.  These 
halves  could  be  closely  aligned  to  produce  a  composite  face  with  a  novel 
configuration  or  misaligned  to  disrupt  configuration.  If  only  the  facial  features 
were  encoded  under  divided  attention,  then  recognition  of  the  face  halves  should 
have  been  unaffected  by  the  configuration  of  the  aligned  composites.  However, 
although  Boutet  et  al  (2002)  found  that  attended  face  composites  were  recognized 
more  accurately  than  unattended  composites,  misaligned  stimuli  produced  better 
recognition  performance  than  aligned  composites  regardless  of  condition.  This 
indicates  that  dividing  attention  interfered  with  the  degree  to  which  the  study  faces 
could  be  remembered  but  did  not  disrupt  holistic  face  encoding. 
22 However,  this  evidence  is  not  entirely  persuasive  as  several  studies  demonstrate  a 
disproportionate  effect  of  inversion  for  faces  in  comparison  with  photographs  of 
houses  (Scapinello  &  Yarmey,  1970;  Valentine  &  Bruce,  1986;  Yarmey,  1971; 
Yin,  1969).  Unlike  faces,  houses  are  also  recognized  equally  well  from  individual 
parts  as  from  whole  items  (Tanaka  &  Farah,  1993;  Tanaka  &  Sengco,  1997).  In 
other  words,  it  appears  that  houses  do  not  draw  on  the  same  (holistic)  resources  as 
faces.  Task-irrelevant  face  processing  also  appears  unaffected  by  task-relevant 
word  processing  (e.  g.  Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis,  2002;  Lavie,  Ro  &  Russell,  2003; 
Young,  Ellis,  Flude,  McWeeney  &  Hay,  1986).  This  opens  the  possibility  that 
Boutet  et  al  (2002)  failed  to  manipulate  relevant  processing  capacity  away  from 
the  study  faces  as  a  consequence  of  the  stimulus  set  used. 
This  notion  receives  support  from  another  study  that  investigated  holistic  face 
encoding.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002)  asked  participants  to  study  a  central  face 
under  full  attention,  or  to  match  two  upright  or  two  inverted  flanker  faces  while 
studying  the  central  target  in  a  divided  attention  condition.  A  speeded  two-choice 
recognition  test  followed  at  the  end  of  each  trial,  consisting  of  two  intact  faces,  the 
target  and  a  foil  face  that  differed  from  the  target  by  one  feature  (e.  g.  a  pair  of 
eyes),  or  two  isolated  exemplars  of  a  particular  feature,  one  of  which  was  extracted 
from  the  target.  The  results  showed  a  whole-to-part  recognition  advantage  for  face 
targets  under  full  attention,  indicating  that  the  targets  were  encoded  holistically. 
Intriguingly,  matching  upright  flanker  faces  eliminated  this  advantage  but 
matching  inverted  flankers  did  not,  even  though  the  latter  was  more  time- 
consuming.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002)  concluded  that  attention  is  important  for 
encoding  facial  configuration,  but  that  there  might  be  two  distinct  processing 
systems  (for  similar  claims  see  e.  g.  Farah  et  al,  1995;  Moscovitch  et  al,  1997) 
23 perhaps  even  with  their  own  dedicated  attentional  capacities.  The  first  reflects  an 
object  recognition  system  dedicated  to  processing  individual  facial  features  but 
also  inverted  faces  and  nonface  objects.  The  other  system  is  used  for  holistic  face 
processing.  Matching  the  inverted  faces  thus  left  sufficient  capacity  for  the  holistic 
encoding  of  the  central  face  target  because  they  did  not  consume  any  holistic 
resources. 
1.3.3  OTHER  TYPES  OF  FACIAL  INFORMATION 
One  aspect  that  is  consistently  ignored  by  the  studies  reviewed  in  the  previous 
section  is  that  faces  convey  much  more  information  than  just  identity,  such  as  sex, 
emotional  expression  and  facial  speech.  Models  of  face  recognition  specify 
functionally  independent  processing  routes  for  these  types  of  information  (e.  g. 
Bruce  &  Young,  1986).  Thus  it  is  not  necessary,  for  example,  to  recognize 
someone  as  familiar  to  determine  his  or  her  sex  or  facial  expression.  In  support  of 
this  architecture,  there  is  now  evidence  for  dissociations  between  sex  and 
expression  (Le  Gal  &  Bruce,  2002),  sex  and  identity  (Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling  & 
Young,  1987;  Ellis,  Young  &  Flude,  1990),  sex  and  facial  speech  (Green,  Kuhl, 
Meltzoff  &  Stevens,  1991),  facial  speech  and  identity  (Campbell,  De  Gelder  &  De 
Haan,  1996;  Campbell,  Landis  &  Regard,  1986),  and  identity  and  expression  (e.  g. 
Campbell,  Brooks,  De  Haan  &  Roberts,  1996;  Humphreys,  Donnelly  &  Riddoch, 
1993;  Sergent,  Ohta,  MacDonald  &  Zuck,  1994).  Moreover,  Calder,  Young, 
Keane  &  Dean  (2000)  showed  that  face  stimuli  that  are  composed  of  two  different 
emotional  expressions,  such  as  the  top  section  of  an  angry  face  and  the  bottom 
section  of  a  happy  face,  are  subject  to  the  composite  effect  (see  Young  et  al,  1987). 
Thus,  subjects  were  slower  in  recognizing  the  separate  expressions  when  both 
sections  were  closely  aligned  than  when  they  were  misaligned.  An  analogous  but 
24 independent  effect  was  also  found  for  facial  identity  when  different  persons  posed 
for  these  expressions.  This  indicates  that  dissociable  types  of  facial  information  are 
coded  by  different  configural  processes. 
The  notion  that  identity  and  expression  are  functionally  independent  has  also  been 
the  subject  of  some  controversy.  Schweinberger  &  Soukup  (1998)  re-examined  the 
extent  to  which  these  dimensions  could  be  processed  independently,  by  selectively 
introducing  variations  in  one  dimension  during  the  classification  of  another.  They 
found  that  identity  decisions  were  not  influenced  by  variations  in  expression,  but 
that  expression  decisions  were  slowed  by  variations  in  identity.  Thus,  observers 
could  not  attend  selectively  to  expression  without  interference  from  identity 
information.  Schweinberger  &  Soukup  (1998)  were  unable  to  combine  these 
findings  with  existing  research  in  favour  of  a  bi-directional  processing 
independence  between  identity  and  expression  (e.  g.  Campbell  et  al,  1996; 
Humphreys  et  al,  1993;  Sergent  et  al,  1994).  Yet,  in  subsequent  research  they 
succeeded  in  producing  further  support  of  an  asymmetric  relationship 
(Schweinberger,  Burton  &  Kelly,  1999). 
On  the  whole  then,  there  is  evidence  that  different  types  of  facial  information  can 
be  extracted  independently  and  that  at  least  some  of  these  types,  such  as 
expression  and  identity,  may  also  be  coded  separately  in  faces.  Although  this  issue 
is  convoluted  by  recent  reports  of  an  asymmetric  dependency  between  identity  and 
expression,  the  notion  of  a  functional  independence  between  these  dimensions 
raises  an  intriguing  question.  If  attention  is  important  for  holistic  face  encoding, 
then  is  it  also  required  to  integrate  identity  and  expression  information  within  the 
same  face  percept  during  visual  processing? 
25 1.4  Capacity  limits  in  face  processing 
As  described  above,  there  is  good  evidence  that  (upright)  face  processing  is 
particularly  dependent  on  holistic  information  (e.  g.  Carey  &  Diamond,  1977, 
Tanaka  &  Farah,  1993;  Valentine  &  Bruce,  1986;  Yin,  1969),  and  that  processing 
upright  faces  but  not  inverted  faces  (Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002)  or  nonface  objects 
(Boutet  et  al,  2002)  disrupts  the  holistic  encoding  of  another  face.  One  implication 
of  these  results  is  that  face  processing  may  have  its  own  processing  limits.  There 
are  two  lines  in  support  of  this  premise.  The  first  line  suggests  that  people  may  be 
unable  to  ignore  a  solitary  face  distractor  during  the  classification  of  a  nonface 
target,  even  under  conditions  that  usually  extinguish  distractor  processing.  The 
second  line  hints  that  face  processing  may  be  subject  to  capacity  limits  in  multiple 
face  displays. 
Several  studies  have  shown  that  task-irrelevant  face  distractors  are  processed 
reliably  with  a  concurrently  presented  nonface  target.  Young,  Ellis,  Flude, 
McWeeney  &  Hay  (1986)  examined  interference  effects  with  displays  composed 
of  a  printed  famous  name  and  a  famous  face  in  a  response-competition  task. 
Participants  were  required  to  classify  the  names  as  pop-stars  or  politicians  while 
ignoring  the  face  distractor,  which  could  be  congruent  (e.  g.  Mick  Jagger's  name 
and  Mick  Jagger's  face)  or  incongruent  with  the  correct  response  (e.  g.  Neil 
Kinnock's  name  and  Mick  Jagger's  face).  They  found  reliable  distractor 
congruency  effects,  suggesting  that  subjects  could  not  prevent  semantic 
categorization  of  the  distractor  faces. 
Lavie,  Ro  &  Russell  (2003)  employed  a  variation  of  this  paradigm  to  examine  the 
effect  of  perceptual  load  on  distractor  processing.  The  subjects'  task  was  to 
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distractor.  In  addition,  task-relevant  load  was  manipulated  by  embedding  the  name 
targets  in  displays  of  one  (lowest  load  condition)  to  eight  letter  strings  (highest 
load  condition).  Response  times  increased  with  the  number  of  letter  strings, 
indicating  that  task-relevant  load  was  successfully  manipulated.  Remarkably 
though,  the  magnitude  of  face  interference  was  unaffected  by  variations  in  relevant 
load.  Furthermore,  interference  from  nonface  distractors  such  as  photographs  of 
fruits  and  musical  instruments  was  extinguished  with  increasing  task-relevant  load 
in  a  similar  task.  These  results  led  Lavie  et  al  (2003)  to  suggest  that  face 
processing  does  not  depend  on  any  general  capacity  limits. 
Comparable  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  another  study,  in  which  subjects  were 
presented  with  letter  strings  that  were  superimposed  on  photographs  of  famous 
face  distractors  under  different  load  conditions  (Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis,  2002). 
Under  low-load,  subjects  responded  to  the  colour  of  the  letter  string,  a  task  that 
poses  minimal  attentional  demands  (e.  g.  Treisman,  1993).  In  a  high  load  condition, 
on  the  other  hand,  subjects  were  required  to  identify  a  specific  letter  target  in  the 
string,  a  manipulation  that  has  previously  been  shown  to  eliminate  distractor 
processing  (e.  g.  Lavie,  1995).  Distractor  processing  was  then  assessed  with  a 
surprise  memory  test  for  the  names  of  the  famous  faces  (e.  g.  "was  Bill  Clinton 
presented?  ")  and  with  repetition  priming,  which  is  a  facilitation  in  identifying  an 
item  due  to  prior  exposure  to  that  item.  Although  explicit  face  memory  strongly 
deteriorated  under  high  load,  repetition  priming  was  equivalent  across  conditions. 
In  addition,  there  have  been  a  number  of  reports  of  prosopagnosic  patients  who, 
despite  being  explicitly  unable  to  recognize  familiar  faces,  nevertheless  show  the 
27 normal  pattern  of  face  interference  when  asked  to  make  semantic  classifications  of 
names  (e.  g.  de  Haan,  Young  &  Newcombe,  1987;  Sergent  &  Signoret,  1992b). 
Collectively,  these  findings  suggests  that  face  processing  is  very  robust  across 
different  manipulations,  and  even  under  conditions  that  should  make  this  difficult, 
as  long  as  only  a  single  face  is  presented  at  a  time.  However,  these  results  do  not 
imply  that  face  processing  is  capacity  free.  In  fact,  Lavie  et  al  (2003)  cautioned 
that  face  processing  might  be  subject  to  its  own  capacity  limits. 
One  source  of  evidence  for  face  processing  limits  comes  from  visual  search  tasks. 
These  studies  demonstrate  that  search  for  a  unique  face  target,  such  as  a  particular 
face  or  facial  expression,  among  inverted  or  scrambled  face  distractors  or  upright 
faces  with  non-target  expressions  generates  steep  search  slopes  with  increasing 
display  size  (e.  g.  Brown,  Huey  &  Findlay,  1997;  Kuehn  &  Jolicoeur,  1994; 
Nothdurft,  1993).  This  suggests  that  face  processing  limits  are  severe  enough  to 
require  sequential  identification  of  the  items  in  these  displays.  However,  what  is 
neglected  by  these  studies  is  that  the  number  of  stimuli  that  can  be  perceived 
simultaneously  also  depends  on  visual  acuity,  which  is  highest  in  the  centre  of  the 
retina  (the  fovea)  but  falls  off  rapidly  towards  the  periphery  (see  e.  g.  Anstis,  1974; 
Curcio  &  Allen,  1990).  Subjects  may  thus  have  to  foveate  across  different 
locations  in  visual  search  displays,  in  particular  when  large  set  sizes  reinforce 
small  individual  items  (as  in  Brown  et  al,  1997;  Kuehn  &  Jolicoeur,  1994; 
Nothdurft,  1993).  In  fact,  Näsänen  &  Ojanpää  (2004)  measured  eye  movements 
during  visual  search  with  faces,  and  found  that  only  two  to  four  faces  can  be 
processed  during  a  single  eye  fixation.  Serial  search  functions  for  multiple  face 
arrays  might  therefore  only  reflect  the  limits  of  visual  acuity. 
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unlikely  to  suffer  from  visual  acuity.  Observers  were  shown  stimuli  composed  of 
two  overlapping  faces,  one  rotated  45°  clockwise  and  the  other  45° 
counterclockwise,  and  had  to  indicate  whether  they  could  perceive  both  faces  as 
whole  and  visibly  independent  entities.  This  was  immediately  followed  by  a  test 
display  of  two  rows  of  four  faces,  with  each  row  containing  one  of  the  targets. 
When  upright  overlapping  faces  were  used,  only  one  of  the  faces  was  subsequently 
recognized.  Two  inverted  faces,  on  the  other  hand,  were  perceived  as  an 
ambiguous  combination  of  both.  These  results  are  logically  similar  to  Palermo  & 
Rhodes's  (2002)  findings,  reviewed  earlier,  that  only  matching  upright  but  not 
inverted  flanker  faces  impairs  the  (holistic)  processing  of  a  central  face  target.  As 
typical  face  processes  are  disrupted  by  inversion,  these  studies  hint  at  a  processing 
limit  for  upright  faces  that  is  independent  of  any  general  processing  limits. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Boutet  &  Chaudhuri  (2001)  used  a  hypothetical  situation 
that  our  face  processing  system  is  not  usually  confronted  with.  Palermo  &  Rhodes 
(2002),  on  the  other  hand,  presented  the  flanker  displays  for  substantial  durations 
of  Z  1.5  seconds  that  may  have  aided  serial  face  processing.  These  studies  may 
have  also  used  an  inappropriate  recognition  test  to  examine  face  processing,  as 
stimuli  may  still  undergo  considerable  processing  when  explicit  memory  is  poor 
(see  e.  g.  Tipper,  1985;  Tipper  &  Driver,  1988).  In  fact,  a  recent  priming  study 
indicates  that  distractor  faces  might  still  be  processed  during  a  face  matching  task. 
Khurana  (2000)  asked  participants  to  match  the  second  and  fourth  face  in  a  row  of 
five  faces  while  ignoring  the  three  remaining  distractor  faces.  When  the  distractors 
were  presented  as  targets  on  a  subsequent  trial,  negative  priming  was  found. 
However,  the  three  distractors  were  always  identical  and  subjects  were  presumably 
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two  targets,  a  situation  that  is  not  dissimilar  to  Palermo  &  Rhodes's  (2002)  task. 
Moreover,  targets  and  distractors  were  always  presented  until  a  response  was 
registered.  Under  those  conditions  the  faces  could  have  been  processed 
sequentially,  again  making  it  difficult  to  specify  any  exact  face  processing  limits. 
Jenkins,  Lavie  &  Driver  (2003)  also  examined  the  processing  of  multiple  face 
distractors,  but  under  better-controlled  conditions  than  Khurana  (2000).  Subjects 
categorized  the  printed  names  of  pop-stars  or  politicians  in  displays  that  were  only 
presented  for  200  ms  (i.  e.  too  briefly  to  permit  stimulus-responsive  saccades), 
while  ignoring  a  critical  famous  face  distractor  that  could  be  congruent  or 
incongruent  with  the  target  response.  An  additional  response-neutral  distractor 
(neither  pop-star  nor  politician)  of  an  upright  face,  a  phase-shifted  version,  an 
inverted  face,  or  a  meaningful  nonface  object  could  also  be  present  in  the  display. 
They  found  that  interference  from  the  critical  face  distractor  could  be  diluted  by  a 
response-neutral  face  distractor,  but  not  by  any  other  stimuli.  In  other  words,  the 
processing  of  a  distractor  face  seemed  to  be  reduced  by  competition  from  another 
face,  but  not  by  general  competition  from  different  classes  of  stimuli. 
Despite  the  recurrence  of  this  notion,  Jenkins  et  al  (2003)  also  obtained  some 
evidence  that  face  processing  does  not  proceed  entirely  independent  of  general 
processing  resources.  When  they  repeated  this  design  with  object  names  as  targets 
and  critical  object  distractors,  they  found  that  distractor  interference  could  be 
diluted  by  the  addition  of  any  visual  stimulus,  including  faces.  In  turn,  it  is  thus 
possible  that  face  distractors  processing  is  partly  determined  by  task-relevant 
30 nonface  load,  which  makes  it  also  difficult  to  make  a  direct  inference  about  face 
capacity  limits  from  this  study. 
In  summary,  there  is  good  evidence  that  faces  are  processed  reliably  alongside 
nonface  stimuli,  provided  that  only  a  single  face  is  presented  at  a  time  (e.  g.  Jenkins 
et  al,  2002;  Lavie  et  al,  2003;  Young  et  al,  1986),  suggesting  that  face  processing 
may  proceed  largely  independent  of  any  general  processing  limits.  There  is  also  a 
growing  body  of  research  hinting  that  face  processing  is  not  capacity-free,  but  may 
be  limited  in  multi-face  displays  (e.  g.  Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2001;  Palermo  & 
Rhodes,  2002;  Jenkins  et  al,  2003).  However,  none  of  these  studies  were  originally 
designed  to  examine  capacity  limits  in  face  processing  and  none  have  tested  such 
limits  directly.  Hence  it  is  difficult  to  specify  the  exact  nature  of  any  capacity 
limits  in  face  processing. 
1.5  Attention  biases  to  faces 
Another  question  of  current  interest  concerns  the  influence  that  faces  have  on  an 
observer's  focus  of  attention.  Evidence  from  visual  search  shows  that  particular 
faces  or  facial  expression  do  not  pop-out  of  crowded  face  arrays  (Brown  et  al, 
1997;  Kuehn  &  Jolicoeur,  1994;  Nothdurft,  1993).  This  suggests  that  faces  do  not 
capture  attention  in  multiple  face  displays.  However,  there  is  some  evidence  that 
faces  may  capture  attention  in  competition  with  other  classes  of  stimuli. 
Vuilleumier  (2000)  studied  neuropsychological  patients  with  unilateral  visual 
extinction  following  brain  damage  to  the  right  parietal  lobe.  This  deficit  is 
characterized  by  impaired  report  of  stimuli  in  the  contralesional  (left)  hemifield 
when  competing  stimuli  are  presented  on  the  ipsilesional  side,  although  neglect 
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alone.  Vuilleumier  (2000)  utilized  this  deficit  to  investigate  whether  face  stimuli 
are  less  affected  by  visual  neglect  in  comparison  with  other  stimuli.  He  found  that 
visual  extinction  was  reduced  for  left-sided  faces  in  comparison  with  meaningless 
shapes,  scrambled  faces  and  names  when  competing  stimuli  were  presented  in  the 
other  hemifield.  Consequently,  Vuilleumier  (2000)  suggested  that  faces  might 
possess  an  advantage  in  capturing  attention  and  overcoming  extinction. 
Mack,  Pappas,  Silverman  &  Gay  (2002)  also  provide  some  evidence  that  faces 
capture  attention.  They  presented  subjects  with  a  stream  of  visual  items  presented 
at  a  rate  of  75  ms/item.  Subjects  had  to  identify  a  line  drawing  of  any  of  five 
primary  targets  (heart,  bell,  fish,  apple,  teardrop)  within  this  stream  and  detect  the 
presence  of  a  closely  following  secondary  target  of  a  happy  face  icon,  an  inverted 
happy  face  icon,  or  a  tree  shape.  Under  these  conditions,  the  face  targets  were 
detected  approximately  90%  of  the  time  compared  to  the  inverted  faces  and  trees 
which  were  only  detected  on  between  40-70%  of  trials. 
Although  the  use  of  rather  artificial  face  stimuli  in  these  studies  offers  little  insight 
into  the  processing  of  real  faces,  which  are  visually  more  complex  and 
informative,  others  have  reported  a  similar  advantage  for  photographs  of  faces.  Ro, 
Russel  &  Lavie  (2001)  alternated  displays  that  were  composed  of  meaningful 
objects  (appliances,  clothes,  food,  musical  instruments,  and  plants)  and  a  solitary 
human  face  with  blank  screens,  so  that  the  stimulus  displays  appeared  to  flicker. 
During  these  alternations,  one  of  the  items  could  suddenly  change  into  another 
exemplar  from  the  same  category.  Results  indicated  that  changes  were  detected 
more  rapidly  and  accurately  in  faces  than  in  any  of  the  other  objects,  an  advantage 
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concluded  that  real  faces  also  have  a  special  capacity  for  drawing  attention. 
However,  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2003)  contested  this  interpretation,  instead 
reasoning  that  these  results  might  reflect  an  "odd-one-out"  advantage  as  Ro  et  al 
(2001)  only  ever  presented  one  face  among  a  range  of  nonface  objects.  In  support 
of  this  idea,  they  found  a  similar  change  detection  advantage  when  a  single 
nonface  object  was  embedded  among  several  face  stimuli.  Intriguingly  though, 
they  failed  to  replicate  Ro  et  al's  (2001)  original  findings  despite  using  the  same 
method  and  stimulus  set.  Nonetheless,  these  results  suggest  that  faces  behave 
similar  to  other  objects  in  a  change  detection  task.  Therefore,  despite  several 
attempts  to  demonstrate  attention  biases  to  faces,  there  is  no  compelling  evidence 
that  realistic  face  stimuli  capture  attention. 
Nonetheless,  there  is  also  some  mixed  evidence  that  the  ability  to  capture  attention 
might  depend  on  the  type  of  face  stimuli  used.  Eastwood,  Smilek  &  Merikle 
(2001)  found  shallower  search  slopes  for  a  sad  face  icon  among  neutral  face 
distractors  than  for  a  happy  face  icon.  They  concluded  that  emotion  information 
may  be  perceived  outside  the  focus  of  attention  and  can  be  used  to  guide  that  focus 
to  a  particular  face.  Angry  schematic  faces  are  also  detected  very  efficiently  in 
visual  search,  although  they  do  not  pop-out  (Fox,  Lester,  Russo,  Bowles,  Pichler  & 
Dutton,  2000).  In  addition,  it  has  been  shown  that  trait-anxious  subjects  respond 
faster  to  a  target  probe  when  its  location  is  correctly  cued  by  an  angry  face,  an 
effect  that  has  been  attributed  to  an  attentional  bias  towards  threatening  stimuli  in 
these  individuals  (e.  g.  Bradley,  Mogg,  Falla  &  Hamilton,  1998;  Mogg  &  Bradley, 
1999). 
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disengagement  of  attention  from  faces.  Eastwood,  Smilek  &  Merikle  (2003) 
showed  that  subjects  were  slower  to  count  upturned  and  downturned  arches  in  a 
display  when  these  were  embedded  in  faces  with  negative  as  opposed  to  positive 
expressions.  Other  studies  show  that  trait-anxious  or  trait-angry  individuals  also 
have  particular  difficulty  in  disengaging  attention  from  threatening  faces  (e.  g. 
Bradley  et  al,  1998;  Fox,  Russo,  Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001;  Fox,  Russo  &  Dutton, 
2002;  van  Honk,  Tuiten,  de  Haan,  van  den  Hout  &  Stam,  2001).  For  example,  Fox 
et  al  (2001)  found  that  responses  to  a  dot  probe  were  delayed  in  trait-anxious 
individuals  compared  to  normal  subjects,  but  only  when  a  threatening  face 
incorrectly  cued  the  probe  location.  In  contrast,  response  times  were  evenly 
matched  for  neutral  and  happy  face  cues.  Thus,  there  is  evidence  that  faces  may 
have  some  limited  ability  to  seize  attention,  depending  on  their  emotional 
connotation  and  probably  also  the  emotional  state  of  the  observer.  However, 
although  several  studies  report  similar  biases  with  threatening  words  and  pictures 
(e.  g.  Amir  et  al,  2003;  Fox  et  al,  2001;  Yiend  &  Mathews,  2001),  expressive  faces 
have  never  been  compared  directly  with  other  stimulus  classes  within  the  same 
experiment.  Hence  it  is  unresolved  whether  a  general  disengagement  bias  exists 
for  faces  compared  to  other  classes  of  stimuli,  independent  of  threat-related 
information  and  observers'  emotional  traits. 
1.6  Structure  of  this  thesis 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  investigate  the  relation  between  attention  and  face 
processing  across  different  selection  mechanisms.  The  first  experimental  chapter 
examined  whether  observers  can  selectively  respond  to  facial  expression  and 
identity,  by  measuring  the  effect  of  systematic  variations  in  one  of  these 
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Although  there  is  already  substantial  evidence  for  the  functional  independence  of 
these  types  of  facial  information,  this  idea  has  recently  been  challenged  in  a 
similar  task  (Schweinberger  et  al,  1999;  Schweinberger  &  Soukup,  1998).  This  is 
followed  by  an  attempt  to  determine  whether  attention  is  required  to  encode 
expression  and  identity  information  from  the  same  face  into  a  multi-dimensional 
visual  percept  (Experiment  3).  To  assess  this,  a  response-competition  task  was 
used  in  which  subjects  classified  face  targets  according  to  particular  identity- 
expression  conjunctions  while  ignoring  two  distractor  faces.  Response-critical 
identity  and  expression  information  was  either  combined  in  one  of  these 
distractors  (the  conjunctive  condition)  or  dispersed  across  both  (the  disjunctive 
condition).  Distractor  congruency  effects  on  target  response  times  were  then 
contrasted  for  these  conditions  to  determine  if  correct  conjunction  information  was 
available  under  inattention. 
A  response-competition  task  was  used  again  in  Chapter  3,  but  now  to  establish 
capacity  limits  in  face  processing.  This  was  done  by  comparing  interference  from 
face  and  nonface  distractors  during  the  classification  of  face  and  nonface  targets. 
The  first  experiment  used  speeded  sex  judgements  to  unfamiliar  faces  and  short 
names  (Experiment  4).  Subsequent  experiments  employed  semantic  judgements  to 
famous  faces  and  famous  names  (Experiment  5),  famous  faces  and  pictures  of 
national  flags  (Experiments  6&  7),  and  a  combination  of  both  (Experiment  8). 
The  purpose  of  Chapter  4  was  to  provide  a  stricter  test  for  face  processing  limits.  It 
has  been  shown  that  nonface  distractors  can  still  give  rise  to  priming  when  they  do 
not  interfere  with  target  classification  (Driver  &  Tipper,  1989).  Chapter  4  therefore 
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from  multiple-item  displays.  Two  experiments  assessed  the  effect  of  face  and  flag 
target  processing  on  face  distractor  priming  (Experiments  9&  10).  A  third  priming 
study  used  face-like  and  face-unlike  nonface  targets  to  explore  the  visual 
properties  that  may  be  responsible  for  eliciting  face  processing  limits  (Experiment 
11). 
The  final  empirical  chapter  investigated  attention  biases  for  faces  in  comparison 
with  a  range  of  nonface  objects  in  a  simple  detection  task.  Over  three  experiments, 
subjects  were  required  to  shift  attentional  resources  from  the  location  of  a  face  or  a 
nonface  distractor  to  the  location  of  a  peripheral  line  target  (Experiments  12-14). 
Contrasting  the  effects  of  different  distractor  types  on  target  RTs  was  then  used  to 
assess  attentional  disengagement.  A  final  study  examined  attentional  engagement 
by  faces  and  nonface  objects.  The  target  and  distractor  locations  were  now 
switched  so  that  the  subjects  were  attending  to  the  target  at  the  start  of  each  trial, 
while  the  distractors  were  presented  in  the  visual  periphery  (Experiment  15). 
36 Chapter  2  Dissociating  and  Integrating  Facial 
Expression  and  Identity 
Introduction 
Established  models  of  face  recognition  postulate  separate  parallel  routes  for  the 
processing  of  different  categories  of  facial  information,  such  as  sex,  emotional 
expression  and  identity  (notably,  Bruce  &  Young,  1986).  In  particular,  the  idea 
that  identity  and  expression  are  dissociable  cognitive  functions  has  been  supported 
by  a  number  of  observations  from  a  range  of  methodologies.  These  include 
neurological  studies  demonstrating  double  dissociations  in  brain-injured 
participants  (e.  g.  Humphreys,  Donnelly  &  Riddoch,  1993;  Parry,  Young,  Saul  & 
Moss,  1991;  Schweinberger,  Klos  &  Sommer,  1995;  Young,  Newcombe,  de  Haan, 
Small  &  Hay,  1993),  functional  imaging  studies  showing  spatially-dissociable 
areas  of  brain  activation  during  the  processing  of  expression  and  identity  (George 
et  al,  1993;  Sergent,  Ohta,  MacDonald  &  Zuck,  1994),  and  cognitive  studies  of 
neurologically  normal  participants,  which  have  shown  that  observers  can 
selectively  attend  to  facial  expression  and  identity  in  time-stressed  categorization 
tasks  (Bruce,  1986;  Calder,  Young,  Keane  &  Dean,  2000;  Campbell,  Brooks,  de 
Haan  &  Roberts,  1996;  Young,  McWeeney,  Hay  &  Ellis,  1986a). 
Recently,  however,  the  idea  that  expression  and  identity  processing  are 
functionally  independent  has  become  the  subject  of  some  controversy.  Using 
Garner's  (1974,1976)  selective  attention  paradigm,  Schweinberger  &  Soukup 
(1998)  re-examined  whether  facial  expression  and  identity  can  be  dissociated  in  a 
speeded  categorization  task.  Within  this  paradigm,  introduced  in  detail  later, 
37 identity  information  was  processed  independent  of  facial  expression  but 
contributed  to  expression  analysis,  an  intriguing  asymmetric  relationship  among 
the  perception  of  facial  identity  and  expression. 
In  a  subsequent  study,  Schweinberger,  Burton  &  Kelly  (1999)  examined  whether 
such  a  relationship  is  related  to  differences  in  processing  speed.  If  identity  is 
perceived  faster  than  facial  expression,  then  variations  in  identity  may  be  more 
likely  to  affect  expression  processing  than  vice  versa.  To  manipulate  processing 
speeds,  Schweinberger  et  al  (1999)  employed  a  morphing  technique  to  create  a 
photographic  continuum  between  two  faces.  Depending  on  the  percentage 
contribution  of  each  original  face  within  any  point  along  this  continuum  (e.  g.  30% 
versus  70%,  20%  versus  80%,  etc.  ),  morphs  were  consistently  categorized  as  the 
facial  identity  contributing  the  most.  In  contrast,  classification  RTs  increased  along 
and  peaked  towards  the  middle  of  the  continuum  (i.  e.  the  point  where  each  of  the 
originals  contributes  50%  to  the  new  image).  Thus,  when  two  different  person's 
faces  with  the  same  expression  were  morphed,  recognition  of  identity  and 
expression  remained  relatively  unaffected  but  identity  classification  times  reflected 
the  decreased  perceptual  salience  of  the  stimuli.  Likewise,  if  two  images  of  one 
person  depicting  different  expressions  were  morphed,  expression  RTs  correlated 
with  the  morphing  continuum.  In  this  way,  Schweinberger  et  al  (1999)  selectively 
manipulated  the  processing  speed  of  expression  and  identity.  However,  despite  this 
manipulation  the  asymmetric  relationship  first  observed  by  Schweinberger  & 
Soukup  (1998)  persisted,  suggesting  that  differences  in  processing  speed  cannot 
account  for  a  functional  dependence  between  these  types  of  facial  information. 
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support  from  other  face  perception  studies  with  Garner's  technique.  Etcoff  (1984) 
measured  participants'  ability  to  sort  cards  depicting  different  expressions  and 
identities,  but  found  that  expression  and  identity  were  classified  without 
interference  from  the  other.  Deprived  of  advanced  timing  systems,  however, 
Etcoff  (1984)  used  a  manual  stopwatch  to  record  sorting  times.  According  to 
Schweinberger  &  Soukup  (1998),  this  might  account  for  the  discrepancies  between 
Etcoff's  (1984)  results  and  their  own  study,  in  which  reaction  times  were 
measured  with  millisecond  accuracy.  However,  similarly  to  Etcoff's  (1984) 
findings,  Le  Gal  &  Bruce  (2002)  assessed  the  independence  of  sex  and  expression 
judgements  to  faces  with  the  Garner  technique  and  found  that  both  dimensions 
were  processed  independently.  As  there  is  evidence  that  sex  classification  also 
proceeds  independent  of  identification  (e.  g.  Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling  &  Young,  1987; 
Ellis,  Young  &  Flude,  1990),  these  findings  do  not  rule  out  an  interaction  between 
expression  and  identity  processing.  Therefore,  they  do  not  provide  sufficient 
evidence  to  dismiss  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  reports.  The  important 
point,  as  far  as  the  present  study  is  concerned,  is  that  an  asymmetric  processing- 
dependence  between  facial  expression  and  identity  has  previously  not  been  found 
with  other  methodologies,  nor  with  Garner's  technique,  nor  have  analogous  effects 
been  observed  with  other  face  processing  routes  within  Garner's  paradigm.  Thus, 
the  purpose  of  Experiments  1&2  was  to  investigate  the  validity  of  Schweinberger 
et  al's  (1998,1999)  claims.  Closer  examination  of  these  studies  suggests  that  their 
response  pattern  may  have  resulted  from  asymmetric  treatment  effects  within  the 
paradigm.  In  the  remainder  of  the  introduction  Garner's  paradigm  is  outlined  and 
these  treatment  effects  are  then  discussed  in  detail. 
39 GARNER'  S  SELECTIVE  ATTENTION  PARADIGM 
Garner  (1974,1976)  originally  devised  this  paradigm  to  examine  whether  basic 
object  properties,  such  as  form  and  colour,  require  shared  or  independent 
processing  resources.  More  specifically,  he  asked  whether  selective  attention  to  a 
task-relevant  stimulus  dimension  is  possible  when  variation  is  added  to  a  second 
task-irrelevant  dimension.  If  both  dimensions  are  separable,  then  selective 
attention  to  a  relevant  dimension  should  be  possible  regardless  of  variations  in 
irrelevant  information.  In  a  typical  Garner  experiment,  participants  are  required  to 
make  speeded  two-choice  judgements  to  four  types  of  stimuli,  consisting  of  the 
crossing  of  two  exemplars  each  of  two  distinct  stimulus  dimensions.  For  example, 
if  the  dimensions  are  colour  and  shape,  participants  are  instructed  to  classify 
colour  while  ignoring  the  shape  of  a  stimulus,  or  to  ignore  colour  while  classifying 
shape. 
During  classification,  these  stimuli  are  presented  in  three  experimental  conditions. 
In  the  control  condition,  stimuli  vary  along  the  relevant  dimension  while  the 
irrelevant  dimension  remains  constant.  To  illustrate,  in  a  colour  categorization  task 
participants  may  be  shown  a  block  of  only  squares  and  a  second  block  of  only 
circles,  and  the  stimuli  in  both  blocks  must  be  classified  as  either  green  or  blue.  In 
the  orthogonal  condition,  stimuli  vary  along  relevant  and  irrelevant  dimensions. 
So,  for  example,  blue  squares,  green  squares,  blue  circles,  and  green  circles  are 
intermixed  within  one  block.  In  the  correlated  condition,  relevant  and  irrelevant 
information  is  covaried;  for  example,  only  green  squares  and  blue  circles. 
The  influence  of  the  irrelevant  dimension  on  the  relevant  one  is  determined  by 
contrasting  performance  across  these  three  conditions.  Increased  RTs  in  the 
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irrelevant  information  interferes  with  the  classification  of  the  task-relevant 
dimension.  This  is  an  indication  that  both  dimensions  are  processed  in  an  integral 
manner.  In  contrast,  comparable  RTs  for  control  and  orthogonal  condition  suggest 
that  both  dimensions  are  dissociable  and  processed  separately.  Garner  also  claimed 
that  faster  RTs  in  the  correlated  compared  to  the  control  condition  can  be 
interpreted  as  evidence  for  integral  processing  of  two  stimulus  dimensions,  a  so- 
called  redundancy  gain.  This  advantage  apparently  arises  due  to  the  invariant 
combination  of  relevant  and  irrelevant  information,  which  facilitates  the 
perception  of  both  dimensions  as  a  unitary  event.  However,  redundancy  gains  may 
also  arise  when  participants  strategically  choose  to  process  the  easier  of  two 
correlated  dimensions,  relevant  or  irrelevant.  Consequently,  redundancy  may  be 
used  to  support  claims  for  the  integral  processing  of  two  dimensions,  but  is  not 
sufficient  to  establish  such  claims. 
ASYMMETRIC  TREATMENT  EFFECTS  WITHIN  THE  GARNER  PARADIGM 
A  major  disadvantage  of  Garner  experiments  is  that  they  can  be  sensitive  to 
asymmetric  treatment  effects.  Schweinberger  et  al  (1999)  eliminated  one  such 
effect  as  a  possible  explanation  for  an  asymmetric  dependency  between  identity 
and  expression,  that  is,  relative  differences  in  processing  speed  of  both  face 
dimensions.  Yet,  these  studies  contain  several  other  potential  asymmetric 
treatment  effects  that  merit  further  examination. 
i)  Picture-based  response  cues  versus  face-related  information 
One  criticism  of  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  studies  is  the  use  of  an 
extremely  limited  stimulus  set.  Schweinberger  &  Soukup  (1998)  used  a  total  of 
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the  same  number  of  stimuli  to  create  twenty-eight  morphed  faces.  These  sets  were 
repeated  over  600  and  280  trials  in  the  respective  studies.  As  a  consequence  of 
excessive  repetition,  subjects  might  have  developed  alternative  task  strategies 
rather  than  engaging  in  typical  face  processes.  Pictures  of  a  person  may,  for 
example,  bear  superficial  similarities  such  as  image  brightness  and  colour 
contrasts  (see  Figure  2.1  overleaf).  Such  similarities  could  result  from  all  images 
of  one  person  being  taken  under  particular  lighting  conditions  on  the  same  day  or 
even  the  same  time  of  day.  If  such  similarities  are  salient  and  correlated  with 
identity,  then  participants  might  learn  to  distinguish  both  stimulus  identities  on  the 
basis  of  these  picture-based  characteristics.  And  if  such  salient  cues  intrude  on  the 
classification  of  expression,  even  if  participants  can  usually  attend  selectively  to 
expression  without  interference  from  identity  information,  then  this  might  produce 
the  orthogonal  interference  reported  by  Schweinberger  et  al  (1998,1999). 
Crucially,  facial  expressions  are  less  likely  to  correlate  with  picture-based  cues 
because  they  are  displayed  by  both  identities.  Thus,  by  facilitating  identity  but  not 
expression  classification,  picture-based  cues  may  have  contributed  to  an 
asymmetric  response  pattern. 
ii)  Internal  features  versus  external  features 
The  use  of  a  limited  stimulus  set  raises  another  potential  problem  as  faces  contain 
a  variety  of  cues  to  identity.  These  include  the  spatial  relation  of  internal  features 
(e.  g.  eyes,  nose,  mouth),  which  can  communicate  very  subtle  but  unique 
differences  between  people  (e.  g.  Haig,  1984;  Tanaka  &  Sengco,  1997;  Valentine 
&  Bruce,  1986),  and  external  features,  such  as  hairstyle  and  face  outline,  which 
can  change  frequently  and  may  be  shared  by  different  people.  Whereas  external 
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everyday  life,  in  an  experiment  with  a  limited  set  size  they  might  provide  a  salient 
and  simple  strategy  to  classify  identity  (see  Figure  2.1).  Comparable  cues  for  the 
classification  of  expression  would  be  unavailable.  Akin  to  picture-based  cues, 
external  feature  processing  could  thus  contribute  to  an  asymmetric  relationship  by 
providing  identity-correlated  information  that  may  intrude  on  expression 
perception. 
Schweinberger  et  al,  1999 
Figure  2.1  Examples  of  the  stimuli  used  by  Scheinberger  &  Soukup  (1998)  and 
Schweinberger  et  al  (1999).  The  photographs  reveal  a  number  of  picture-based  identity 
cues  and  external  features  that  may  have  been  exacerbated  by  the  use  of  a  small  stimulus 
set.  These  include  differences  in  luminance  (2,5),  in  hairstyle  (2,3)  and  in  face  outline  (for 
example,  note  the  presence  and  absence  of  ears;  1,4,6). 
iii)  Effects  of  face  familiarity 
The  potential  contribution  of  external  identity  cues  within  the  Garner  paradigm 
also  draws  attention  to  the  role  of  face  familiarity.  It  is  well  established  that 
different  processes  are  involved  in  recognizing  familiar  and  unfamiliar  faces  (e.  g. 
Burton,  Wilson,  Cowan  &  Bruce,  1999;  Hancock,  Bruce  &  Burton,  2000). 
Although  we  may  rely  on  external  features,  such  as  hairstyle  and  face  outline,  to 
identify  well-known  people,  familiar  faces  are  primarily  recognized  from  internal 
facial  features  (e.  g.  Ellis,  Shepherd  &  Davis,  1979;  Young,  Hay,  McWeeney, 
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Schweinberger  &  Soukup,  1998 Flude  &  Ellis,  1985).  Unfamiliar  person  recognition,  on  the  other  hand,  tends  to 
rely  more  on  those  prominent  external  features  (Bruce,  Henderson,  Greenwood, 
Hancock,  Burton  &  Miller,  1999;  Ellis  et  al,  1979;  Young  et  al,  1985). 
Consequently,  one  might  expect  external  identity  cues  to  influence  expression 
classification  particularly  when  unfamiliar  faces  are  used.  Alternatively,  facial 
identity  might  only  interfere  with  expression  if  participants  are  capable  of 
distinguishing  between  the  stimulus  identities.  Yet,  this  may  not  be  the  case  with 
unfamiliar  faces  even  when  external  identity  cues  are  available.  Face  familiarity 
might  thus  play  a  crucial  role  in  understanding  asymmetric  interactions  between 
identity  and  expression.  Notably,  Schweinberger  and  associates  (1998,1999) 
failed  to  specify  face  familiarity  in  their  studies.  Consequently,  it  remains 
unresolved  whether  their  findings  reflect  general  face  processes  or  more  specific 
processes  related  to  either  unfamiliar  or  familiar  face  processing. 
iv)  Asymmetric  increases  in  task-relevant  information 
A  fourth  problem  within  the  Garner  paradigm  are  asymmetric  increases  in  task- 
relevant  information.  As  alluded  to  earlier,  integrated  processing  of  two  task 
dimensions  is  primarily  assessed  within  this  paradigm  by  increasing  the  ratio  of 
task-irrelevant  to  relevant  information  in  the  orthogonal  condition.  This  is 
achieved  by  presenting  stimuli  in  this  condition  that  vary  along  both,  the  relevant 
and  irrelevant  task  dimension.  Although  such  an  increase  in  information  may  leave 
the  amount  of  task-relevant  information  intact  when  simple  shapes  and  colours  are 
used,  expression  and  identity  information  may  be  coded  by  to  some  extent 
overlapping  physical  features.  In  other  words,  increases  in  irrelevant  information 
in  the  orthogonal  condition  may  be  accompanied  by  analogous  increases  in 
relevant  information.  This  is  problematic  if  participants  use  substantially  different 
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classified  on  the  basis  of  external  features  or  picture-based  cues,  then  this  may  not 
be  overly  affected  by  increasing  irrelevant  information  in  the  orthogonal  condition, 
as  the  distinctive  physical  feature  remains  relatively  intact  across  different  images. 
To  the  contrary,  the  same  expression  can  show  considerable  variation  within  as 
well  as  between  different  persons.  Unlike  identity,  increasing  irrelevant 
information  in  the  orthogonal  condition  may  thus  increase  relevant  information 
when  expression  is  classified.  If  this  results  in  an  increase  in  task  difficulty,  one 
might  predict  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  asymmetric  response  pattern. 
However,  this  would  not  reflect  orthogonal  interference  from  the  task-irrelevant 
dimension,  and  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  functional  dependency  between 
independent  processing  routes. 
In  summary,  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  studies  contain  several  potential 
confounds  that  may  have  contributed  to  an  asymmetric  response  pattern  within 
Garner's  selective  attention  methodology.  These  are:  i)  a  severely  limited  stimulus 
set,  which  may  have  enabled  participants  to  perform  identity  categorizations  on  the 
basis  of  salient  picture  characteristics;  ii)  similarly,  the  use  of  external  features  for 
identity  classifications;  iii)  effects  of  face  familiarity;  and  iv)  asymmetric  increases 
in  task  difficulty  between  identity  and  expression  in  the  orthogonal  condition, 
especially  if  identity-correlated  task  strategies  were  available.  The  aim  of  the 
present  experiments  was  to  investigate  whether  an  asymmetric  relationship 
between  expression  and  identity  persist  when  the  potential  impact  of  these 
confounds  is  reduced.  To  address  these  concerns,  the  current  experiments  used  a 
variation  of  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  task.  To  discourage  the  use  of 
picture-based  response  cues  during  the  classification  of  identity,  a  substantially 
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the  influence  of  external  features  on  identity  classification,  the  stimuli  consisted  of 
faces  photographed  from  a  variety  of  viewpoints  and,  on  half  of  all  pictures,  with  a 
cap  to  disguise  hairstyle.  Because  of  this  large  and  varied  set  -  each  stimulus  was 
only  encountered  once  during  the  experimental  trials  of  each  condition  -  these 
changes  were  also  designed  to  eliminate  asymmetric  increases  in  task  difficulty 
from  the  control  to  the  orthogonal  condition.  Finally,  to  examine  the  influence  of 
face  familiarity,  identity  and  expression  processing  was  contrasted  across  two 
experiments  with  participants  who  were  unfamiliar  (Experiment  1)  and  familiar 
with  the  stimulus  identities  (Experiment  2). 
Experiment  1 
Experiment  1  examined  whether  the  processing  of  facial  expression  is  contingent 
on  facial  identity  information  within  the  Garner  paradigm,  as  was  suggested  by 
Schweinberger  et  al  (1998,1999).  Rather  than  revealing  a  novel  functional 
architecture  of  identity  and  expression  processing,  these  findings  might  reflect 
asymmetric  treatment  effects  within  this  paradigm.  To  address  this,  the  present 
experiment  employed  a  variation  of  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  task.  Faces 
were  classified  according  to  either  expression  or  identity,  while  ignoring  the  other 
dimension.  However,  in  order  to  prevent  asymmetric  treatment  effects,  a  large  and 
varied  stimulus  set,  consisting  of  120  digital  photographs,  was  used.  In  addition,  to 
investigate  effects  of  face  familiarity  all  participants  were  unfamiliar  with  the 
stimulus  identities  presented  in  this  experiment.  If  expression  processing  is 
affected  by  task-irrelevant  variations  of  identity  in  unfamiliar  face  processing,  then 
an  asymmetric  interaction  analogous  to  the  one  reported  by  Schweinberger  et  al 
(1998,1999)  should  be  found.  On  the  other  hand,  if  previous  findings  reflect 
46 asymmetric  treatment  effects  and  if  observers  can  selectively  attend  to  these  types 
of  facial  information,  then  variations  in  identity  should  not  interfere  with 
expression  processing. 
Method 
Subjects  Thirty-six  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  whose 
ages  ranged  from  18-25  years,  volunteered  to  participate  in  the  experiment  for  a 
small  fee.  All  reported  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision  and  were  unfamiliar 
with  the  faces  they  were  to  encounter  in  the  Experiment. 
Stimuli  &  Apparatus  An  Apple  Macintosh  computer  presented  the  stimuli  and 
recorded  responses  using  SuperLab  1.74.  Digital  photographs  of  two  male 
employees  from  the  Psychology  department  at  the  University  of  Glasgow  served 
as  stimuli.  Each  model  posed  for  portraits  of  two  emotional  expressions  (happy  & 
angry)  from  three  different  viewpoints  (full-face,  left,  right).  To  add  variation, 
head-shifts  were  performed  unrestrained  during  the  recording  of  these  images.  In 
addition,  both  models  posed  with  a  cap  on  half  of  all  photographs  to  disguise 
hairstyle  (see  Figure  2.2  overleaf).  In  total,  120  photographs  were  taken  with  a  Fuji 
FinePix6800  digital  camera,  consisting  of  five  images  under  each  level  of  identity 
(Person  A  vs.  Person  B),  facial  expression  (happy  vs.  angry),  viewpoint  (full-face, 
left,  right),  and  hairstyle  (cap  vs.  no  cap).  These  images  were  displayed  in 
greyscale  at  a  size  of  4.5  cm  x  6.0  cm. 
47 Figure  2.2  Example  displays  from  Experiment  1.  The  target  set  contained  two  identities, 
Person  A  and  Person  B,  depicted  from  a  variety  of  viewpoints  and  wearing  a  cap  on  50% 
of  trials  to  disguise  hairstyle.  The  faces  displayed  angry  facial  expressions  (see  left  two 
columns)  and  happy  facial  expressions  (right  two  columns). 
Design  The  experiment  had  a2x3  mixed  design,  with  the  between-subjects 
variable  of  group  at  two  levels  (identity  vs.  expression  classification)  and 
condition  at  three  levels  (correlated,  control,  orthogonal).  Dependent  measures 
were  reaction  times  (RTs)  and  error  percentages. 
Procedure  The  procedure  for  the  identity  task  was  as  follows.  Prior  to  the  main 
task,  the  18  participants  in  this  group  were  shown  3  colour  photographs  (full-face, 
left,  right)  of  each  identity,  printed  out  and  mounted  on  card,  for  approximately  30 
seconds  for  familiarisation  purposes.  Participants  were  then  told  that  the  task 
involved  making  identity  decisions  as  quickly  and  as  accurately  as  possible  to  the 
faces  of  these  persons  presented  on  a  computer  screen.  In  addition,  subjects  were 
emphatically  instructed  to  ignore  facial  expression.  Each  trial  began  with  a  central 
fixation  cross,  displayed  for  1500  ms.  This  was  replaced  by  a  face  stimulus,  which 
remained  visible  until  a  response  had  been  made.  Following  a  response,  the  face 
was  replaced  by  the  fixation  cross,  marking  the  start  of  the  next  trial.  Subjects 
were  requested  to  respond  by  pressing  the  "D"  or  the  "L"  key  on  a  standard 
48 
Person  A,  angry  Person  B,  happy computer  keyboard.  Button-press  latencies  were  measured  from  stimulus  onset  and 
feedback  for  incorrect  responses  was  given  immediately  by  a  short  warning  tone. 
All  subjects  underwent  2  consecutive  blocks  for  each  of  the  three  conditions.  For 
the  correlated  condition,  the  1$`  block  contained  happy  faces  of  Person  A  and  angry 
faces  of  Person  B,  and  the  2°d  block  contained  angry  faces  of  Person  A  and  happy 
faces  of  Person  B.  In  the  control  condition,  the  15`  block  contained  happy  faces  of 
both  Persons  A  and  B,  and  the  2°d  block  contained  angry  faces  of  Persons  A  and  B. 
In  the  orthogonal  condition,  all  possible  combinations  of  expression  and  identity 
were  presented  within  both  blocks.  Each  of  the  six  blocks  consisted  of  20  practice 
and  60  experimental  trials.  Thus,  with  a  stimulus  set  of  120  images,  each  image 
was  only  encountered  once  during  the  experimental  trials  of  each  condition. 
However,  a  third  of  these  images  were  also  encountered  during  practice.  Trial 
order  was  randomized  within  each  block  and  the  order  of  conditions  was  counter- 
balanced  across  all  subjects.  Subjects  could  rest  between  blocks,  initiating  the  next 
block  by  pressing  the  space  bar. 
The  same  procedure  was  used  for  the  expression  classification  task,  except  for  the 
following  changes.  The  18  participants  in  this  group  were  also  familiarized  with 
the  face  identities  but  were  instructed  to  ignore  identity  while  making  two-choice 
expression  decisions.  In  addition,  the  composition  of  the  correlated  and  orthogonal 
conditions  remained  the  same,  but  the  control  condition  now  contained  happy  and 
angry  faces  of  Person  A  in  one  block,  and  happy  and  angry  faces  of  Person  B  in 
the  other  block. 
49 Results 
Errors  Error  rates  were  generally  low.  In  the  identity  group,  errors  were  made  on 
4.1%  of  all  correlated  trials,  5.6%  of  all  control  trials,  and  3.5%  of  all  orthogonal 
trials.  For  the  expression  group,  the  error  rates  were  2.4%,  3.2%,  and  3.5% 
respectively.  Error  rates  were  not  analyzed  further. 
RTs:  Comparisons  between  classification  tasks  across  conditions.  The  median 
correct  reaction  times  (RTs)  were  computed  for  each  level  of  group  (identity  vs. 
expression)  and  condition  (correlated,  control,  orthogonal).  The  averages  of  these 
RTs  across  subjects  are  shown  in  Figure  2.3. 
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Figure  2.3  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  (RTs,  in  msec)  as  a  function  of  the  Garner 
conditions  and  group  in  Experiment  1.  Vertical  bars  represent  the  positive  standard  errors 
of  the  means. 
As  can  be  seen  from  Figure  2.3,  classifications  times  were  faster  for  identity  than 
expression  decisions.  However,  neither  the  identity  nor  the  expression  group 
showed  an  RT  advantage  in  the  control  condition  in  comparison  with  the 
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Expression orthogonal  condition,  indicating  that  task-irrelevant  information  did  not  influence 
task-relevant  processing  in  this  experiment.  These  observations  were  confirmed  by 
a2  (identity  vs.  expression)  x3  (correlated,  control,  orthogonal)  mixed  analysis  of 
variance  (ANOVA),  which  showed  a  main  effect  of  group,  F(1,34)=7.31,  p<.  05, 
reflecting  faster  responses  to  identity  than  to  expression,  but  no  main  effect  of 
condition,  F(2,68)=1.49,  and  no  interaction  between  group  and  condition, 
F(2,68)<1. 
RTs:  Comparisons  within  each  classification  task.  Separate  3  (correlated,  control, 
orthogonal)  x2  (happy  vs.  angry)  x2  (Person  A  vs.  Person  B)  ANOVAs  were 
carried  out  for  each  level  of  group  for  a  more  detailed  analysis  within  the  Garner 
conditions.  The  RTs  for  every  combination  of  these  factor  levels  may  be  seen  in 
Figure  2.4. 
Identity 
650  j  1O  Happy  A 
600 
JDAngry  A 
I Happy 
B' 
UAngry  B 
E  550 
c  500  ®  rLL  1 
450 
Correlated  Control  Orthogonal 
Expression 
650 
600 
E550 
N 
500 
450 
Correlated  Cons  of  Orthogonal 
Figure  2.4  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  (RTs)  for  every  combination  of  each 
relevant  and  irrelevant  dimension  for  Experiment  1.  A=  face  of  Person  A;  B=  face  of 
Person  B. 
For  identity  classifications,  no  main  effects  of  condition,  F(2,34)=1.03,  or 
expression  were  found,  F(1,17)<1,  again  indicating  that  identity  processing  was 
unaffected  by  expression.  A  main  effect  of  identity,  F(1,17)=6.73,  p<.  05,  is 
51 interpreted  as  reflecting  slightly  slower  RTs  to  Person  A  than  to  Person  B  across 
all  identity  conditions.  No  other  comparisons  were  significant. 
For  expression  classifications  no  main  effects  of  condition,  F(2,34)=1.43, 
expression,  F(1,17)<1,  or  identity,  F(1,17)=2.03,  were  found.  However,  a 
significant  interaction  between  identity  and  condition  was  observed,  F(2,34)=6.15, 
p<.  01.  Simple  main  effect  analysis  revealed  similar  RTs  for  both  face  identities  in 
the  correlated  condition,  F(1,17)<1,  but  significantly  faster  RTs  to  Person  A  than 
Person  B  in  the  control  condition,  F(1,17)=10.12,  p<.  01,  and  the  reverse  pattern  in 
the  orthogonal  condition,  F(1,17)=24.85,  p<.  01.  Importantly  however,  no  simple 
main  effects  of  condition  were  found  for  either  identity  (Person  A,  F(2,34)=1.80; 
Person  B,  F(2,34)=1.78).  Thus,  expression  classification  was  not  systematically 
affected  by  variations  in  identity  across  the  Garner  conditions. 
Discussion 
Experiment  1  examined  recent  claims  of  an  asymmetric  dependency  in  face 
processing,  such  that  expression  perception  may  be  contingent  upon  identity 
(Schweinberger  et  al,  1998,1999).  Specifically,  the  aim  was  to  determine  whether 
the  response  pattern  of  previous  studies  might  have  arisen  from  asymmetric 
treatments  effects  within  the  Garner  paradigm.  Using  a  modification  of 
Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  design,  the  current  experiment  sought  to 
diminish  the  contribution  of  such  effects  by  using  a  substantially  larger  and  more 
varied  stimulus  set.  The  RT  data  show  that  identity  classifications  were  faster  than 
expression  classifications,  which  indicates  that  the  facial  identity  may  have  been 
more  discriminable  in  the  present  stimulus  set.  However,  the  critical  comparisons 
for  establishing  an  interaction  between  identity  and  expression  processing,  those 
52 between  the  control  and  orthogonal  conditions,  revealed  no  significant  differences 
for  the  classification  of  either  face  dimension.  This  indicates  that  participants  were 
able  to  attend  to  each  dimension  selectively,  and,  at  least  initially,  appears  to 
contradict  claims  of  an  asymmetric  interaction. 
However,  Experiment  1  only  investigated  the  processing  of  unfamiliar  faces. 
There  is  considerable  evidence  that  unfamiliar  face  processing,  in  comparison  with 
familiar  face  recognition,  may  rely  particularly  on  external  features  for  person 
identification,  such  as  hairstyle  and  face-outline  (e.  g.  Bruce  et  al,  1999).  In  the 
introduction  it  was  suggested  that  such  information  might  have  contributed  to 
Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  findings  if  unfamiliar  face  stimuli  were  used. 
The  current  results  do  not  support  this  idea,  although  the  design  involved  several 
manipulations  to  diminish  the  contribution  of  external  identity  cues.  Even  so,  since 
external  features  provide  only  an  unreliable  source  of  identity  information,  the 
deduction  of  external  identity  cues  merely  serves  to  underline  the  validity  of  the 
present  results. 
Experiment  2 
The  results  of  Experiment  1  provide  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  identity  and 
expression  perception  are  dissociable  cognitive  functions,  albeit  only  when 
unfamiliar  faces  are  processed.  However,  an  objection  could  be  raised  as  to 
whether  the  use  of  unfamiliar  face  stimuli  is  appropriate  to  investigate  the  relation 
of  expression  and  identity  processing.  Although  the  participants  in  the  identity 
condition  were  able  to  distinguish  the  different  faces  quickly  and  with  few  errors, 
the  participants  in  the  expression  condition  may  not  have  learned  to  do  so.  Thus  it 
is  possible  that  variations  in  identity  did  not  interfere  with  expression  classification 
53 precisely  because  the  participants  in  this  group  had  not  learned  to  distinguish  the 
task-irrelevant  face  identities.  To  assess  whether  the  absence  of  any  interference 
may  have  been  due  to  this,  Experiment  2  used  participants  that  were  familiar  with 
the  stimulus  identities.  If  expression  processing  is  also  unaffected  by  identity 
information  from  familiar  faces,  this  would  provide  further  support  for  a  functional 
independence  between  expression  and  identity  within  this  paradigm.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  expression  processing  is  contingent  on  face  familiarity,  this  would  provide 
some  support  for  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  functional  interaction. 
Method 
Subjects.  Stimuli  & 
-Procedure 
Thirty-six  new  subjects,  whose  ages  ranged  from 
21-33  years,  volunteered  to  participate  in  the  unpaid  experiment.  All  subjects  were 
postgraduate  students  or  research  staff  from  the  Department  of  Psychology  at  the 
University  of  Glasgow  and  reported  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision.  The 
subjects  were  familiar  with  the  face  identities  they  were  to  encounter  in  the 
experiment  and  could  identify  them  without  delay  prior  to  the  task.  Apparatus, 
stimuli  and  procedure  were  identical  to  those  of  Experiment  1. 
Results 
Errors  As  in  Experiment  1,  error  rates  were  generally  low.  In  the  identity  group, 
errors  were  made  on  4.2%  of  all  correlated  trials,  4.5%  of  all  control  trials,  and 
4.6%  of  all  orthogonal  trials.  For  the  expression  group,  the  error  rates  were  2.8%, 
4.6%,  and  4.5%  respectively.  Error  rates  were  not  analyzed  further. 
RTs:  Comparions  between  classification  tasks  across  conditions.  The  median 
correct  reaction  times  (RTs)  were  computed  for  each  level  of  group  (identity  vs. 
54 expression)  and  condition  (correlated,  control,  orthogonal).  The  averages  of  these 
RTs  across  subjects  are  shown  in  Figure  2.5. 
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Figure  2.5  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  (RTs,  in  msec)  as  a  function  of  the  Garner 
conditions  and  group  in  Experiment  2.  Vertical  bars  represent  the  positive  standard  errors 
of  the  means. 
A2  (identity  vs.  expression)  x3  (correlated,  control,  orthogonal)  mixed  ANOVA 
revealed  a  main  effect  of  group,  F(1,34)=5.52,  p<.  05,  reflecting  faster  RTs  in  the 
identity  task  than  in  the  expression  task,  a  main  effect  of  condition,  F(2,68)=4.54, 
p<.  05,  and  an  almost  reliable  interaction  between  group  and  condition, 
F(2,68)=3.10,  p=.  052.  As  can  be  seen  from  Figure  2.5,  although  RTs  were 
noticeably  faster  in  the  correlated  condition  than  in  the  control  and  orthogonal 
conditions  of  the  expression  group,  RTs  were  evenly  matched  across  all  conditions 
in  the  identity  group.  This  was  confirmed  by  a  simple  main  effect  of  condition 
when  making  expression  decisions,  F(2,68)=7.57,  p<.  01,  but  not  for  identity 
decisions,  F(2,68)<1. 
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Expression RTs:  Comparisons  within  each  classification  task.  Separate  3  (correlated,  control, 
orthogonal)  x2  (happy,  angry)  x2  (Person  A,  Person  B)  ANOVAs  were  carried 
out  for  each  level  of  group  to  examine  variability  across  every  combination  of  the 
relevant  and  irrelevant  dimension.  The  RTs  for  these  combinations  are  in  Figure 
2.6. 
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Figure  2.6  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  (RTs)  for  every  combination  of  each 
relevant  and  irrelevant  dimension  for  Experiment  2.  A=  face  of  Person  A;  B=  face  of 
Person  B. 
For  identity  classifications,  no  main  effects  of  condition,  F(2,34)<1,  expression, 
F(1,17)=1.00,  or  identity  were  found,  F(1,17)<1.  An  interaction  between 
expression  and  identity,  F(1,17)=6.51,  p<.  05,  reflects  slightly  slower  RTs  for 
angry  expressions  of  Person  A  than  for  angry  expressions  of  Person  B, 
F(1,17)=6.12,  p<.  05,  while  RTs  to  happy  expressions  were  more  evenly  matched, 
F(1,17)=1.41,  and  an  almost  reliable  difference  between  happy  and  angry 
expressions  for  Person  B,  F(1,17)=3.94,  p=.  06. 
For  expression  classifications,  no  main  effects  of  expression,  F(1,17)=1.35,  or 
identity  were  found,  F(1,17)<1.  However,  an  effect  of  condition  was  confirmed, 
F(2,32)=5.17,  p<.  05.  Newman-Keuls  comparisons  (alpha  =  . 
05)  showed  that  RTs 
in  the  correlated  condition  were  significantly  different  from  the  control  and  the 
56 orthogonal  condition.  More  importantly,  no  differences  were  found  between  these 
latter  conditions.  The  effect  of  condition  was  also  modified  by  an  interaction  of 
expression  and  condition,  F(2,34)=6.62,  p<.  01,  reflecting  faster  RTs  to  angry  than 
to  happy  expressions  in  the  control  condition,  F(1,17)=4.78,  p<.  05,  and  the  reverse 
pattern  in  the  orthogonal  condition,  F(1,17)=6.87,  p<.  05.  In  addition,  happy 
expressions  were  classified  faster  in  the  correlated  condition  relative  to  the  control 
condition,  Tukey's  HSD  test,  p<.  05. 
A  second  complex  interaction  was  observed  between  identity  and  condition, 
F(2,34)=12.73,  p<.  01,  reflecting  faster  RTs  to  Person  A  than  to  Person  B  in  the 
control  condition,  F(1,17)=17.45,  p<.  01,  and  the  reverse  pattern  in  the  orthogonal 
condition,  F(1,17)=10.61,  p<.  01.  In  addition,  simple  main  effects  of  condition  for 
each  identity  were  found  (Person  A,  F(2,34)=3.92,  p<.  05;  Person  B,  F(2,34)=  3.71, 
p<.  05).  In  depth  analysis  of  these  effects  revealed  faster  RTs  for  Person  A  in  the 
correlated  condition  in  comparison  with  the  orthogonal  condition,  Tukey's  HSD, 
p<.  05,  and  faster  RTs  for  Person  B  in  the  correlated  condition  in  comparison  with 
the  control  condition,  Tukey's  HSD,  P<05-  No  other  comparisons  were 
significant. 
As  in  Experiment  1,  the  comparisons  critical  for  establishing  a  functional 
interaction  -  those  between  the  control  and  orthogonal  conditions  -  were  not 
significant  for  identity  or  expression  decisions.  This  result  therefore  further 
contradicts  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  claims  of  an  asymmetric 
dependency  between  expression  and  identity  processing,  and  extends  the  findings 
of  Experiment  1  to  familiar  faces.  In  addition,  there  is  some  support  for  the  idea 
57 that  identity  and  expression  are  not  just  dissociable  functions  but  are  processed  in 
parallel  (see  e.  g.  Bruce  &  Young,  1986).  This  can  be  seen  from  a  redundancy  gain 
during  the  classification  of  expression,  reflecting  significantly  faster  RTs  in  the 
correlated  than  in  the  control  and  the  orthogonal  condition.  As  was  reviewed 
earlier,  redundancy  gains  may  be  used  to  support  claims  of  integral  processing 
between  two  stimulus  dimensions,  provided  that  reliable  orthogonal  interference  is 
found.  However,  in  the  absence  of  orthogonal  interference,  as  was  the  case  in  this 
experiment,  redundancy  gains  most  likely  arise  when  participants  use  correlated 
irrelevant  information  to  enhance  performance.  Here,  identity  decisions  were 
consistently  faster  than  expression  decisions,  which  would  suggest  that  it  was 
indeed  possible  to  use  irrelevant  identity  information  to  decrease  response  times  to 
correlated  expression  decisions.  Notably,  a  similar  non-significant  redundancy 
pattern  was  observed  during  unfamiliar  face  processing  in  Experiment  1,  which 
suggests  that  the  participants  in  the  expression  group  may  have  been  able  to 
distinguish  the  task-irrelevant  identities  to  some  extent. 
The  observation  of  a  redundancy  gain  is  interesting  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  indication 
of  participants'  proclivity  to  employ  alternative  strategies  within  the  Garner 
paradigm.  Thus,  it  provides  some  tentative  support  for  the  hypothesis  that 
participants  may  have  developed  alternative  strategies  to  produce  an  asymmetric 
response  pattern  in  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  studies.  In  contrast  to  those 
studies,  the  present  experiments  used  a  substantially  larger  and  more  varied 
stimulus  set  to  reduce  the  contribution  of  such  strategies.  Nonetheless,  Experiment 
2  revealed  several  complex  interactions,  particularly  during  the  classification  of 
facial  expression,  which  suggest  that  some  stimulus  groupings  may  have  been 
more  discriminable  than  others.  However,  similar  to  the  overall  response  pattern, 
58 none  of  the  individual  stimulus  groupings  revealed  a  functional  dependency 
between  the  processing  of  expression  and  identity. 
Therefore,  the  results  of  Experiment  1  and  now  also  of  Experiment  2  suggest  that 
facial  expression  and  identity  processing  are  dissociable  cognitive  functions. 
Observers  can  selectively  attend  to  each  type  of  information  without  interference 
from  the  other,  both  during  the  processing  of  familiar  and  unfamiliar  faces. 
Although  these  findings  contradict  recent  claims  of  an  asymmetric  interaction 
between  the  processing  of  identity  and  expression,  they  support  the  long-standing 
view  that  facial  expression  and  identity  are  perceived  independently  and  in  parallel 
(e.  g.  Bruce  &  Young,  1986). 
Experiment  3 
The  findings  from  Experiments  1  and  2  converge  with  numerous  claims  that 
observers  can  selectively  attend  to  facial  expression  and  identity  (for  a  review  see 
Young,  1998).  Furthermore,  it  is  thought  that  these  processes  occupy  spatially 
dissociable  brain  areas  (e.  g.  George  et  al,  1993;  Sergent  et  al,  1994),  and  rely  on 
distinct  types  of  visual  information  (Calder  et  al,  2000).  However,  considering  this 
wide-ranging  dissociation,  it  is  perhaps  surprising  that,  upon  encountering  a  face, 
expression  and  identity  are  perceived  as  belonging  to  the  same  face  percept.  In 
fact,  the  perceptual  experience  of  these  facial  dimensions  appears  remarkably 
integrated:  We  can  accurately  extricate  a  face's  identity  and  expression  without 
confusing  them  with  those  from  another  face.  This  opens  the  intriguing  question  as 
to  how  dissociable  types  of  facial  information  are  accurately  combined  within  the 
same  face  percept  during  visual  processing. 
59 Outside  the  face  domain,  visual  attention  has  long  been  viewed  as  a  crucial 
resource  for  full,  integrated  perception.  According  to  one  influential  account, 
attention  acts  like  glue  during  visual  encoding  that  binds  different  types  of 
information  belonging  to  the  same  stimulus  (e.  g.  Treisman,  1988,1993;  Treisman 
&  Gelade,  1980;  Treisman  &  Schmidt,  1982;  see  also  Lavie,  1997).  Thereby, 
object  features  such  as  colour  and  shape  are  perceived  independently  under 
conditions  of  inattention,  but  are  combined  into  a  multidimensional,  conscious 
percept  through  focused  visual  attention. 
So  far,  the  role  of  attention  in  face  encoding  has  been  considered  by  just  a  few 
studies  and  these  have  concentrated  on  only  one  face  dimension  -  the  perception  of 
identity  (Boutet,  Gentes-Hawn  &  Chaudhuri,  2002;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002; 
Reinitz,  Bartlett  &  Searcy,  1997;  Reinitz,  Morrissey  &  Demb,  1994).  All  of  these 
studies  examined  whether  attention  integrates  featural  (or  part-based)  facial 
information  into  holistic  percepts,  in  which  these  features  and  their  spatial  relation 
are  captured  as  an  inseparable  source  of  information.  This  was  done  by 
manipulating  attention  to  or  away  from  faces  during  learning  and  by  measuring 
whole/part  recognition  at  a  subsequent  test  phase.  As  face  processing  is 
particularly  dependent  on  holistic  information  (e.  g.  Tanaka  &  Farah,  1993;  Tanaka 
&  Sengco,  1997),  it  seems  plausible  that  distinct  facial  features,  similar  to 
Treisman's  (1988,1993)  object  features,  might  be  integrated  into  holistic  percepts 
by  attention.  However,  previous  studies  failed  to  produce  consistent  results,  with 
some  suggesting  that  holistic  processing  requires  attentional  encoding  (Palermo  & 
Rhodes,  2002;  Reinitz  et  al,  1994),  but  others  reporting  that  holistic  processing 
proceeds  without  attention  (Boutet  et  al,  2002;  Reinitz  et  al,  1997). 
60 As  even  immediate  memory  for  faces  appears  remarkably  poor,  these  studies  may 
have  suffered  from  possible  memory  confounds  (see  e.  g.  Simons  &  Levin,  1998). 
The  inconsistencies  might  also  reflect  the  use  of  facial  features,  which  were  either 
defined  in  terms  of  local  face  characteristics  corresponding  to  particular  lexical 
values,  such  as  the  eyes,  nose  and  mouth  (Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002;  Reinitz  et  al, 
1994,1997),  or  particular  face  regions,  for  instance  the  top  versus  the  bottom  face 
half  (Boutet  et  al,  2002).  However,  this  may  not  be  compatible  with  how  facial 
features  are  actually  represented  by  the  brain,  which  might  not  be  spatially  distinct 
but  perhaps  represent  different  types  of  configural  face  information,  such  as 
expression  and  identity  (see  e.  g.  Calder  et  al,  2000).  Therefore,  if  attention  is  a 
crucial  resource  for  feature  encoding  in  face  perception,  then  it  is  possible  that  it 
may  be  involved  in  the  integration  of  expression  and  identity  information  from  the 
same  face  into  a  complete  percept.  To  examine  this,  a  variation  of  Lavie's  (1997) 
response  competition  paradigm  was  used. 
Similar  to  Garner's  (1974,1976)  selective  attention  methodology,  Lavie's  (1997) 
paradigm  was  originally  applied  to  basic  object  attributes,  such  as  colour  and 
shape,  to  assess  the  visual  integration  of  such  features.  During  Lavie's  (1997)  task, 
participants  were  required  to  respond  to  a  central  target,  while  ignoring  two 
flanking  distractors.  Responses  were  based  on  particular  conjunctions 
(combinations)  of  two  features.  For  example,  participants  pressed  one  key  for  a 
purple  cross  or  another  for  a  green  circle  on  a  critical  trial,  but  withheld  responses 
on  non-critical  trials  when  the  target  consisted  of  the  opposite  conjunctions  (i.  e.  a 
green  cross  or  a  purple  circle).  Thus,  colour  or  shape  alone  was  not  sufficient  for 
correct  target  classification. 
61 Importantly,  the  unattended  distractors  were  also  processed  and  could  influence 
target  responses  by  way  of  their  response  congruency.  On  a  congruent  trial,  the 
distractors  would  contain  the  same  target  features,  thus  facilitating  activation  of 
the  correct  response.  On  an  incongruent  trial,  on  the  other  hand,  response  times  to 
a  particular  target  conjunction  (e.  g.  a  purple  cross)  were  slowed  by  the  presence  of 
an  incongruent  set  of  target  features  amongst  the  distractors  (e.  g.  a  green  circle). 
The  distractors  could  also  influence  target  classification  through  the  combination 
of  their  features.  Thus,  response-associated  distractor  information  (both  congruent 
and  incongruent)  was  presented  either  as  a  conjunction,  in  which  response-critical 
features  were  presented  within  one  common  distractor,  or  as  a  disjunction,  in 
which  critical  features  were  separated  across  both  distractors.  To  illustrate,  in  a 
conjunctive  congruent  trial  participants  may  have  been  shown  a  purple  cross  target 
flanked  by  a  purple  cross  distractor  on  one  side  and  a  response-neutral  distractor 
on  the  other  side  (e.  g.  a  brown  triangle).  In  a  disjunctive  congruent  trial,  on  the 
other  hand,  a  stimulus  display  may  have  consisted  of  a  purple  cross  target  flanked 
by  a  purple  triangle  and  a  brown  cross. 
Comparing  target-distractor  congruency  effects  between  conjunctive  and 
disjunctive  conditions  was  critical  for  establishing  the  role  of  attention  in  colour 
and  shape  integration.  Thus,  if  colour  and  shape  information  are  not  separately 
accessible  from  unattended  objects,  then  conjunctive  stimuli  should  have 
interfered  more  with  target  classification  than  disjunctive  distractors,  which  did 
not  match  the  targets  accurately.  Alternatively,  if  conjunction  information  is 
unavailable  under  inattention,  then  the  colour  and  shape  of  unattended  conjunctive 
and  disjunctive  distractors  should  have  interfered  equally  with  target  classification, 
because  their  individual  features  were  equal  in  terms  of  target-distractor 
62 congruency.  This  is  precisely  what  Lavie  (1997)  found,  conjunctive  and 
disjunctive  distractors  produced  equivalent  target-distractor  congruency  effects. 
The  present  experiment  examined  whether  these  findings  can  be  extended  to 
expression  and  identity  information  from  faces.  In  order  to  make  Lavie's  (1997) 
paradigm  relevant  for  such  a  task,  responses  were  now  based  on  expression- 
identity  conjunctions.  On  critical  trials,  which  made  up  two  thirds  of  all  trials, 
participants  responded  to  the  happy  face  of  one  person  (Person  A)  or  the  angry 
face  of  another  person  (Person  B).  On  non-critical  trials,  on  the  other  hand, 
participants  pressed  a  single  response  key  for  the  opposite  expression-identity 
combinations.  Additionally,  two  irrelevant  face  distractors  were  presented  to  the 
left  and  right  of  the  target,  of  which  one  identity  and  one  expression  were  either 
congruent  or  incongruent  with  the  target.  In  the  Conjunctive  condition,  this 
identity  and  expression  information  was  conjoined  in  one  of  the  distractors  (e.  g. 
happy  Person  A)  with  the  other  distractor  displaying  two  response  neutral  features 
(e.  g.  surprised  Person  Q.  In  the  Disjunctive  condition,  the  same  information  was 
disjoined  across  both  distractors  (e.  g.  happy  Person  C,  surprised  Person  A). 
Displays  were  also  included  in  which  distractors  were  congruent  (or  incongruent) 
in  expression  or  identity  alone  to  assess  their  specific  contribution  to  distractor 
congruency  effects.  It  is  possible  that  distractor  interference  could  arise  from  just 
one  face  dimension.  For  example,  in  the  preceding  experiments  it  was  found  that 
identity  information  was  more  discriminative  than  expression.  If  the  same  applies 
here,  then  distractor  interference  may  predominantly  reflect  identity  information. 
Equivalent  congruency  effects  between  the  Conjunctive,  the  Disjunctive  and  the 
Identity  condition,  but  not  for  the  Expression  condition  would  reveal  this.  Finally, 
63 in  one  further  condition  both  distractors  in  a  display  consisted  of  features  from 
outwith  the  possible  target  set  (the  Neutral  condition),  for  example,  a  happy  face 
target  of  Person  A  flanked  by  surprised  Person  C  on  one  side  and  sad  Person  D  on 
the  other.  This  baseline  condition  was  included  to  examine  whether  any 
congruency  effects  reflect  interference  or  facilitation  during  target  classification. 
If  identity  and  expression  require  attention  for  visual  integration  into  a  single 
multi-dimensional  face  percept,  the  following  RT  pattern  may  be  predicted.  The 
Conjunctive  and  Disjunctive  conditions  should  show  reliable  target-distractor 
congruency  effects,  with  slower  RTs  to  incongruent  than  congruent  distractors. 
These  congruency  effects  should  be  equivalent,  since  under  conditions  of 
inattention  the  only  way  in  which  these  stimuli  differ,  their  conjunctive  format, 
should  be  inaccessible.  Furthermore,  if  these  congruency  effects  arise  from  both 
types  of  facial  information,  then  the  Identity  and  Expression  conditions  should  also 
reveal  noticeable  distractor  interference. 
Method 
Subjects  Eighteen  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  whose 
ages  ranged  from  19-24  years,  volunteered  to  participate  in  the  experiment  for  a 
small  fee.  All  reported  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Stimuli  &  Apparatus  An  Apple  Macintosh  computer  presented  the  stimuli  and 
recorded  responses  using  Superlab  1.74.  The  stimuli  consisted  of  greyscale 
photographs  of  four  males  (person  A,  B,  C,  and  D)  from  the  Ekman  and  Friesen 
(1976)  pictures  of  facial  affect.  Of  each  person  a  happy,  angry,  surprised,  and  sad 
picture  were  used.  To  remove  extraneous  background,  all  images  were  ellipse- 
64 shaped  and  measured  3.5  cm  x  4.9  cm  (3.4°  x  4.7°  of  visual  angle  (VA)  at  a 
viewing  distance  of  60  cm,  fixed  by  means  of  a  chinrest).  These  faces  were  used  to 
construct  stimulus  displays  containing  a  central  target  with  one  distractor  to  the 
left  and  one  to  the  right.  The  nearest  target-distractor  contours  were  0.6  cm  (0.6°  of 
VA)  apart. 
There  were  two  main  types  of  stimulus  displays,  corresponding  to  the  critical  and 
non-critical  trials  of  the  experiment.  In  critical  trials,  the  targets  consisted  of  angry 
Person  A  or  happy  Person  B.  These  targets  were  combined  with  distractors  under 
five  conditions.  In  these  conditions,  with  the  exception  of  the  Neutral  condition, 
some  of  the  distractor  features  could  be  either  congruent  (same  response  category) 
or  incongruent  (different  response  category)  with  the  target.  In  the  Conjunctive 
condition,  response-congruent  (or  incongruent)  expression  and  identity  features 
were  conjoined  within  one  distractor,  with  the  other  distracor  containing  two 
response-neutral  features  (i.  e.  Person  C  or  D,  sad  or  surprised  expressions;  see 
Figure  2.7  overleaf).  In  the  Disjunctive  condition,  these  features  were  disjoined 
between  both  distractors  (see  Figure  2.7).  In  the  Identity  condition,  the  distractors 
contained  just  one  congruent  (or  incongruent)  identity  feature,  with  the  remaining 
three  distractor  features  displaying  response-neutral  features.  Similarly,  in  the 
Expression  condition,  the  distractors  contained  just  one  congruent  (or  incongruent) 
expression  feature  while  the  remaining  three  distractor  features  were  response 
neutral. 
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Figure  2.7  Example  displays  from  Experiment  3.  The  critical  targets  were  angry  Person  A 
(right  column)  and  happy  Person  B  (left  column).  In  the  Conjunction  and  Disjunction 
conditions,  one  distractor  identity  and  one  distractor  expression  were  either  congruent 
(same  response-category)  or  incongruent  (different  response  category)  with  the  target.  In 
the  Identity  condition,  one  of  the  distractors  displayed  a  response-associated  identity 
(Person  A  or  Person  B).  In  the  Expression  condition,  one  of  the  distractor  faces  displayed 
a  response-associated  expression  (happy  or  angry).  The  remaining  distractor  features  were 
always  response-neutral  (i.  e.  Person  C,  Person  D,  sad,  surprised).  In  the  Neutral  condition, 
all  distractor  features  were  response-neutral  (left  column,  bottom  row).  Non-critical 
targets  consisted  of  the  opposite  expression  and  identity  combinations  (e.  g.  happy  Person 
A;  right  column,  bottom  row). 
66 For  non-critical  displays,  the  targets  consisted  of  the  opposite  expression  and 
identity  conjunctions  (i.  e.  happy  Person  A  and  angry  Person  B;  see  Figure  2.7),  but 
contained  exactly  the  same  distractors  as  the  critical  trials.  As  a  consequence, 
target-distractor  compatibility  was  ambiguous  on  non-critical  trials.  Note, 
however,  that  the  purpose  of  these  trials  was  singularly  to  ensure  that  participants 
were  responding  to  the  correct  combinations  of  both  target  dimensions,  expression 
and  identity,  and  response-congruency  effects  were  not  analyzed  for  these 
conditions.  Thus,  the  same  distractor  combinations  were  used  for  non-critical  as 
for  critical  trials  to  avoid  cuing  their  presence  via  the  distractors. 
Pairing  the  critical  targets  (angry  Person  A,  happy  Person  B)  in  the  Conjunctive, 
Disjunctive,  Identity,  and  Expression  conditions,  with  each  of  the  neutral 
distractors  (Person  C  and  D,  sad  and  surprised),  and  under  each  level  of 
congruency  (congruent  vs.  incongruent)  resulted  in  a  total  of  64  stimulus  displays. 
For  non-critical  targets,  64  analogous  displays  were  made.  In  addition,  16  Neutral 
displays  (8  critical,  8  non-critical)  were  created  by  pairing  critical  and  non-critical 
targets  with  only  response-neutral  distractor  features. 
Procedure 
Prior  to  the  main  task  the  participants  underwent  a  training  phase  to  learn  the  four 
face  identities:  Participants  were  shown  four  arrays  of  the  face  identities,  each 
array  depicting  the  four  faces  (Person  A,  B,  C&  D)  with  a  different  expression 
(angry,  happy,  sad,  surprised).  This  was  followed  by  3  blocks  of  64  trials  (4 
identities  x4  expressions  x  4)  in  which  the  faces  had  to  be  classified  according  to 
identity  (Blocks  1&  3)  and  expression  (Block  2).  Response  accuracy  was 
emphasized  in  the  instructions  and  feedback  for  incorrect  responses  was  given  by  a 
67 warning  tone.  Participants  had  to  achieve  less  than  10%  errors  for  identity 
classifications  to  proceed  to  the  main  task.  Of  18  participants,  12  completed  the 
training  phase  twice  to  meet  these  criteria. 
In  the  main  task,  participants  were  told  that  the  task  involved  making  speeded 
decisions  to  expressive  face  targets,  presented  at  fixation,  while  ignoring  two 
flanking  distractor  faces.  Subjects  were  requested  to  respond  to  angry  Person  A  by 
pressing  the  "D"  key  and  to  happy  Person  B  by  pressing  the  "L"  key  on  a  standard 
computer  keyboard,  and  to  press  the  <space>  bar  to  both  happy  Person  A  and 
angry  Person  B.  Each  trial  began  with  a  fixation  cross,  displayed  for  1000  ms, 
followed  by  a  target-distractor  display  for  200  ms  (i.  e.  too  briefly  to  permit 
stimulus-responsive  saccades  to  distractors),  ending  with  a  blank  screen  until  a 
response  had  been  made.  All  subjects  underwent  12  blocks  of  54  randomly- 
ordered  trials  (36  critical  &  18  non-critical  trials).  The  experimental  conditions 
were  randomly  intermixed  within  blocks.  Blocks  1  and  2  served  as  practice  and 
were  excluded  from  analysis. 
Results 
Errors  Incorrect  responses  were  made  on  3.1%  of  critical  trials  and  were  evenly 
matched  across  all  conditions  (see  Figure  2.8  overleaf).  For  non-critical  displays, 
errors  were  made  on  7.9%  of  all  trials.  As  critical  trials  were  twice  as  likely  as 
non-critical  trials,  this  difference  might  reflect  anticipatory  response  strategies. 
Overall,  however,  participants  were  accurate.  This  indicates  that  responses  were 
based  on  both  target  features,  expression  and  identity.  Errors  were  not  analyzed 
further. 
68 RTs  The  median  correct  RTs  were  computed  as  a  function  of  distractor  type 
(Conjunctive,  Disjunctive,  Identity,  Expression,  Neutral)  and  target-distractor 
congruency  (congruent  vs.  incongruent).  The  means  of  these  RTs  are  shown  in 
Figure  2.8. 
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Figure  2.8  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  (RTs,  in  msec)  and  percentage  errors  as  a 
function  of  distractor  type  and  congruency  for  the  critical  conditions  in  Experiment  3. 
Vertical  bars  represent  the  standard  error  (SE)  of  the  means.  '  Non-critical  trials:  mean  RT, 
503  ms;  error  rate,  8%. 
Similar  to  error  rates,  RTs  were  slightly  slower  for  non-critical  than  critical  trials, 
which  provides  further  evidence  that  participants  might  have  formed  expectancies 
to  both  types  of  trials.  More  important,  neither  the  Conjunction  nor  the  Disjunction 
Throughout  this  thesis,  standard  error  bars  for  within-subject  designs  are  based  on  within- 
participant  variability  (see  Loftus  &  Masson,  1994).  This  provides  identical  error  terms  for  all 
conditions  by  legitimately  ignoring  between-subject  variance. 
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Expression  Neutral condition  showed  a  congruency-based  response  pattern  and  the  Expression 
condition  actually  revealed  a  marginal  reverse  trend  (-  6  ms).  In  fact,  only  the 
Identity  condition  revealed  markedly  faster  RTs  to  congruent  than  to  incongruent 
displays.  However,  a2  (congruent  vs.  incongruent)  x4  (Conjunction,  Disjunction, 
Identity,  Expression)  within-subjects  ANOVA  failed  to  find  an  effect  of 
congruency,  F(1,17)<l,  condition  F(3,51)<1,  or  an  interaction  between  both 
factors,  F(3,51)<1,  indicating  that  there  were  no  differences  between  any  of  these 
conditions.  A  separate  one-factor  ANOVA  of  condition  (Conjunction  vs. 
Disjunction  vs.  Identity  vs.  Expression  vs.  Neutral)  was  conducted  to  compare 
performance  in  the  Neutral  condition  with  all  other  critical  conditions.  This  did  not 
reveal  differences  between  any  of  the  conditions,  F(8,136)<1. 
Discussion 
The  present  study  employed  a  variation  of  Lavie's  (1997)  response  competition 
paradigm  to  examine  the  attentional  encoding  of  facial  expression  and  identity. 
Face  encoding  was  assessed  by  measuring  interference  from  distractor  features 
(i.  e.  expression  and  identity)  during  the  classification  of  a  face  target,  whereby  the 
distractors'  features  could  be  either  congruent  (same  response  category)  or 
incongruent  (different  response  category)  with  the  target.  Importantly,  congruent 
(or  incongruent)  features  were  either  combined  in  one  of  two  distractors  (the 
Conjunctive  condition)  or  separated  across  both  distractors  (the  Disjunctive 
condition).  According  to  this  design  two  opposing  predictions  were  made.  If 
expression  and  identity  require  attention  to  be  integrated  into  one  face  percept, 
then  the  conjunctive  format  of  the  unattended  distractor  faces  should  have  been 
inaccessible.  Thus,  Conjunctive  and  Disjunctive  conditions  should  have  yielded 
equivalent  congruency  effects.  Conversely,  if  attention  is  not  required  for 
70 perceptual  integration,  then  conjunctive  distractors  should  have  produced  larger 
congruency  effects  than  disjunctive  distractors  by  providing  exact  matches  (i.  e.  the 
correct  combinations  of  expression  and  identity)  for  the  target  set. 
Intriguingly,  the  RT  data  do  not  support  either  of  these  predictions,  as  no 
congruency  effects  were  found  in  the  Conjunctive  or  the  Disjunctive  condition. 
Indeed,  of  all  conditions,  a  slight  congruency  pattern  (of  13  ms)  was  only  observed 
in  the  Identity  condition.  However,  within  this  paradigm  a  congruency  effect  in  the 
Identity  condition  alone  is  improbable,  as  the  Conjunctive  and  Disjunctive 
conditions  provide  the  same  amount  of  potentially  distracting  identity  information. 
This  was  confirmed  by  the  statistical  analysis,  which  showed  that  there  were  no 
reliable  congruency  effects  in  any  of  the  distractor  conditions.  This  is  even  more 
striking  in  comparison  with  the  Neutral  condition,  in  which  the  distractors 
consisted  exclusively  of  identities  and  expressions  from  outwith  the  target  set. 
Thus,  if  response-associated  distractor  features  produced  any  target-distractor 
interference,  independent  even  of  congruency,  then  they  should  have  produced 
dissimilar  RTs  with  the  Neutral  condition.  However,  although  average  RTs  were 
marginally  faster  in  the  Neutral  condition  than  in  the  other  conditions,  none  of 
these  conditions  differed  statistically  from  each  other. 
The  failure  to  obtain  distractor  interference  in  this  experiment  means  that  the  role 
of  attention  in  the  integration  of  facial  expression  and  identity  information  remains 
unresolved.  Thus,  the  present  study  contributes  little  in  terms  of  data  to  the 
existing  research  concerned  with  the  role  of  attention  in  face  encoding  (Boutet  et 
al,  2002;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002;  Reinitz  et  al,  1994,1997).  Nonetheless,  the 
current  design  highlights  a  number  of  important  issues  that  have  been  neglected  in 
71 previous  studies,  and  that  may  require  consideration  in  future  research.  First, 
Reinitz  et  al  (1994,1997)  required  participants  to  study  novel  faces  under  divided- 
or  full-attention,  followed  by  a  subsequent  face  recognition  test  to  examine  the 
effects  of  attention  on  face  encoding.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002)  and  Boutet  et  al 
(2002)  also  examined  the  effects  of  unfamiliar  face  encoding  under  divided  or  full 
attention  with  a  subsequent  recognition  test.  However,  even  immediate  recognition 
memory  for  unfamiliar  faces  appears  remarkably  poor  (Simons  &  Levin,  1998). 
This  implies  that  previous  findings  might  have  been  subject  to  memory  confounds. 
By  contrast,  the  present  paradigm  measured  interference  from  simultaneously 
presented  faces,  thus  minimizing  any  memory  demands.  Although  this  particular 
design  was  unsuccessful,  future  studies  should  also  try  to  separate  effects  of 
attention  and  memory  in  face  processing. 
Second,  previous  studies  examined  the  encoding  of  facial  features  into  holistic 
faces,  whereby  features  were  defined  in  terms  of  lexical  values  (e.  g.  eyes,  nose, 
mouth)  or  face  regions  (e.  g.  top  half  vs.  bottom  half),  even  though  this  may  be 
incompatible  with  how  features  are  actually  presented  by  the  brain  (e.  g.  Ellis  et  al, 
1997).  The  current  design  avoided  similar,  arbitrary  definitions  by  capturing 
different  facial  `features'  in  terms  of  the  distinctive  meaning  that  they  convey, 
such  as  expression  and  identity.  This  has  the  added  advantage  of  focusing  on  more 
than  the  recognition  of  identity,  which  is just  one  type  of  information  that  can  be 
derived  from  faces. 
In  view  of  these  advantages,  the  complete  absence  of  distractor  interference  in  this 
experiment  is  surprising.  Particularly,  since  Lavie  (1997)  obtained  reliable  colour- 
shape  interference  in  a  similar  design.  Of  course,  this  could  be  explained  in  terms 
72 of  the  visual  attributes  of  faces,  which  are  visually  more  complex  than  simple 
objects.  However,  faces  were  classified  quickly  and  with  few  errors  as  targets,  and 
one  might  expect  that  the  distractor  faces  could  have  been  processed  just  as  easily. 
In  fact,  as  only  four  different  face  targets  were  used  in  Experiment  3,  target- 
distractor  interference  might  have  been  obtained  even  just  through  picture-based 
cues  than  identity  and  expression  processing,  as  was  suggested  previously  as  a 
potential  explanation  for  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998,1999)  findings  (see  p.  41). 
Moreover,  target-distractor  interference  is  generally  very  robust  and  has  been 
obtained  in  letter-letter  (e.  g.  Eriksen  &  Eriksen,  1974),  picture-word  (e.  g.  Smith  & 
Magee,  1980),  and  face-name  interference  tasks  (Young,  Ellis,  Flude,  McWeeney 
&  Hay,  1986).  So,  how  might  the  absence  of  distractor  interference  in  the  present 
experiment  have  been  caused?  A  possible  explanation  is  that  the  distractor  faces 
did  not  interfere  with  target  classification  because  they  were  not  processed  at  all. 
According  to  the  perceptual  load  theory  of  selective  attention  (Lavie,  1995,2000), 
the  processing  of  task-relevant  and  task-irrelevant  information  proceeds 
automatically  until  available  processing  capacity  is  exhausted.  However,  irrelevant 
information  is  excluded  from  processing  if  task-relevant  processing  consumes  all 
available  processing  capacity.  If  the  same  principles  apply  to  face  processing,  then 
it  is  possible  that  a  relevant  face  target  could  monopolize  available  resources  to  the 
detriment  of  the  distractor  faces.  This  would  imply  a  capacity  limit  for  face 
processing,  such  that  only  a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time.  This  possibility 
is  examined  in  the  next  chapter. 
73 Chapter  3  Capacity  Limits  for  Face  Processing:  Face 
Distractor  Interference  in  Sex  and  Semantic  Classification 
Tasks 
Introduction 
In  the  preceding  chapter,  the  role  of  attention  in  facial  expression  and  identity 
processing  was  assessed  in  a  response-competition  experiment  (i.  e.  experiments 
concerning  distractor  interference  with  target  classification;  see  Experiment  3),  in 
which  subjects  categorized  face  targets  according  to  specific  expression-identity 
conjunctions  while  ignoring  task-irrelevant  distractor  faces.  Although  the  target 
faces  were  classified  fast  and  accurately,  the  same  faces  did  not  interfere  with  face 
target  classification  when  they  were  presented  as  distractors.  This  could  be 
explained  by  supposing  capacity  limits  in  face  processing,  such  that  only  a  single 
face  (i.  e.  the  target)  may  be  processed  at  a  time.  On  their  own,  however,  these 
results  provide  only  a  hint  at  such  limits  as  target  and  distractor  stimuli  were 
constrained  to  faces  images.  Under  these  conditions  task-irrelevant  faces  might 
have  been  processed  even  if  they  did  not  act  as  distractors,  or  alternatively,  the 
face  targets  might  not  have  been  subject  to  any  distractor  interference,  from  face  or 
nonface  stimuli.  Therefore,  the  question  addressed  in  the  current  chapter  is 
whether  responses  to  a  face  target  can  be  affected  by  irrelevant  distractor  faces 
under  conditions  that  normally  allow  for  distractor  interference. 
Thus  far,  several  studies  have  shown  that  face  distractors  are  processed  reliably 
with  a  concurrently  presented  nonface  target.  Young,  Ellis,  Flude,  McWeeney  & 
Hay  (1986)  examined  interference  effects  between  simultaneously  presented 
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semantic  categorization  task  (pop-star  vs.  politician),  participants  were  required  to 
classify  either  a  face  or  a  name  while  ignoring  the  distractor,  which  could  be 
congruent  (i.  e.  same  occupation)  or  incongruent  (different  occupation)  with  the 
target.  Names  reliably  interfered  with  the  classification  of  face  targets.  Moreover, 
faces  also  interfered  with  the  classification  of  name  targets.  Indeed,  faces 
interfered  more  with  names  than  names  interfered  with  faces. 
Recently,  Lavie,  Ro  &  Russell  (2003)  extended  this  paradigm  to  investigate  the 
effect  of  task-relevant  load  on  irrelevant  distractor  processing.  According  to 
Lavie's  perceptual  load  theory  of  selective  attention  (Lavie,  1995,2000;  see 
Chapter  1),  the  processing  of  visual  information  proceeds  automatically  until 
available  capacity  is  exhausted.  Therefore,  irrelevant  information  is  excluded  from 
processing  when  task-relevant,  attended-to  stimuli  demand  all  available  capacity. 
To  provide  a  test  for  this  theory  with  meaningful  stimuli,  Lavie  et  al  (2003) 
measured  interference  from  a  flanking  distractor  upon  the  classification  of  a 
central  word  or  a  famous  name  embedded  among  several  letter  strings.  Perceptual 
load  of  the  relevant  task  was  manipulated  by  varying  the  number  of  strings  in  the 
interference  displays.  In  accord  with  the  load  theory,  increasing  relevant  load 
eliminated  congruency  effects  from  meaningful  nonface  distractors.  Intriguingly 
though,  interference  from  famous  face  distractors  was  entirely  unaffected  by  these 
load  manipulations,  leading  Lavie  et  al  (2003)  to  suggest  that  face  processing  may 
proceed  automatically  (for  similar  claims  see  Farah,  Wilson,  Drain  &  Tanaka, 
1995),  independent  of  target  processing. 
75 Comparable  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  a  study  by  Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis 
(2002)  in  which  an  irrelevant  famous  face  distractor  showed  equivalent  repetition 
priming  independent  of  variations  in  task-relevant  load  in  a  letter-string  task,  even 
though  explicit  memory  for  the  faces  was  markedly  affected  by  this  manipulation. 
There  have  also  been  a  number  of  reports  of  prosopagnosic  patients  who  show  the 
normal  pattern  of  interference  from  distractor  faces  when  asked  to  make  semantic 
classifications  of  names,  despite  being  explicitly  unable  to  recognise  familiar  faces 
(e.  g.  de  Haan,  Young  &  Newcombe,  1987;  Sergent  &  Signoret,  1992b),  and  these 
findings  have  been  used  extensively  to  inform  theories  of  covert  recognition  in 
prosopagnosia  (Young  &  Burton,  1999).  The  findings  of  all  these  studies  suggest 
that  face  processing  is  very  robust  even  across  manipulations,  which  should  make 
it  difficult.  In  Experiment  3  one  might  have  therefore  expected  the  normal  pattern 
of  interference,  with  face  categorization  times  varying  as  a  function  of  target- 
distractor  congruency.  However,  unlike  Experiment  3  none  of  these  studies 
examined  face  processing  in  multi-face  displays,  and  none  imply  that  face 
processing  is  entirely  capacity-free.  Indeed,  Lavie  et  al  (2003)  suggest  that  face 
processing  may  be  subject  to  its  own  capacity  limits. 
So  far,  evidence  for  face  processing  limits  has  been  rather  indirect  and  has  accrued 
mostly  from  studies  that  were  not  originally  motivated  by  this  issue.  For  example, 
Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002)  asked  subjects  to  remember  a  centrally  presented  target 
face  while  matching  two  flanker  faces.  Memory  for  the  central  face  was  assessed 
using  a  two-alternative  recognition  test,  consisting  of  either  two  intact  faces,  the 
target  and  a  foil  image  that  differed  from  the  target  by  one  feature  (e.  g.  a  pair  of 
eyes),  or  two  exemplars  of  a  particular  feature,  one  of  which  was  extracted  from 
the  target.  Successfully  matching  the  flanker  faces  resulted  in  better  memory  for 
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presented  inverted.  Conversely,  matching  upright  flanker  faces  eliminated  this 
advantage,  suggesting  a  processing  limit  for  upright,  intact  faces  that  is 
independent  of  any  general  processing  limits.  Using  a  different  technique,  Boutet 
&  Chaudhuri  (2001)  observed  perceptual  rivalry  of  two  upright  overlapping  faces, 
one  rotated  45°  and  the  other  45°  counterclockwise,  whereby  only  one  of  the  faces 
could  be  retrieved  at  a  subsequent  recognition  test.  Two  inverted  faces,  on  the 
other  hand,  were  perceived  as  an  ambiguous  combination  of  both,  again 
suggesting  upright  face  processing  limits.  Finally,  Jenkins,  Lavie  &  Driver  (2003) 
examined  dilution  of  congruency  effects  in  a  famous  name  categorization  task. 
They  found  that  interference  from  a  famous  face  distractor  could  be  diluted  by  the 
presence  of  another  (response-neutral)  face,  but  not  by  phase-shifted  faces, 
inverted  faces,  or  meaningful  nonface  objects.  In  other  words,  processing  of  the 
distractor  face  seemed  to  be  reduced  by  competition  from  an  additional  face,  but 
not  by  general  competition  from  different  classes  of  stimuli. 
If  limits  on  face  processing  do  apply,  then  it  is  possible  that  a  distractor  face  might 
not  influence  responses  to  a  target  face,  as  the  resources  needed  to  process  the 
distractor  would  already  be  engaged  in  processing  the  target.  This  could  provide 
an  explanation  for  the  absence  of  face-face  interference  in  Experiment  3.  Note 
however,  that  target-distractor  interference  is  a  highly  robust  effect,  which  has 
been  demonstrated  with  various  classes  of  stimulus  pairs  (e.  g.  letter-letter,  Eriksen 
&  Eriksen,  1974;  picture-word,  Smith  &  Magee,  1980;  face-name,  Young  et  al, 
1986).  Given  this  remarkable  generality,  the  absence  of  any  face-face  interference, 
at  least  under  conditions  that  normally  produce  target-distractor  interference, 
seems  a  somewhat  counterintuitive  prediction.  The  present  chapter  provides  a 
77 direct  test  for  this  prediction,  by  assessing  interference  from  faces  and  nonface 
comparisons  over  a  series  of  five  experiments. 
The  first  experiment  examined  capacity  limits  in  face  processing  with  unfamiliar 
faces  in  a  sex  classification  task.  Most  previous  studies  that  hint  at  capacity  limits 
for  face  processing  rely  on  memory  for  previously  unfamiliar  faces  (e.  g.  Boutet  & 
Chaudhuri,  2001;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002).  However,  memory  for  unfamiliar 
faces  appears  remarkably  poor,  even  over  a  very  short  time  interval  (see  e.  g. 
Simons  &  Levin,  1998),  and  this  may  have  contributed  to  previous  findings.  Sex 
judgements,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  performed  very  quickly  and  without 
difficulty  on  unfamiliar  faces  (e.  g.  Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling  &  Young,  1987). 
Moreover,  faces  usually  contain  some  salient  external  sex-cues  such  as  hairstyle. 
These  face-related  cues  might  produce  interference  even  when  subtler  types  of 
facial  information,  such  as  expression  (as  for  the  expression-identity  decisions  in 
Experiment  3),  do  not.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  noted  that  previous  studies 
reporting  face-nonface  interference  used  semantic  decisions,  which  require  access 
to  facial  identity  but  can  be  made  independent  of  a  person's  sex  (see  e.  g.  Bruce  & 
Young,  1986;  Burton,  Bruce  &  Johnston,  1990;  Burton,  Bruce  &  Hancock,  1999). 
Subsequent  experiments  in  this  chapter  therefore  examined  face-face  interference 
with  semantic  decisions  to  provide  a  closer  analogue  to  previous  face-nonface 
interference  tasks  (e.  g.  Jenkins  et  al,  2003;  Lavie  et  al,  2003;  Young  et  al,  1986), 
and  to  generalize  the  findings  of  Experiment  4  from  unfamiliar  faces  in  a  sex 
decision  to  known  faces  in  semantic  tasks. 
78 Experiment  4 
In  this  experiment  capacity  limits  in  face  processing  were  assessed  with  unfamiliar 
faces  in  a  sex  classification  task.  Subjects  were  asked  to  classify  stimuli  presented 
at  fixation  as  being  male  or  female.  These  target  stimuli  were  either  unfamiliar 
faces  or  printed  four-letter  forenames,  and  they  were  flanked  by  the  distractor 
images  of  faces  and  names.  Processing  of  the  distractor  was  assessed  via  its 
congruency  effects  on  target  RTs  (i.  e.  same  sex  vs.  different  sex).  However,  in 
contrast  to  previous  studies,  which  only  examined  face-name  interference  (e.  g. 
Jenkins  et  al,  2003;  Lavie  et  al,  2003;  Young  et  al,  1986),  additional  conditions 
were  included  to  assess  within  category  interference  of  face  and  nonface  stimuli. 
In  total,  congruency  effects  were  measured  under  four  conditions.  These 
conditions  involved  combining  a  face  target  and  a  face  distractor  (in  the  FACE- 
face  condition),  combining  a  face  target  and  a  name  distractor  (the  FACE-name 
condition),  combining  a  name  target  and  a  face  distractor  (the  NAME  face 
condition),  and  combining  two  names  (the  NAME-name  condition).  If  face 
processing  is  capacity  limited,  one  might  expect  measurable  congruency  effects 
with  this  paradigm,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  within-category  interference  in  the 
FACE  face  condition.  Alternatively,  if  several  faces  can  be  processed 
simultaneously,  then  face  distractors  should  also  interfere  with  the  classification  of 
face  targets. 
Method 
Subjects  Thirty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  whose 
ages  ranged  from  19-25  years,  participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small 
payment.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
79 Design  &  Stimuli  An  Apple  Macintosh  computer  was  used  to  present  stimuli  and 
record  responses,  using  PsyScope  1.2.5.  Photographs  of  four  unfamiliar  female 
and  four  unfamiliar  male  models  served  as  face  stimuli.  These  images  were 
cropped  to  remove  extraneous  background,  but  the  outlines  of  all  faces  including 
differences  in  hairstyle  were  preserved.  In  addition,  4  four-letter  printed  female 
forenames  (Anne,  Kate,  Lisa  &  Mary)  and  4  male  forenames  (Hugh,  John,  Paul  & 
Tony),  shown  in  36-point  Times  font,  served  as  name  stimuli.  All  faces  were 
greyscale  on  a  black  background  and  measured  3.6  cm  x  4.5  cm  (subtending  3.4°  x 
4.3°  of  VA  at  a  viewing  distance  of  60  cm).  The  names  were  printed  white  on 
black  and  were  between  2.4  cm  (the  shortest  name)  and  3.1  cm  (the  longest  name) 
in  width  (2.  Y-3.0'  of  VA).  These  sixteen  images  were  used  to  construct  stimulus 
displays  containing  a  central  target  image  (face  or  name),  flanked  by  a  distractor 
image  (face  or  name)  that  could  be  congruent  (same  sex)  or  incongruent  (different 
sex)  with  the  target  (see  Figure  3.1  overleaf).  The  nearest  target-distractor  contours 
were  1.25  cm  apart  (1.2°  of  VA).  Distractors  were  equally  likely  to  appear  on  the 
left  or  right  of  the  target  (this  manipulation  produced  no  reliable  effects  or 
interactions  and  is  therefore  not  reported  further  below). 
Pairing  each  of  the  16  target  stimuli  with  each  class  of  distractor  (face  or  name) 
under  each  level  of  congruency  (same  or  different  sex)  resulted  in  a  total  of  64 
displays.  For  displays  in  which  target  and  distractor  were  of  the  same  sex  (e.  g.  two 
male  faces,  or  two  male  names),  stimuli  of  two  different  persons  were  used  (see 
Figure  3.1). 
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Figure  3.1  Example  displays  from  Experiment  4.  The  target  could  be  a  face  or  a  four- 
letter  forename,  and  was  accompanied  by  a  face  or  a  name  distractor,  which  could  be 
either  congruent  (same  sex)  or  incongruent  (different  sex)  with  the  target. 
Procedure 
Subjects  viewed  the  displays  at  a  distance  of  60  cm,  which  was  kept  constant  by 
means  of  a  chin-rest.  Each  trial  began  with  a  fixation  cross  for  750  ms,  followed 
by  the  target-distractor  display  for  200  ms  (i.  e.  too  briefly  to  permit  a  stimulus- 
responsive  saccade  to  the  distractor),  and  ended  with  a  blank  interval  until  a 
response  was  made.  Subjects  were  instructed  to  classify  the  target  image  as  a  male 
by  pressing  the  "D"  key  or  as  a  female  by  pressing  the  "L"  key  on  a  standard 
computer  keyboard,  as  quickly  and  as  accurately  as  possible,  while  ignoring  the 
distractors.  Feedback  for  errors  was  given  immediately  by  a  short  warning  tone. 
Button-press  response  latencies  were  measured  from  stimulus  onset.  Subjects 
81 completed  one  practice  block  of  32  trials  and  6  experimental  blocks  of  64 
randomly  ordered  trials,  and  could  take  short  breaks  between  blocks. 
Results 
Figure  3.2  shows  the  means  of  the  median  correct  RTs  for  all  conditions.  A2  (face 
vs.  name  target)  x2  (face  vs.  name  distractor)  x2  (congruent  vs.  incongruent) 
within-subjects  ANOVA  showed  a  main  effect  of  congruency,  F(1,29)=23.31, 
p<.  01,  with  slower  responses  to  incongruent  displays,  and  a  main  effect  of  target 
type,  F(1,29)=32.51,  p<.  01,  with  faster  responses  to  face  targets  than  to  name 
targets.  No  main  effect  of  distractor  type  was  found,  F(1,29)<1. 
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Figure  3.2  Mean  reaction  times  (in  msec)  across  subjects  (n=30)  as  a  function  of  distractor 
congruency  and  target-distractor  pairings  in  Experiment  4.  Vertical  bars  represent  the 
standard  error  of  the  means. 
The  effect  of  target  type  was  modified  by  an  interaction  with  distractor  type, 
F(1,29)=6.02,  p<.  05,  an  interaction  with  congruency,  F(1,29)=7.73,  p<.  01,  and  a 
three-way  interaction  between  all  three  factors,  F(1,29)=5.48,  p<.  05.  As  Figure  3.2 
82 suggests,  analysis  of  simple  main  effects  revealed  significant  congruency  effects  in 
the  FACE-name  condition,  F(1,29)=4.52,  p<.  05,  the  NAME  face  condition, 
F(1,29)=16.06,  p<.  01,  and  the  NAME-name  condition,  F(1,29)=9.62,  p<.  01.  By 
contrast,  there  was  no  effect  in  the  FACE  face  condition,  F(1,29)<1. 
Error  rates  were  analyzed  as  the  RT  data.  Incongruent  displays  resulted  in  a  slight 
increase  in  errors  in  the  NAME  face  condition  (incongruent  8.0%,  congruent  4.0%) 
and  the  NAME-name  condition  (5.7%  vs.  5.1%),  but  no  corresponding  increase  in 
the  FACE  face  (2.7%  vs.  2.8%)  or  the  FACE-name  conditions  (3.8%  vs.  3.8%). 
ANOVA  showed  a  significant  main  effect  of  congruency,  F(1,29)=9.91,  p<.  01,  a 
main  effect  of  target  type,  F(1,29)=23.03,  p<.  01,  and  an  interaction  of  target  type 
with  distractor  type,  F(1,29)=6.67,  p<.  05.  In  addition,  a  significant  congruency 
effect  was  found  in  the  NAME  face  condition,  F(1,29)=32.56,  p<.  01.  No  other 
comparisons  were  significant. 
Discussion 
Similar  to  Experiment  3,  no  distractor  congruency  effects  were  observed  when  a 
face  distractor  flanked  a  face  target.  However,  in  the  current  design  reliable 
congruency  effects  in  the  NAME-face  and  the  FACE-name  condition  contrasted 
this.  Moreover,  the  observed  distractor  extinction  in  the  FACE  face  condition  does 
not  seem  to  be  a  generalized  within-category  phenomenon,  as  distractor  names 
also  exerted  congruency  effects  onto  name  targets  in  the  NAME-name  condition. 
This  pattern  of  results  implies  that  processing  a  target  face  may  indeed  prevent  the 
processing  of  a  distractor  face,  and  converges  with  previous  findings  hinting  at 
capacity  limits  for  face  processing  (Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2001;  Jenkins  et  al,  2003; 
Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002).  However,  the  absence  of  face-face  interference  in  a  sex 
83 classification  task  is  nonetheless  surprising,  as  the  face  stimuli  preserved  salient 
external  sex-cues  such  as  hairstyle.  On  the  basis  of  such  cues  irrelevant  faces  could 
have  been  classified  even  without  processing  actual  face  information.  Thus,  these 
data  suggest  that  the  processing  of  an  attended-to  face  target  prevents  the 
processing  of  all  sex-related  information  from  an  additional  irrelevant  face, 
including  even  salient  external  features. 
Experiment  5 
Experiment  5  was  designed  to  replicate  the  findings  of  the  previous  experiment 
with  familiar  faces  in  a  semantic  classification  task.  The  retrieval  of  semantic 
information,  such  as  occupation  and  nationality,  requires  access  to  a  person's 
identity,  which  is  not  necessary  for  a  sex  judgement  to  be  made  (see  e.  g.  Bruce, 
1986;  Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling  &  Young,  1987;  but  see  also  Rossion,  2002). 
Consequently,  the  possibility  exists  that  the  results  of  Experiment  4  will  not 
generalize  to  tasks  that  require  the  identification  of  familiar  faces.  Note  also  that 
previous  studies  examining  face  interference  have  used  semantic  judgements, 
rather  than  sex  or  expression  decisions,  to  face-name  pairings  (Jenkins  et  al,  2003; 
Lavie  et  al,  2003;  Young  et  al,  1986).  Experiment  5  thus  provides  a  closer 
analogue  to  existing  designs  that  have  produced  face  distractor  interference. 
Method 
Subjects  Thirty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  whose 
ages  ranged  from  19-25  years,  participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small 
payment.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
84 Stimuli  &  Procedure  The  procedure  was  identical  to  Experiment  4,  except  that  the 
decision  to  be  made  was  whether  the  targets  were  pop-stars  or  politicians.  The 
surnames  and  faces  of  four  male  pop-stars  (Kurt  Cobain,  Eminem,  Michael 
Jackson  &  Elvis  Presley)  and  four  male  politicians  (George  Bush,  Bill  Clinton, 
Colin  Powell  &  Donald  Rumsfeld)  served  as  stimuli.  The  faces  were  manipulated 
as  in  Experiment  4.  The  surnames  were  shown  in  18-point  Arial  font,  measuring 
between  1.7  cm  and  2.9  cm  in  width  (1.6°  -  2.8°  of  VA).  As  before,  these  images 
were  used  to  construct  64  stimulus  displays  containing  a  central  face  or  name 
target,  flanked  by  a  face  or  a  name  distractor,  which  could  be  either  congruent  or 
incongruent  (same  or  different  occupation)  with  the  target  (see  Figure  3.3). 
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Figure  3.3  Example  displays  from  Experiment  S.  The  target  could  be  a  famous  face  or  a 
famous  name,  and  was  accompanied  by  a  face  or  name  distractor,  which  could  be  either 
congruent  (same  occupation)  or  incongruent  (different  occupation)  with  the  target. 
85 Results 
Figure  3.4  shows  the  means  of  the  median  correct  RTs  for  all  conditions.  As 
before,  a2  (face  vs.  name  target)  x2  (face  vs.  name  distractor)  x2  (congruent  vs. 
incongruent)  within-subjects  ANOVA  showed  a  main  effect  of  congruency, 
F(1,29)=42.36,  p<.  01,  with  slower  responses  to  incongruent  versus  congruent 
displays,  and  a  main  effect  of  target  type,  F(1,29)=26.02,  p<.  01,  with  faster 
responses  to  face  targets. 
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Figure  3.4  Mean  reaction  times  (in  msec)  across  subjects  (n=30)  as  a  function  of  distractor 
congruency  and  target-distractor  pairings  in  Experiment  5.  Vertical  bars  represent  the 
standard  error  of  the  means. 
In  addition,  a  main  effect  of  distractor  type  was  found,  F(1,29)=4.89,  p<.  05, 
reflecting  slower  responses  to  displays  containing  face  distractors  than  displays 
with  name  distractors.  These  main  effects  were  modified  by  two-way  interactions 
between  each  of  the  factors  [target  type  x  distractor  type,  F(1,29)=13.96,  p<.  01; 
target  type  x  congruency,  F(1,29)=33.47,  p<.  01;  and  distractor  type  x  congruency, 
86 F(1,29)=8.09,  p<.  01],  and  a  three-way  interaction  between  all  factors, 
F(1,29)=17.53,  p<.  01.  Simple  main  effect  analysis  revealed  significant  congruency 
effects  in  the  NAME  face  condition,  F(1,29)=74.32,  p<.  01,  and  the  NAME-name 
condition,  F(1,29)=7.19,  p<.  05.  However,  there  were  no  congruency  effects  in  the 
FACE  face,  F(1,29)<1,  or  the  FACE-name  condition,  F(1,29)=1.47. 
An  analogous  analysis  of  the  error  rates  was  carried  out.  Incongruent  displays 
resulted  in  an  increase  in  errors  in  the  FACE-name  condition  (incongruent  5.2%, 
congruent  3.3%),  the  NAME  face  (13.3%  vs.  6.0%),  and  the  NAME-name 
condition  (6.5%  vs.  5.6%).  However,  no  corresponding  increase  was  observed  in 
the  FACE  face  condition  (3.9%  vs.  3.7%).  ANOVA  revealed  main  effects  of 
congruency,  F(1,29)=33.39,  p<.  01,  target  type,  F(1,29)=28.01,  p<.  01,  and 
distractor  type,  F(1,29)=7.01,  p<.  05.  As  for  the  RTs,  there  were  also  interactions 
between  each  of  the  factors  [target  type  x  distractor  type,  F(1,29)=20.41,  p<.  01; 
target  type  x  congruency,  F(1,29)=15.27,  p<.  01;  and  distractor  type  x  congruency, 
F(1,29)=6.22,  p<.  05],  and  a  three-way  interaction  between  all  factors, 
F(1,29)=22.28,  p<.  01.  Significant  congruency  effects  were  found  in  the  FACE- 
name,  F(1,29)=4.45,  p<.  05,  and  NAME  face  conditions,  F(1,29)=67.22,  p<.  01.  No 
other  comparisons  were  significant. 
Discussion 
This  experiment  replicates  some  of  the  important  aspects  of  Experiment  4  with  a 
semantic  decision,  which,  unlike  a  sex  decision,  requires  the  identification  of  the 
face  stimuli.  As  before,  the  FACE  face  condition  failed  to  yield  a  congruency 
effect.  This  was  contrasted  by  a  reliable  congruency  effect  in  the  NAME  face 
condition,  which  indicates  that  irrelevant  faces  can  nonetheless  act  as  distractors 
87 when  a  semantic  task  is  used.  However,  unlike  the  sex  classification  task  of 
Experiment  4,  the  RT  data  failed  to  yield  a  reliable  interference  effect  when  a  face 
target  was  flanked  by  a  name  distractor  (a  9  ms  trend  in  this  direction  did  not 
approach  significance).  While  the  RTs  failed  to  show  reliable  distractor 
interference  in  the  FACE-name  condition,  a  significant  congruency  effect  in  error 
rates  was  found.  This  alone,  however,  does  not  support  parallel  processing  of  face 
target  and  name  distractor.  Alternatively,  it  might  represent  attentional  shifts  to  the 
distractor  locations,  which  may  have  enhanced  distractor  processing  to  the 
detriment  of  accurate  target  classification. 
Note  that  previous  studies  also  obtained  less,  albeit  significant,  interference  from 
name  distractors  during  face  classification  than  from  face  distractors  during  name 
classification  (Young  et  al,  1986).  In  contrast  to  Young  et  al  (1986),  who  presented 
target  and  distractor  centrally,  the  distractors  always  appeared  in  the  periphery  in 
this  experiment,  clearly  separated  from  the  target.  Although  this  arrangement  was 
designed  to  avoid  target-distractor  confusion,  numerous  studies  have  shown  that 
interference  can  be  significantly  reduced  by  increasing  spatial  separation  between 
a  target  and  a  distractor  (e.  g.  Gatti  &  Egeth,  1978;  Merikle  &  Gorewich,  1979; 
Hagenaar  &  Van  der  Heijden,  1986).  Therefore,  a  possible  explanation  for  the 
absence  of  any  FACE-name  interference  could  to  some  extent  lie  in  the  spatial 
arrangement  of  the  target-distractor  pairings.  Nonetheless,  the  absence  of  reliable 
distractor  interference  in  the  FACE-name  condition  is  potentially  problematic,  as  it 
raises  the  possibility  that  the  extinction  of  FACE  face  interference  does  not  reflect 
capacity  limits  in  face  processing,  but  rather  that  the  famous  face  targets  may  not 
have  been  subject  to  any  distractor  interference  in  the  present  task.  This  is 
explored  more  thoroughly  in  the  next  experiment. 
88 Experiment  6 
The  purpose  of  Experiment  6  was  two-fold.  The  first  aim  was  to  replicate  the 
interference  pattern  of  the  within-category  conditions  of  Experiment  5,  and 
specifically  to  produce  distractor  congruency  effects  in  both  between-category 
conditions  (i.  e.  the  NONFACE-face  and  the  FACE-nonface  conditions).  As  was 
discussed  in  the  preceding  experiment,  the  comparison  between  these  latter 
conditions  and  the  FACE  face  condition  is  vital  in  establishing  capacity  limits  for 
face  processing.  The  second  aim  was  to  examine  whether  nonface  stimuli  other 
than  names  are  subject  to  interference  within  this  paradigm.  To  provide  an 
analogue  to  the  semantic  task  of  Experiment  5,  images  of  national  flags  were  used 
as  nonface  comparisons  and  subjects  were  asked  to  classify  the  face  and  flag 
targets  as  being  American  or  British. 
Method 
Subjects  Twenty  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  whose 
ages  ranged  from  18-24  years,  participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a  small 
payment.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Stimuli  &  Procedure  The  procedure  was  the  same  as  for  Experiment  5,  except  as 
follows.  Subjects  were  now  instructed  to  classify  the  targets  as  American  or 
British.  Three  different  images  each  of  Tony  Blair  (British  Prime  Minister), 
George  Bush  (American  President),  the  Union  Jack  (British  flag),  and  the  Stars 
and  Stripes  (American  flag)  served  as  stimuli.  The  faces  and  flags  were  cropped  to 
rectangular  shapes  to  produce  a  closer  resemblance  but  this  resulted  in  the  loss  of 
some  external  features,  such  as  stimulus  outline.  Faces  and  flags  were  then 
converted  to  greyscale  and  sized  to  2.2  cm  x  3.0  cm  (2.1°  x  3.9°  of  VA).  These 
89 images  were  used  to  construct  the  stimulus  displays  as  in  Experiment  5  (see  Figure 
3.5).  Pairing  each  of  the  12  stimuli  with  each  class  of  distractor  (face  or  flag) 
under  each  level  of  congruency  (same  or  different  nationality)  resulted  in  48 
displays.  Subjects  completed  a  practice  and  8  experimental  blocks  of  48 
randomized  trials. 
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Figure  3.5  Example  displays  from  Experiment  6.  The  target  could  be  a  famous  face  or  a 
national  flag,  and  was  accompanied  by  a  face  or  a  flag  distractor,  which  could  be  either 
congruent  (same  nationality)  or  incongruent  (different  nationality)  with  the  target. 
Results 
As  for  Experiment  4,  the  means  of  the  median  correct  RTs  were  calculated  for  all 
conditions  and  are  shown  in  Figure  3.6.  A2  (face  vs.  flag  target)  x2  (face  vs.  Flag 
distractor)  x2  (congruent  vs.  incongruent)  within-subjects  ANOVA  showed  a 
main  effect  of  congruency,  F(1,19)=21.29,  p<.  01,  with  slower  RTs  to  incongruent 
displays,  but  no  main  effect  of  target  type,  F(1,19)<1,  or  distractor  type, 
90 F(1,19)=1.09.  The  effect  of  congruency  was  modified  by  an  interaction  with  target 
type,  F(1,19)=6.94,  p<.  05.  As  Figure  3.6  suggests,  significant  congruency  effects 
were  found  in  the  FACE  flag  condition,  F(1,19)=5.21,  p<.  05,  the  FLAG  face 
condition,  F(1,19)=27.71,  p<.  01,  and  the  FLAG  flag  condition,  F(1,19)=4.82, 
p<.  05.  By  contrast,  there  was  no  effect  in  the  FACE  face  condition,  F(1,19)<1. 
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Figure  3.6  Mean  reaction  times  (in  msec)  across  subjects  (n=20)  as  a  function  of  distractor 
congruency  and  target-distractor  pairings  in  Experiment  6.  Vertical  bars  represent  the 
standard  error  of  the  means. 
Error  rates  mirrored  the  RT  data.  Incongruent  displays  resulted  in  an  increase  in 
errors  in  the  FACE  flag  condition  (incongruent  7.0%,  congruent  5.1%),  the  FLAG- 
face  condition  (8.5%  vs.  5.1%),  and  the  FLAG  flag  condition  (6.9%  vs.  4.0%),  but 
no  corresponding  increase  in  the  FACE  face  condition  (4.4%  vs.  4.6%).  ANOVA 
showed  a  significant  main  effect  of  congruency,  F(1,19)=4.60,  p<.  05,  and  an 
interaction  between  target  type  and  distractor  type,  F(1,19)=6.70,  p<.  05.  No  other 
comparisons  were  significant. 
91 Discussion 
The  results  show  an  intriguing  pattern.  As  in  Experiment  5,  no  evidence  of 
distractor  processing  was  found  in  the  FACE  face  condition.  In  contrast,  however, 
the  present  data  shows  that  face  targets  can  be  subject  to  congruency  effects  in  a 
semantic  classification  task,  as  exerted  here  by  the  flag  distractors.  Faces  also 
functioned  as  distractors.  In  fact,  the  largest  congruency  effect  was  observed  again 
in  the  condition  in  which  a  nonface  target  was  flanked  by  a  distractor  face.  In 
addition,  within-category  congruency  effects  were  observed  for  images  of  flags, 
suggesting  that  they  are  not  subject  to  analogous  capacity  limits  to  faces.  Thus, 
these  results  replicate  the  pattern  that  was  observed  in  Experiment  4,  and  of 
Experiment  5  with  the  addition  of  a  reliable  congruency  effect  in  the  FACE- 
nonface  condition,  and  extend  those  findings  to  images  of  flags  in  a  nationality 
task. 
Experiment  7 
Experiments  4-6  provide  converging  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  face 
processing  may  be  capacity  limited,  such  that  a  face  distractor  does  not  influence 
target  face  processing.  In  nonface  paradigms,  however,  target-distractor 
interference  is  seemingly  boosted  by  presenting  several  congruent  (or  incongruent) 
distractors  (e.  g.  letter-letter,  Eriksen  &  Hoffman,  1973).  Therefore,  to  provide  a 
stronger  test  of  the  claim  that  face  distractors  do  not  influence  target  face 
processing,  the  number  of  distractors  was  increased  to  four  in  this  experiment,  thus 
increasing  fourfold  the  total  amount  of  congruent  and  incongruent  information  in 
each  display.  If  multiple  faces  can  be  processed  simultaneously,  one  might  expect 
this  manipulation  to  boost  any  influence  of  the  distractors.  This  might  lead  to 
measurable  congruency  effects  even  in  the  FACE  face  condition,  where  none  were 
92 previously  found.  On  the  other  hand,  if  target  face  processing  is  unaffected  by 
adding  further  distractors,  this  would  provide  additional  support  for  the  face 
processing  limits  that  were  observed  in  the  preceding  experiments. 
Method 
Subic  Twenty-two  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow, 
whose  ages  ranged  from  18-26  years,  participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a 
small  payment.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Stimuli  &  Procedure  These  were  the  same  as  in  Experiment  6,  except  for  the 
following  changes.  The  former  single  distractors  were  replaced  by  four  distractors, 
positioned  around  the  central  target  to  form  a  "+"  configuration  (see  Figure  3.7 
overleaf).  The  nearest  distractor  contours  were  approximately  1.0  cm  (1.00  of  VA) 
horizontally,  and  0.9  cm  (0.9°  of  VA)  vertically  from  the  target.  Twenty 
celebrities'  faces  (10  British,  10  American,  see  Appendix  A)  and  20  flags  (10 
British,  10  American)  were  used  as  stimuli.  In  each  flanker  display,  all  four 
distractors  were  of  the  same  nationality  (e.  g.  four  American  faces).  To  avoid 
confounding  semantic  information  during  target  classification,  the  faces  were 
drawn  from  five  occupational  categories  (pop-star,  politician,  sports-star, 
comedian,  movie-star),  so  that  no  occupation  occurred  more  than  once  in  any  face 
display.  Faces  were  presented  with  their  external  features  (i.  e.  hair,  face  outline) 
and  the  flags  were  cropped  to  elliptical  shapes  in  order  to  produce  a  closer 
resemblance  between  the  flag  and  face  outlines  (see  Figure  3.7).  Faces  and  objects 
measured  between  2.1-2.4  cm  horizontally  and  2.5-3.2  cm  vertically  (2.0°-2.3°  x 
2.4°-3.1°  of  VA). 
93 Figure  3.7  Example  displays  from  the  FACE  face  condition  (left  display)  and  the  FACE- 
flag  condition  (right  display)  in  Experiment  7.  Clockwise  from  top,  the  face  distractors 
here  are:  Tom  Cruise,  Andre  Agassi,  Elvis  Presley,  and  Groucho  Marx.  Target  face:  Bill 
Clinton. 
Combining  each  of  the  40  targets  with  congruent  and  incongruent  distractors, 
under  two  levels  of  distractor  type,  resulted  in  a  total  of  160  stimuli.  Each  subject 
completed  a  practice  block  of  40  trials,  followed  by  eight  experimental  blocks  of 
80  trials.  Therefore,  over  the  eight  experimental  blocks  each  stimulus  display  was 
encountered  a  total  of  four  times.  Each  condition  was  equally  likely  to  occur  in 
each  block  and  trial  order  was  randomized  in  all  blocks. 
Results 
Figure  3.8  shows  the  means  of  the  median  correct  RTs  for  all  conditions.  A2  (face 
vs.  flag  targets)  x2  (face  vs.  flag  distractors)  x2  (congruent  vs.  incongruent) 
within-subjects  ANOVA  of  the  RT  data  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of 
congruency,  F(1,21)=26.00,  p<.  01,  with  slower  responses  to  incongruent  displays, 
and  a  main  effect  of  target  type,  F(1,21)=56.39,  p<.  01,  with  faster  responses  to 
flag  targets.  These  effects  were  modified  by  interactions  between  target  type  and 
94 congruency,  F(1,21)=4.87,  p<.  05,  and  between  distractor  type  and  congruency, 
F(1,21)=8.77,  p<.  01.  As  Figure  3.8  suggests,  significant  congruency  effects  were 
found  in  the  FACE  flag  condition,  F(1,21)=30.54,  p<.  01,  and  the  FLAG  flag 
conditions,  F(1,21)=9.35,  p<.  01,  but  not  in  the  FLAG  face  condition,  F(1,21)<1,  or 
the  FACE  face  condition,  F(1,21)=1.72. 
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Figure  3.8  Mean  reaction  times  (in  msec)  across  subjects  (n=22)  as  a  function  of 
distractor  congruency  and  target-distractor  pairings  in  Experiment  7.  Vertical  bars 
represent  the  standard  error  of  the  means. 
Error  rates  followed  a  similar  pattern.  Incongruent  displays  showed  increased 
errors  in  the  FACE  flag  (incongruent  7.8%,  congruent  5.2%),  and  the  FLAG-flag 
conditions  (5.5%  vs.  3.8%),  but  not  in  the  FACE  face  (5.8%  vs.  6.4%)  or  the 
FLAG  face  conditions  (5.9%  vs.  6.6%).  Main  effects  of  target  type,  F(1,21)=3.99, 
p=.  06,  and  distractor  type,  F(1,21)=3.78,  p=.  07,  were  not  statistically  reliable  but 
approached  significance.  In  addition,  a  target  type  x  distractor  type  interaction, 
F(1,21)=7.18,  p<.  05,  and  a  distractor  type  x  congruency  interaction,  F(1,21)=8.32, 
p<.  01,  were  found.  However,  only  one  congruency  effect,  in  the  FACE-flag 
95 condition,  reached  significance,  F(1,21)=6.57,  p<.  05.  No  other  comparisons  were 
significant. 
Discussion 
To  provide  a  stronger  test  for  face  processing  limits,  the  number  of  task-irrelevant 
distractor  stimuli  was  increased  to  four  in  this  study.  However,  despite  a  fourfold 
increase  in  the  amount  of  potentially  distracting  information,  distractor  faces  were 
still  unable  to  influence  responses  to  target  faces.  In  fact,  multiple  face  distractors 
even  failed  to  produce  congruency  effects  onto  the  nonface  targets,  images  of 
flags.  This  diverges  from  Experiments  4-6,  in  which  a  solitary  face  distractor 
interfered  strongly  with  nonface  comparison  targets.  Indeed,  the  largest 
congruency  effects  were  observed  in  the  NAME  face  and  the  FLAG  face 
conditions  in  those  experiments.  Contrary  to  multiple  face  distractors,  however, 
and  analogous  to  the  solitary  distractor  flags  of  Experiment  6,  multiple  flag 
distractors  exerted  congruency  effects  upon  flag  targets  and  face  targets  alike. 
The  absence  of  interference  from  face  distractors  onto  nonface  targets  under 
conditions  in  which  multiple  flag  distractors  produce  congruency  effects  is  perhaps 
surprising,  in  particular  as  the  processing  of  just  a  single  of  the  four  distractor 
faces  could  have  been  used  to  produce  the  same,  strong  face-nonface  interference 
of  previous  experiments.  A  possible  explanation  for  this  finding  is  that  multiple 
faces  may  compete  for  limited  processing  resources  (see  e.  g.  Vuilleumier,  2000; 
Ro,  Russell  &  Lavie,  2001,  for  such  claims),  whereby  competition  may  remain 
unresolved  between  several  equally  task-irrelevant  competitors.  This  suggestion 
will  be  discussed  in  detail  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.  Before  then,  however,  it  is 
worth  considering  other  potential  explanations  for  these  results. 
96 Experiment  7  used  a  substantially  larger  number  of  stimuli  than  the  preceding 
experiments.  It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  particular  stimuli  chosen  were  not 
sufficiently  highly  associated  with  the  response  category  (nationality)  to  produce 
interference.  However,  the  face  images  consisted  of  well-known  celebrities  and  as 
targets  these  faces  were  classified  quickly  according  to  their  nationality  and  with 
few  errors.  Moreover,  although  target  RTs  were  slightly  faster  to  flags  than  to 
faces  in  this  experiment,  this  overall  difference  cannot  explain  the  complete 
absence  of  interference  from  multiple  distractor  faces,  since  multiple  flag 
distractors  exerted  congruency  effects  upon  both  fast  flag  targets  and  slow  face 
targets.  Indeed,  Young  et  al  (1986)  also  found  that  slow  name  targets  interfere 
with  fast  face  distractors  during  semantic  classification.  Of  course,  whenever  one 
is  using  nonface  and  face  stimuli  within  the  same  experiment,  it  is  always  possible 
that  effects  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  visual  complexity  or  other  physical 
attributes.  Although  this  is  always  possible,  the  results  of  Experiments  4-6, 
specifically  the  fact  that  solitary  face  distractors  interfered  more  with  nonface 
classification  than  nonface  comparisons  interfered  with  both  face  and  nonface 
classification,  provides  at  least  suggestive  evidence  that  these  results  might  require 
explanation  in  terms  of  competition  from  multiple  face  distractors. 
Experiment  8 
Experiments  4-7  demonstrate  that  irrelevant  face  distractors  do  not  interfere  with 
face  target  classification  when  two  or  more  faces  are  presented  simultaneously. 
This  indicates  that  face  processing  may  be  capacity  limited  under  these  conditions, 
such  that  no  more  than  a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time.  This  experiment 
raises  a  different  question  than  the  preceding  experiments.  A  few  studies  have 
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70  ms  (Ellis,  Young  &  Koenken,  1993;  Morrison,  Bruce  &  Burton,  2000),  which 
is  considerably  less  than  the  200  ms  display  time  of  the  present  interference 
paradigms.  This  opens  the  possibility  that  the  extinguished  (non-interfering)  face 
distractors  of  Experiments  4-7  may  have  been  processed  alongside  the  face  targets, 
although  too  late  to  affect  response  times,  even  if  they  were  not  processed  in 
parallel.  However,  despite  previous  studies  reporting  face  recognition  thresholds 
of  less  than  70  ms,  participants  were  given  ample  time  to  provide  a  face 
identification  response  in  the  shape  of  a  name  or  some  unambiguous  semantic 
information  (Ellis  et  al,  1993;  Morrison  et  al,  2000).  Moreover,  Bentin,  Deouell  & 
Soroker  (1999)  showed  that  ERP  markers  sensitive  to  face  familiarity  occur 
usually  250  to  500  ms  after  stimulus  onset.  Thus,  face  processing  continues 
considerably  beyond  the  acquisition  of  a  face  stimulus  from  the  visual  field.  This 
raises  the  question  whether  the  ongoing  processing  of  a  face  stimulus  is  sufficient 
to  extinguish  distractor  face  interference  in  a  subsequent  display,  or  whether  face 
processing  limits  are  only  observed  in  situations  in  which  two  faces  are  displayed 
simultaneously. 
The  present  study  examined  this  by  manipulating  the  temporal  conditions  under 
which  face  targets  and  distractor  faces  were  presented.  To  this  end,  a  cue 
consisting  of  either  a  famous  face  or  a  flag  was  displayed  at  fixation,  followed  by  a 
famous  name  target  in  the  same  spatial  location  and  a  flanking  famous  face 
distractor.  As  in  the  preceding  experiments,  face  distractor  processing  was 
assessed  via  its  congruency  effects  on  (name)  target  classification  times.  However, 
name  classification  was  contingent  upon  cue  type,  such  that  subjects  were 
instructed  to  respond  to  targets  that  were  preceded  by  a  British  stimulus  (e.  g.  the 
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following  non-British  stimuli.  Importantly,  cues  were  presented  either  for  a  short 
duration  (67  ms)  or  a  long  duration  (500  ms),  followed  by  a  50  ms  inter-stimulus 
interval  (ISI),  followed  by  a  face-name  interference  display  of  200  ms.  Thus,  face 
cues  and  face  distractors  were  presented  in  the  same  spatial  arrangement  as  targets 
and  distractors  in  Experiments  4-6  and  both  relevant  face  and  irrelevant  face 
processing  was  assessed,  but  the  temporal  relationship  between  these  stimuli  was 
changed.  If  cue  and  distractor  faces  can  be  processed  in  quick  succession,  then  a 
face  distractor  should  interfere  with  a  name  target  following  an  immediately 
preceding,  briefly  presented  face  cue.  Alternatively,  distractor  processing  may  be 
extinguished  by  the  ongoing  processing  of  a  briefly  presented  face  cue,  relative  to 
when  it  is  displayed  for  longer. 
Method 
Subjects  Twenty-seven  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow, 
whose  ages  ranged  from  20-25  years,  participated  in  the  experiment  in  return  for  a 
small  payment.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Design  &  Stimuli  An  Apple  Macintosh  computer  equipped  with  PsyScope  1.2.5 
software  presented  the  stimuli  and  recorded  responses.  For  the  cue  displays, 
photographs  of  four  famous  British  people  (Richard  Branson,  Prince  Charles, 
Lawrence  Lwellelyn-Bohen  &  Jamie  Oliver)  and  of  four  non-British  people 
(Woody  Allen,  Jean  Reno,  Arnold  Schwarzenegger  &  Jerry  Springer)  served  as 
face  stimuli,  and  images  of  four  Union  Jacks  (British  flag)  and  the  national  flags  of 
four  other  countries  (Greece,  South  Africa,  Switzerland  &  the  USA)  served  as 
nonface  comparisons.  Faces  and  flags  were  presented  in  greyscale  on  a  black 
99 background,  and  with  their  outline  intact,  and  measured  maximally  3.6  cm  x  4.5 
cm  (subtending  3.4°  x  4.3°  of  VA).  For  the  interference  displays,  the  full  names 
and  faces  of  six  male  politicians  (Tony  Blair,  George  Bush,  Bill  Clinton,  John 
Major,  Colin  Powell  &  Jack  Straw)  and  of  six  male  pop-stars  (Kurt  Cobain,  Gareth 
Gates,  Mick  Jagger,  Elton  John,  Elvis  Presley  &  Justin  Timberlake)  were  used. 
Names  acted  as  central  targets  and  were  shown  white  on  black  in  18-point  Arial 
font,  measuring  between  2.8  cm  (the  shortest  name)  and  4.9  cm  (the  longest  name) 
in  width  (2.7°-4.7°  of  VA).  The  faces  served  as  flanking  distractors  to  the  left  or 
right  of  the  name  target,  and  were  presented  in  greyscale  at  a  size  of  3.6  cm  x  4.5 
cm  (subtending  3.4°  x  4.3°  of  VA)  on  a  black  background.  Target-distractor 
distance  varied  between  0.6  cm  (0.6°  of  VA,  for  the  longest  name  target)  and  1.6 
cm  (1.6°  of  VA,  for  the  shortest  name  target). 
Overall,  there  were  two  main  types  of  trials:  no-go  trials,  for  which  the  cue  was 
always  a  non-British  face  or  flag,  and  go  trials,  for  which  the  cues  consisted  of 
British  faces  or  flags.  This  distinction  was  included  to  ensure  that  participants 
were  processing  the  cue  stimuli,  for  which  no  direct  response  requirement  was 
incorporated.  In  addition  to  the  go/no-go  distinction,  the  cues  and  the  name-face 
displays  were  combined  in  four  conditions  under  each  level  of  target-distractor 
congruency  (i.  e.  name-face:  same  vs.  different  occupation).  These  conditions 
involved  presenting  a  face  for  67  ms  followed  by  a  name-face  display  (in  the  Short 
Face  condition),  presenting  a  face  for  500  ms  followed  by  a  name-face  display 
(the  Long  Face  condition),  or  presenting  a  flag  for  67  ms  followed  by  a  name-face 
display  (the  Short  Flag  condition),  and  a  flag  for  500  ms  followed  by  a  name-face 
display  (the  Long  Flag  condition).  Thus,  the  interference  phase  was  identical 
100 across  all  conditions,  which  varied  only  in  cue  type  (face  vs.  flag)  and  SOA  (500 
ms  vs.  67  ms). 
The  specific  stimulus  pairings  for  all  conditions  were  created  online  during  the 
experiment  via  a  PsyScope  Factor  Table,  which  was  programmed  so  that  each 
possible  combination  was  equally  likely  to  occur  for  each  participant.  The  only 
exceptions  were  no-go  trials,  which  were  only  half  as  likely  to  occur  as  go  trials. 
Due  to  the  use  of  a  Factor  table  for  trial  generation,  for  some  interference  displays 
the  name  target  and  the  face  distractor  were  of  the  same  person.  The  probability  of 
this  event  was  1/24.  Such  trials  may  produce  larger  congruency  effects,  than  trials 
in  which  the  name  and  face  of  different  persons  are  paired  under  congruent 
conditions  (see  Young  et  al,  1986).  In  contrast  to  Experiments  4-6,  however,  in 
which  targets  and  distractors  were  never  taken  from  the  same  person  to  avoid 
perceptual  matching  of  targets  and  distractors  in  the  within-category  conditions, 
such  strategies  cannot  account  for  name-face  interference. 
Procedure  Each  trial  began  with  a  fixation  cross  for  1000  ms,  followed  by  a  cue 
item.  This  was  displayed  at  fixation  for  67  ms  or  500  ms,  and  was  replaced  by  a 
blank  ISI  for  50  ms,  which  was  in  turn  replaced  by  a  name-face  display  for  200 
ms,  and  a  final  blank  interval  until  a  response  was  registered  (see  Figure  3.9 
overleaf).  Subjects  were  instructed  to  classify  the  name  target  as  belonging  to  a 
pop-star  or  a  politician  as  quickly  and  as  accurately  as  possible  while  ignoring  the 
face  distractors,  but  only  provided  that  it  was  preceded  by  a  British  face  or  a 
British  flag.  For  non-British  cues,  subjects  were  instructed  to  press  the  space  bar 
following  the  presentation  of  the  interference  displays  (to  initiate  the  next  trial).  A 
short  warning  tone  again  gave  feedback  for  errors.  Button-press  latencies  were 
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practice  block  of  36  trials  and  three  experimental  blocks  of  120  randomly  ordered 
trials.  Subjects  were  given  breaks  between  blocks,  and  initiated  each  block  by 
pressing  the  space  bar. 
Fixation  Cross, 
1000  ms 
Face  (or  Flag)  C 
67  or  500  ms 
Interstimulus 
Interval,  50  ms 
Name-Face  Into 
Display,  200  rr 
Figure  3.9  Example  of  a  go-trial  from  Experiment  8.  After  a  1000  msec  fixation,  the  cue 
displays  were  presented  for  67  msec  (on  Short  trials)  or  500  msec  (on  Long  trials), 
followed  by  a  blank  screen  for  50  msec.  The  response-competition  displays  were  then 
presented  for  200  msec,  followed  by  a  further  blank  screen  until  a  response  was  made. 
The  cue  could  be  a  face  or  a  flag.  Subjects  were  asked  to  make  an  occupational 
categorization  response  (pop-star  vs.  politician)  to  the  name  target  of  the  interference 
displays,  but  only  if  it  was  preceded  by  a  British  face  or  a  British  flag. 
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The  data  from  two  subjects  with  overall  error  rates  of  28%  and  49%  were  excluded 
from  the  analysis.  Accuracy  was  high  for  go  and  no-go  face  conditions  (errors, 
4.2%  and  2.7%),  which  confirms  that  responses  were  based  on  information  from 
the  cue  as  well  as  the  interference  displays.  For  go  conditions,  the  means  of  the 
median  correct  RTs  and  percentage  error  rates  were  computed  for  each  level  of 
cue  type  (face  vs.  flag),  SOA  (500  ms  vs.  67  ms),  and  for  each  level  of  target- 
distractor  congruency  (congruent  vs.  incongruent  occupation).  The  mean  RTs  of 
these  conditions  are  shown  in  Figure  3.10. 
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Figure  3.10  Mean  reaction  times  across  subjects  as  a  function  of  distractor  congruency, 
cue  type  (Face  vs.  Flag)  and  SOA  (Long  vs.  Short)  in  Experiment  8.  Vertical  bars 
represent  the  standard  error  of  the  means. 
A2  (face  vs.  flag)  x2  (67  ms  vs.  500  ms)  x2  (congruent  vs.  incongruent)  within- 
subjects  ANOVA  of  the  RT  data  revealed  a  main  effect  of  cue  type, 
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Short  Long 
Face  Flag F(1,25)=41.74,  p<.  01,  with  slower  responses  following  the  presentation  of  face 
cue,  a  main  effect  of  SOA,  F(1,24)=211.38,  p<.  01,  with  slower  responses 
following  short  cues,  and  a  main  effect  of  congruency,  F(1,24)=22.79,  p<.  01,  with 
slower  responses  to  incongruent  name-face  displays.  The  effect  of  cue  type  was 
modified  by  interactions  with  SOA,  F(1,24)=8.50,  p<.  01,  and  congruency, 
F(1,24)=7.02,  p<.  01.  Simple  main  effect  analysis  revealed  congruency  effects  in 
the  Short  Flag  condition,  F(1,24)=9.96,  p<.  01,  in  the  Long  Flag  condition, 
F(1,24)=12.85,  p<.  01,  and  in  the  Long  Face  condition,  F(1,24)=5.12,  p<.  05,  but  no 
congruency  effect  was  found  in  the  Short  Face  condition,  F(1,24)<1. 
Equivalent  analysis  was  conducted  for  the  error  data.  Incongruent  name-face 
displays  resulted  in  a  small  increase  in  errors  in  the  Short  Flag  condition 
(incongruent  5.7%  vs.  congruent  5.3%),  in  the  Long  Flag  condition  (3.7%  vs. 
2.8%),  and  in  the  Long  Face  condition  (5.1%  vs.  4.1%).  However,  the  reverse 
pattern  was  found  in  the  Short  Face  condition  (incongruent  5.8%  vs.  congruent 
6.7%).  ANOVA  showed  a  main  effect  of  SOA,  F(1,24)=9.60,  p<.  01,  with  higher 
errors  following  short  cues.  Although  marginally  higher  errors  were  observed  for 
the  face  cue  conditions,  no  main  effect  of  cue  type  was  found,  F(1,24)=1.43.  No 
other  comparisons  were  significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment  7  examined  the  temporal  conditions  under  which  interference  from 
task-irrelevant  face  distractors  is  eliminated.  The  results  show  that  processing  the 
flags  had  little  effect  on  subsequent  name-face  interference:  for  both  short  and 
long  flag  cues,  irrelevant  face  distractors  interfered  reliably  with  name 
classification.  A  different  response  pattern  was  observed  following  the 
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following  Long  Face  displays.  By  contrast,  face  distractor  interference  was 
eliminated  following  immediately  preceding,  briefly  presented  faces.  This  suggests 
that  the  ongoing  processing  of  a  face  is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  processing  of 
another,  subsequently  presented  face  distractor. 
However,  note  that  face-cue  processing  also  resulted  in  longer  name  categorization 
RTs  in  comparison  with  the  flag  conditions,  which  suggests  that  the  face 
conditions  were  more  difficult  in  this  experiment.  Moreover,  name  RTs  increased 
by  almost  200  ms  from  long  face  to  short  face  displays.  What  seems  to  be 
happening  here  is  that  the  ongoing  processing  of  a  face's  identity  was  not  only 
extinguishing  face  distractor  interference  but  also  affecting  name  categorization  in 
a  subsequent  display.  This  dramatic  decline  in  performance  clearly  needs  an 
explanation.  The  architecture  of  the  IAC  model  of  person  recognition  (Burton, 
1998;  Burton  et  al,  1990,1999;  Burton,  Young,  Bruce,  Johnston  &  Ellis,  1991; 
Burton  &  Bruce,  1993)  provides  one  possible  explanation  for  this  effect. 
According  to  the  IAC  model,  known  faces  are  recognized  by  Face  Recognition 
Units  (FRUs),  one  of  which  exists  for  each  known  face.  This  leads  to  activation  at 
Person  Identity  Node  (PIN)  corresponding  to  the  classification  of  a  person  rather 
than  a  face.  It  is  at  this  stage  that  people  can  state  whether  they  recognize  a  person 
as  familiar.  Crucially,  PINs  can  also  receive  activation  from  persons'  names  (via 
Name  Recognition  Units),  and  it  is  held  that  activation  of  one  PIN  leads  to  the 
inhibition  of  others.  One  possibility  is  then  that  activation  of  a  known  person's 
face,  the  cue  item  in  the  case  of  the  present  experiment,  excites  a  corresponding 
person  identity  node  (PIN)  in  the  brain.  This  not  only  elicits  face  processing  limits, 
thus  eliminating  distractor  face  processing,  but  also  inhibits  person  recognition  at  a 
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However,  two  findings  suggest  that  this  is  not  a  likely  explanation.  First,  although 
name  RTs  were  slower  in  the  face  conditions,  erroneous  responses  to  the  name 
targets  were  reasonably  low  in  all  of  the  conditions.  This  suggests  that  face  cues 
did  not  prevent  the  processing  but  only  affected  the  classification  of  the 
subsequent  name  targets.  Second,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  an  explanation  in  terms 
of  PIN  inhibition  with  the  results  of  Experiment  5,  in  which  face-name  and  name- 
name  interference  for  famous  persons  was  found. 
An  alternative  explanation  could  be  that  face  cues  were  particularly  effective  at 
retaining  attentional  resources  necessary  for  response  to  the  detriment  of  the 
succeeding  name  targets,  even  though  they  did  not  affect  whether  the  names  were 
actually  processed.  At  present,  there  is  only  some  indirect  evidence  that  faces  have 
this  ability,  and  this  has  mostly  been  obtained  with  emotionally  expressive  faces  in 
anxious  individuals  (e.  g.  Bradley,  Mogg,  Falla  &  Hamilton,  1998;  Fox,  Russo, 
Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001;  Fox,  Russo  &  Dutton,  2002).  These  studies  show  that 
classification  of  a  simple  perceptual  target  is  slowed  when  a  threatening  face  in  a 
task-irrelevant  location  precedes  it.  I  return  to  this  issue  in  Chapter  5  to  investigate 
whether  faces  are  generally  particularly  effective  at  retaining  attention  in  a 
classification  task,  in  comparison  with  other  stimulus  classes. 
Overall,  the  results  of  Experiment  8  converge  with  the  main  claim  of  Experiments 
4-7  that  face  processing  is  capacity  limited  in  an  interference  task  such  that  only  a 
single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time,  and  extend  these  findings  to  the  processing 
of  temporally  distinct  faces.  A  number  of  previous  studies  have  already  suggested 
capacity  limits  for  face  processing  (Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2001;  Jenkins  et  al,  2003; 
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to  the  experiments  reported  here.  Boutet  &  Chaudhuri  (2001)  used  overlapping 
faces,  a  hypothetical  situation  that  our  face  processing  system  is  not  confronted 
with  outside  the  laboratory,  while  the  present  experiments  measured  the 
processing  of  spatially  distinct  faces.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002)  used  displays  of 
three  faces  presented  substantially  longer  (?  1.5  s)  than  the  faces  in  the  present 
experiments  (i.  e.  200  ms),  and  required  participants  to  match  two  peripheral  faces 
before  encoding  a  central  target.  Under  those  conditions  it  is  likely,  that  the  three 
faces  were  processed  sequentially  and,  consequently,  an  exact  limit  in  face 
processing  is  difficult  to  specify.  Additionally,  both  these  studies  tested 
(immediate)  memory  for  unfamiliar  faces,  rather  than  providing  a  direct  test  for 
face  processing.  Finally,  Jenkins  et  al.  (2003)  only  measured  task-irrelevant  face 
processing  in  a  name-face  interference  paradigm.  Without  taking  resources 
attributed  to  task-relevant  processing  into  account,  this  also  makes  it  difficult  to 
make  a  direct  inference  about  capacity  limits.  Thus,  the  experiments  in  this  chapter 
add  a  novel  set  of  data  in  support  of  the  notion  that  face  processing  may  be 
capacity  limited. 
Previous  studies  suggesting  capacity  limits  for  face  processing  also  observed 
different  patterns  for  upright  and  inverted  faces  (Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2001; 
Jenkins  et  al,  2003;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2001),  suggesting  a  limit  specifically  for 
upright  face  processing.  Similarly,  others  report  that  the  processing  of  an  irrelevant 
face  seems  unaffected  by  variations  in  task-relevant  processing  load  of  nonface 
stimuli  (Jenkins  et  al,  2002;  Lavie  et  al,  2003),  again  suggesting  a  face  processing 
capacity.  Although  the  present  experiments  were  not  intended  to  examine  face- 
specificity,  the  results  also  converge  with  these  suggestions  by  demonstrating 
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multiple  stimuli:  single  face  distractors  were  processed  alongside  nonface  targets 
in  Experiments  4-6  and  subsequent  to  nonface  stimuli  in  Experiment  8,  and  none 
of  the  nonface  comparisons  (forenames,  famous  names,  images  of  national  flags) 
in  Experiments  4-7  displayed  analogous  processing  limits. 
Alternatively,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  processing  of  faces,  which  are  a  visually 
complex  and  homogeneous  category  of  stimuli,  is  simply  more  demanding  of 
general  resources  than  processing  printed  names  or  images  of  flags.  Thus,  two 
faces  might  exceed  general  processing  capacity,  even  when  two  flags  or  two 
names,  or  a  face  and  a  flag/name  do  not.  Therefore,  some  nonface  stimuli  may  be 
subject  to  corresponding  processing  limits.  Likewise,  some  face-specific 
phenomena  have  repeatedly  been  attributed  to  the  fact  that  we  possess  a  great  level 
of  expertise  in  face  processing  (see  e.  g.  Gauthier  &  Logothetis,  2000),  which  is 
required  to  discriminate  between  highly  similar  exemplars  of  a  particular  class. 
One  might  thus  expect  that  other  visual  stimuli,  for  which  we  possess  a  high  level 
of  expertise,  may  be  subject  to  such  processing  limits.  However,  target  RTs  were 
as  fast  or  faster  for  face  targets  than  for  nonface  targets  in  Experiments  4-6,  which 
suggests  that  face  processing  was  no  more  difficult  than  the  processing  of  the 
comparison  stimuli,  and  the  error  data  support  this  impression.  In  addition,  Jenkins 
et  al  (2003)  report  that  an  intact,  irrelevant  face  produces  no  more  dilution  of 
object-word  interference  than  a  phase-shifted  face.  If  faces  are  simply  a 
disproportionate  drain  on  general  resources,  it  is  hard  to  see  why  this  should  be  so; 
one  would  expect  them  to  produce  disproportionate  dilution  in  that  situation. 
Although  many  theories  of  attention  already  propose  separate  modality-specific 
processing  limits  (see  e.  g.  Pashler,  1998;  Schmitt,  Postma  &  de  Haan,  2000, 
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processing  limits,  acting  to  constrain  processing  of  a  particular  range  of  stimuli 
within  the  same  modality. 
Several  other  aspects  of  the  present  findings  merit  further  discussion.  First,  in 
Experiments  4-6,  face  distractors  interfered  more  with  the  categorization  of  names 
and  flags  than  these  stimuli  interfered  with  faces.  This  replicates  Young  et  al 
(1986)  who  observed  the  same  pattern  in  a  semantic  categorization  task.  Young  et 
al  (1986)  suggested  that  this  pattern  emerges  from  the  encoding  of  visual 
information,  whereby  faces  may  be  encoded  into  a  form  that  particularly  suits 
categorization  tasks  in  contrast  to  names,  which  may  be  encoded  for  naming  tasks. 
In  fact,  in  naming  tasks  names  do  seem  to  interfere  more  with  faces  than  vice  versa 
(Young  et  al,  1986).  However,  according  to  this  explanation  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  faces  should  interfere  more  with  flags  in  the  nationality  task  of  Experiment  5 
than  flags  interfered  with  faces.  If  anything,  flags  should  have  been  coded  more 
readily  into  a  nationality  than  faces,  which  are  more  visually  complex  than  the 
salient  flag  patterns  and  code  much  more  information  than  a  person's  nationality 
(e.  g.  sex,  emotional  expression,  occupation). 
Second,  in  Experiment  7  multiple  face  distractors  not  only  failed  to  interfere  with 
the  classification  of  the  face  targets  but  also  the  nonface  targets,  images  of  flags.  It 
is  conceivable  that  multiple  face  distractors  do  not  interfere  with  nonface  targets 
for  the  same  reason  that  a  single  face  distractor  produces  more  interference  than  a 
nonface  stimulus,  with  the  notable  exception  of  when  a  face  target  is  paired  with  a 
face  distractor.  There  have  been  numerous  recent  claims  that  faces  are  amongst  a 
class  of  stimuli  capable  of  capturing  attention,  even  under  conditions  that  deem 
109 this  unlikely.  For  example,  Vuilleumier  (2000)  observed  that  line-drawn  faces  are 
detected  more  frequently  in  the  neglected  field  of  patients  suffering  from  unilateral 
neglect  than  written  names,  meaningless  shapes,  or  scrambled  faces.  Similarly, 
faces  may  have  an  advantage  in  capturing  attention  in  neurological  normal 
participants.  Thus,  normal  participants  detect  an  intact  schematic  face  more 
quickly  amongst  an  array  of  scrambled  faces  than  a  scrambled  face  amongst  intact 
face  distractors  (Mack,  Pappas,  Silvermann  &  Gay,  2002).  Schematic  faces  are 
also  detected  more  often  in  a  stream  of  visual  stimuli  than  inverted  faces  or 
nonface  comparisons  (Mack  et  al,  2002).  In  addition,  Ro,  Russell  &  Lavie  (2001) 
showed  that  participants  noticed  changes  concerning  pictures  of  real  faces  more 
accurately  and  more  quickly  than  for  other  objects  in  a  change  detection  paradigm 
(but  see  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2003). 
If  faces  do  capture  attention,  one  might  expect  solitary  face  distractors  to  interfere 
strongly  with  relevant  nonface  processing  by  drawing  processing  resources  to  the 
distractor  location  (as  in  Experiments  4-6).  And  if  face  processing  involved  limited 
resources,  one  might  expect  it  to  fail  when  confronted  with  several  simultaneously 
presented  competing  inputs  of  equal  status,  such  as  the  four  task-irrelevant  face 
distractors  in  Experiment  7.  In  contrast,  if  competition  between  simultaneously 
presented  faces  can  be  resolved,  for  example,  by  deliberate  attention  to  one  of 
them  (e.  g.  a  fixated  target  face),  that  privileged  face  could  plausibly  monopolize 
the  limited  resources,  to  the  detriment  of  other  faces  present  (i.  e.  the  distractor 
faces  in  Experiments  4-8). 
The  final  chapter  of  this  thesis  provides  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  question  whether 
the  conditions  in  which  faces  tend  to  capture  attention  are  related  to  those  in  which 
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in  face  processing  remains  difficult  to  specify.  The  present  results  only  imply  that 
face  distractor  processing,  under  conditions  capable  of  elucidating  capacity  limits, 
stops  short  of  full  semantic  analysis.  Yet,  it  seems  unlikely  that  these  processing 
limits  are  located  at  a  semantic  level,  as  faces  interfered  with  names  and  national 
flags  during  semantic  classification.  The  results  of  Experiment  4  suggest  that 
capacity  limits  in  face  processing  occur  at  an  earlier,  perceptual  stage,  since  even 
salient  face-related  sex  information  was  unavailable  in  face-face  displays. 
However,  sex  and  identity  are  dissociable  face  dimensions  (Bruce  et  al,  1987;  Ellis 
et  al,  1990),  and  a  processing  limit  for  one  of  these  does  not  imply  the  same  limit 
for  the  other.  Moreover,  extinguished  distractor  faces  presumably  undergo  some 
superficial  processing.  At  the  very  least  they  must  register  as  faces  at  some  level, 
otherwise  multiple  distractor  faces  would  not  compete  for  processing  resources. 
Therefore,  the  aim  of  the  next  chapter  is  to  examine  whether  the  present  face 
processing  limits  apply  prior  to  semantics. 
111 Chapter  4  Capacity  Limits  for  Face  Processing: 
Repetition  Priming  of  Distractor  Faces  from  Two-item 
Displays 
Introduction 
The  experiments  in  Chapter  3  examined  whether  responses  to  face  targets  can  be 
affected  by  concurrently  presented  distractor  faces  in  interference  paradigms.  In 
the  first  study,  Experiment  4,  participants  were  required  to  classify  the  sex  of 
unfamiliar  faces  or  short  forenames,  while  ignoring  a  face  or  name  distractor  in  the 
display.  Subsequent  experiments  repeated  this  design  with  famous  faces  and 
famous  names  (Experiment  5),  famous  faces  and  images  of  national  flags 
(Experiment  6&  7),  or  a  combination  of  both  (Experiment  8),  and  with  a  single 
distractor  stimulus  (Experiments  4-6  &  8)  or  multiple  distractors  (Experiment  7)  in 
semantic  classification  tasks.  These  experiments  demonstrated  that  interference 
from  distractor  faces  is  extinguished  by  processing  a  face,  but  not  by  processing 
nonface  stimuli  (e.  g.  names,  flags).  This  distractor  extinction  effect  occurred  in  a 
context  in  which  faces  interfered  with  nonface  targets,  and  nonface  distractors 
interfered  with  the  classification  of  both  face  and  nonface  targets.  Collectively, 
these  findings  suggest  that  face  processing  may  be  capacity-limited,  such  that  only 
a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time. 
The  question  that  is  addressed  in  this  chapter  is  whether  these  processing  limits  are 
still  observed  in  tasks  that  do  not  require  semantic  or  sex  processing.  According  to 
established  models  of  person  recognition,  the  retrieval  of  personal  semantic 
information  is  relatively  deep  and  follows  face  identification  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Young, 
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lines  of  evidence  also  indicate  that  sex  and  identity  information  from  faces  are 
processed  independently  and  in  parallel  (e.  g.  Bruce,  1986;  Bruce,  Ellis,  Gibling  & 
Young,  1987).  Consequently,  the  possibility  remains  that  extinguished  distractor 
faces  were  processed  at  some  level  during  face  target  classification.  Indeed,  in 
Chapter  3  it  was  already  suggested  that  these  distractors  might  at  least  undergo 
some  superficial  processing  to  compete  for  limited  processing  resources.  Such 
processing  could  extend  beyond  that  minimum,  perhaps  involving  access  to  face 
identity. 
One  established  method  of  assessing  whether  a  visual  stimulus  has  been  processed 
is  repetition  priming.  This  is  a  facilitation  in  processing  an  item  due  to  prior 
exposure  to  that  item.  In  the  face  domain,  such  tasks  typically  consist  of  a  prime 
phase  during  which  participants  are  exposed  to  famous  faces,  followed  by  an 
interval  of  a  few  minutes  and  an  unexpected  test  phase  involving  familiarity 
judgements  (famous/unfamiliar)  to  primed  and  unprimed  famous  faces  and  some 
unfamiliar  filler  faces.  The  reliable  finding  here  is  that  responses  to  primed  faces 
are  faster  than  to  unprimed  famous  faces  and  unfamiliar  faces  (e.  g.  Bruce  & 
Valentine,  1985;  Ellis,  Young,  Flude  &  Hay,  1987) 
Repetition  priming  is  a  robust  and  long  lasting  effect,  that  is  even  found  when 
different  images  of  the  same  person's  face  are  used  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985; 
Ellis,  Flude,  Young  &  Burton,  1996),  across  changes  in  context  (e.  g.  location,  task, 
Bruce,  Carson,  Burton  &  Kelly,  1998),  and  persists  over  radically  altered  but  still 
recognizable  representations  of  a  face  (e.  g.  part-face  to  whole-face,  Brunas,  Young 
&  Ellis,  1990).  However,  although  repetition  priming  proceeds  independent  of  the 
113 judgement  being  made  at  prime  phase  (Ellis,  Young  &  Flude,  1990),  and  even 
when  no  explicit  judgement  is  required  (Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis,  2002),  it  is 
usually  not  observed  onto  sex  or  expression  decisions  at  test  (Ellis  et  al,  1990;  but 
see  Goshen-Gottstein  &  Ganel,  2000,  who  obtained  priming  using  part-faces),  or 
onto  familiarity  decisions  when  priming  of  unfamiliar  faces  is  measured  (Ellis  et 
al,  1990).  In  addition,  repetition  priming  is  domain-specific  when  the  typical 
familiarity  decision  is  used.  Thus,  faces  prime  faces  and  names  prime  names,  but 
one  type  of  stimulus  does  not  prime  the  other  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985; 
Burton,  Kelly  &  Bruce,  1998;  Ellis  et  al,  1996).  Consequently,  it  is  held  that 
repetition  priming  operates  within  the  system  that  responds  to  facial  identity  (e.  g. 
Burton  et  al,  1990,1999;  Ellis  et  al,  1990),  which  becomes  activated  automatically 
by  any  recognizable  view  of  a  known  person's  face.  Note  that  this  type  of  priming 
can  be  dissociated  from  cross-domain  repetition  priming  which  occurs  when 
semantic  judgements  are  used  at  prime  and  test  (Burton  et  al,  1998;  McNeill, 
Burton  &  Ellis,  2003),  reflecting  shared  semantic  access  to  faces  and  names 
following  person  recognition.  Unlike  the  interference  paradigms  of  the  preceding 
chapter,  domain-specific  priming  can  therefore  be  used  to  assess  face  identity 
processing  directly,  independent  of  subsequent  semantic  processing. 
The  following  experiments  utilized  this  characteristic  to  provide  a  further  test  for 
face  processing  limits.  Of  specific  interest  was  whether  repetition  priming  would 
reveal  any  evidence  of  face  distractor  processing  when  it  is  presented  alongside  a 
task-relevant  face  target,  in  comparison  with  the  extinction  of  face-face 
interference  in  Chapter  3.  Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis  (2002)  report  that  irrelevant 
famous  face  distractors  are  primed  automatically  during  nonface  target  processing, 
even  under  conditions  of  high  relevant  processing  load  and  when  participants  have 
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processed  simultaneously,  one  might  thus  also  expect  some  repetition  priming 
from  task-irrelevant  famous  distractor  faces  during  task-relevant  face  processing. 
Experiment  9 
Experiment  9  examined  capacity  limits  in  face  processing  by  measuring  repetition 
priming  from  two-item  displays.  To  provide  an  analogue  to  the  interference 
displays  of  Chapter  3,  the  subjects'  task  was  to  classify  famous  face  targets  or 
nonface  comparisons,  in  this  case  images  of  national  flags,  as  American  or  British 
while  ignoring  a  flanking  famous  face  distractor.  Within  these  displays  faces  could 
be  primed  under  three  conditions:  i)  as  task-relevant  face  targets  (the  Target  Face 
condition),  ii)  as  irrelevant  face  distractors  that  were  presented  alongside  these 
face  targets  (the  Face-Face  condition),  and  iii)  as  irrelevant  face  distractors 
presented  alongside  flag  targets  (the  Flag-Face  condition).  The  extent  to  which 
these  faces  were  processed  was  then  assessed  in  a  surprise  test  phase  via  speeded 
familiarity  judgements  (famous/unfamiliar)  to  primed  famous  faces,  unprimed 
famous  faces  and  some  unfamiliar  filler  faces.  The  unprimed  famous  faces  were 
included  as  a  baseline  (the  Unprimed  condition)  to  determine  whether  face 
distractors  were  subject  to  any  repetition  priming. 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  repetition  priming  can  usually  be 
seen  even  when  different  images  of  the  same  person's  face  are  used  at  prime  and 
test,  reflecting  repeated  processing  within  the  face  recognition  system.  The  present 
experiment  therefore  measured  cross-image  priming  to  determine  whether 
irrelevant  face  distractors  can  be  processed  to  recognition.  Face  targets  should 
produce  the  standard  pattern  of  repetition  priming,  and  comparisons  with  this 
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priming  effects.  If  identity  information  from  two  faces  can  be  processed 
simultaneously,  then  face  distractors  should  show  repetition  priming  regardless  of 
target  type.  Alternatively,  if  such  processing  is  limited  to  just  a  single  face,  then 
distractor  priming  should  be  eliminated  in  the  Face-Face  condition.  However, 
since  face  distractors  interfered  strongly  with  nonface  target  classification  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  the  Flag-Face  condition  should  allow  for  reliable  distractor 
priming. 
Method 
Subjects  Thirty-two  British  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  aged  20-28  years,  were  paid  a  small  fee  to  participate  in  the  experiment. 
All  reported  normal  or  correct  vision. 
Design  &  Stimuli  For  the  prime  phase,  photographs  of  forty  British  and  of  forty 
American  celebrities  (see  Appendix  B),  and  of  twenty  national  flags  (10  Stars  & 
Stripes,  10  Union  Jacks)  served  as  stimuli.  All  images  were  greyscale  and 
measured  3.6  cm  x  4.5  cm  (3.4°  x  4.3°  of  VA  at  a  viewing  distance  of  60  cm). 
Faces  were  presented  with  their  external  features  intact  (i.  e.  hair,  face  outline)  and 
the  flags  were  manually  cropped  to  roughly  elliptical  shapes  to  produce  a  closer 
resemblance  with  the  face  stimuli.  These  images  were  used  to  construct  displays 
consisting  of  a  central  target,  which  could  be  either  a  face  or  a  flag,  and  a  flanking 
face  distractor  (see  Figure  4.1  overleaf).  Distractors  were  equally  likely  to  appear 
left  or  right  of  the  target,  1.0  cm  (1.0°  of  VA)  from  the  nearest  target  contours,  and 
were  counterbalanced  so  that  target  and  distractor  were  of  the  same  nationality  and 
of  the  same  sex  (face-face  pairings  only)  in  half  of  the  displays.  Combining  each 
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resulted  in  40  stimulus  displays.  Overall,  this  involved  60  of  the  80  face  stimuli. 
The  20  remaining  face  identities  were  reserved  as  unprimed  controls  for  the 
second  phase.  The  80  face  images  were  rotated  around  these  conditions  so  that 
over  the  course  of  the  whole  experiment,  each  famous  face  appeared  in  each 
condition  an  equal  number  of  times. 
Prime  Phase  Displays: 
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Figure  4.1  Illustration  of  the  experimental  conditions  in  Experiment  9.  At  prime  phase, 
displays  consisting  of  a  face  or  flag  target  and  a  flanking  face  distractor  were  shown  for 
200  msec  in  an  American/British  categorization  task.  At  test  phase,  repetition  priming  of 
these  faces  was  assessed  via  familiarity  judgements  (famous  versus  unfamiliar)  to 
different  photographs  of  the  primed  face  targets  (the  Target  Face  condition)  and  the 
distractors  (in  the  Face-Face  and  Flag-Face  conditions),  and  to  photographs  of  unseen 
famous  faces  (the  Unprimed  baseline  condition)  and  some  unfamiliar  filler  faces.  The 
famous  faces  here  are,  from  left  to  right  at  test  phase:  Rowan  Atkinson,  Harrison  Ford, 
Britney  Spears,  and  Keanu  Reaves. 
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Face-Face  Tarqet  Face  Flag-Face  Unprlrned Different  (unseen)  images  of  the  same  80  celebrities'  faces,  intermixed  with  80 
unfamiliar  faces,  were  used  in  the  test  phase  in  a  speeded  familiarity  task  (see 
Figure  4.1).  The  unfamiliar  faces  were  photographs  of  anonymous  male  and 
female  models,  which  provided  a  close  match  for  the  famous  faces  in  terms  of 
image  quality,  approximate  age  and  good  looks.  All  images  were  presented  in 
greyscale  at  fixation,  one  at  a  time,  at  a  size  of  6.0  cm  x  7.5  cm  (5.7°  x  7.3°  of  VA) 
on  a  dark  background.  An  Apple  Macintosh  computer  was  used  to  present  stimuli 
and  record  responses  using  PsyScope  1.2.5.  Viewing  distance  was  fixed  at  60  cm 
by  means  of  a  chinrest. 
Procedure  In  the  prime  phase,  each  trial  began  with  a  fixation  cross  for  750  ms, 
followed  by  a  target-distractor  display  for  200  ms  (i.  e.  too  briefly  to  permit 
stimulus-responsive  saccades),  and  a  blank  screen  which  remained  on  until  a 
response  was  registered.  Subjects  made  speeded  judgements  concerning  whether 
the  central  target  was  American  or  British  by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons  ("D"  and 
"L")  on  a  standard  computer  keyboard,  but  were  emphatically  instructed  to  ignore 
the  task-irrelevant  distractors.  Subjects  were  encouraged  to  guess  if  they  were 
uncertain  regarding  the  correct  answer.  If  no  response  was  made  within  2.5 
seconds  of  stimulus  onset,  the  next  trial  was  initiated.  All  subjects  underwent  a 
short  practice  block  of  16  trials,  consisting  of  an  additional  4  flags  and  12  famous 
face  images.  Each  of  these  images  was  displayed  twice  during  practice  and  none 
were  encountered  subsequently.  An  experimental  block  of  40  randomly  intermixed 
trials  followed  the  practice  block. 
Upon  completion  of  the  prime  phase  subjects  were  instructed  to  remain  seated  at 
the  computer  by  an  onscreen  message.  The  experimenter  then  entered  the 
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consisted  of  a  fixation  cross  for  750  ms,  followed  by  a  single  face  image,  which 
was  displayed  at  fixation  until  a  response  had  been  made.  Subjects  were  told  to 
make  famous/unfamiliar  judgements  to  these  faces  as  quickly  and  as  accurately  as 
possible  via  a  two-choice  keypress  response  ("C"  vs.  ".  ").  Subjects  underwent  4 
blocks  consisting  of  20  famous  and  20  unfamiliar  trials  presented  in  random  order. 
They  were  able  to  rest  between  blocks,  initiating  the  next  block  by  pressing  the 
space  bar. 
Results 
Priming  Phase  Accuracy  in  the  prime  phase  was  important  for  confirming  that 
subjects  were  focussing  on  the  target  stimuli.  Incorrect  responses  were  discarded 
and  mean  RTs  and  error  rates  were  calculated  for  responses  to  face  and  flag 
targets.  The  cross-subject  averages  of  these  means  were:  face  targets  915  msec 
(error  rates  19.4%),  flag  targets  715  msec  (error  rates  7.8%).  Prime  phase  data  was 
not  analyzed  further. 
Test  Phase  The  data  of  principal  interest  were  the  responses  to  primed  and 
unprimed  famous  faces  at  test  phase.  Incorrect  responses  and  RTs  exceeding  2 
seconds  (less  than  1%  of  correct  responses)  were  excluded  from  analysis.  The 
mean  RTs  and  error  rates,  averaged  across  subjects,  are  shown  in  Figure  4.2  as  a 
function  of  experimental  condition. 
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Figure  4.2  Mean  correct  responses  (n=32)  to  famous  faces  in  the  surprise  test  phase  of 
Experiment  9.  Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  prime  type;  Target  Face,  Flag-Face, 
Face-Face,  and  Unprimed.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  (Target  Face  versus  Face-Face  versus 
Flag-Face  versus  Unprimed)  showed  an  effect  of  prime  type,  F(3,93)=19.64 
p<.  01.  Post  hoc  comparisons  with  Tukey's  HSD  test  (p<.  05)  revealed  more 
repetition  priming  in  the  Target  Face  condition  in  comparison  with  each  of  the 
other  conditions  (Face-Face,  Flag-Face,  and  Unprimed),  indicating  greatest 
repetition  priming  for  task-relevant  faces.  More  importantly,  the  Flag-Face 
condition  also  showed  significant  repetition  priming  in  comparison  with  both  the 
Face-Face  and  the  Unprimed  conditions  (p<.  05).  However,  there  was  no 
difference  between  the  Face-Face  condition  and  the  Unprimed  condition. 
Errors  were  made  on  11.4%  of  Target  Face  trials,  13.6%  of  Flag-Face  trials, 
16.3%  of  Face-Face  trials,  and  on  14.7%  of  Unprimed  trials.  Error  rates  were 
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versus  Unprimed)  ANOVA,  which  showed  a  main  effect  of  prime  type, 
F(3,93)=3.33,  p<.  05,  reflecting  higher  errors  for  Face-Face  primes  than  Target 
Face  primes  (Tukey's  HSD,  p<.  05).  No  other  comparisons  were  significant. 
Discussion 
The  results  show  maximal  repetition  priming  for  face  targets,  reflecting  the  task- 
relevance  of  these  images  at  prime  phase.  Irrelevant  face  distractors  also  showed 
repetition  priming  when  presented  with  flag  targets.  Although  this  priming  effect 
was  smaller  than  for  the  face  targets,  this  processing  evidently  involved  access  to 
the  distractors'  identities  since  it  survived  a  change  in  image  between  prime  and 
test.  By  contrast,  no  priming  was  found  for  face  distractors  during  face  target 
processing.  Given  that  face  priming  has  previously  been  shown  to  be  unaffected 
by  relevant  nonface  processing,  even  under  conditions  of  high  processing  load 
(Jenkins  et  al,  2002),  the  absence  of  any  reliable  priming  effects  in  this  condition  is 
striking.  Overall  however,  the  present  data  are  analogous  to  the  findings  of 
Chapter  3,  where  face  distractor  interference  was  consistently  extinguished  by 
relevant  face  but  not  by  relevant  nonface  processing.  Thus  the  results  further 
support  the  claim  that  face  processing  is  capacity  limited.  In  contrast  to  Chapter  3, 
face  processing  was  now  measured  prior  to  personal  semantic  information  and 
independent  of  facial  sex.  The  present  findings  therefore  exclude  the  possibility 
that  the  previously  observed  extinction  of  face-face  interference  reflects 
processing  limits  only  for  sex  information  or  at  a  semantic  level,  and  extends  these 
limits  to  facial  identity. 
121 Experiment  10 
The  preceding  experiment  showed  that  face  target  processing  eliminates  cross- 
image  repetition  priming  of  a  simultaneously  presented  face  distractor.  Although 
these  findings  converge  with  the  idea  that  face  processing  is  capacity  limited,  they 
are  nonetheless  surprising  as  repetition  priming  onto  familiarity  decisions  usually 
proceeds  automatically  at  prime  phase,  thus  greatly  minimizing  any  face 
processing  demands  (see  e.  g.  Ellis  et  al,  1990;  Jenkins  et  al,  2002).  The  basis  for 
the  next  experiment  is  the  observation  that  greatest  repetition  priming  is  observed 
when  identical  images  are  used  at  prime  and  test  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985; 
Ellis  et  al,  1987).  In  this  way,  it  might  thus  be  possible  to  further  optimize  the 
conditions  for  face  distractor  priming. 
Intriguingly,  same-image  repetition  priming  has  never  been  found  under 
conditions  that  do  not  allow  cross-image  priming.  However,  the  possibility  exists 
that  a  same-image  priming  advantage  might  arise  to  some  extent  independent  of 
the  face  recognition  system.  Some  researchers  propose  that  this  effect  could  be 
attributed  to  facilitation  at  a  separate  "pictorial"  memory  stage  (e.  g.  Jacoby,  1983; 
Jacoby  &  Brooks,  1984)  or  from  a  processing  overlap  in  the  visual  system  between 
prime  and  test  phase  (e.  g.  Blaxton,  1989;  Roediger,  1990;  for  a  possible 
explanation  see  also  Ellis,  Burton,  Young  &  Flude,  1997).  Such  "episodic" 
accounts  emphasize  the  retrieval  of  stored  event  memories,  whereby  repetition 
priming  is  optimized  when  the  processing  requirements  of  prime  and  test  phase  are 
most  similar.  On  their  own,  these  accounts  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  repetition 
priming  of  familiar  faces.  For  instance,  repetition  priming  across  radically 
different  images  of  the  same  person  (e.  g.  Bruce  &  Valentine,  1985;  Brunas  et  al, 
1990),  cross-domain  priming  from  faces  to  names  (Burton  et  al,  1998),  and  reports 
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same  faces  and  the  same  decisions  to  these  faces  are  used  at  prime  and  test  (Ellis  et 
al,  1990)  all  resist  effortless  accommodation  into  purely  episodic  accounts. 
Nonetheless,  several  studies  have  also  reported  priming  for  unfamiliar  faces, 
effects  that  are  unlikely  to  arise  within  the  face  recognition  system.  In  one  study, 
Khurana  (2000)  asked  participants  to  match  the  second  and  the  fourth  face  in  a 
row  of  five  unfamiliar  faces  while  ignoring  the  three  remaining  distractor  faces. 
Negative  priming  was  found  when  the  face  targets  consisted  of  the  to-be-ignored 
distractors  of  the  preceding  trials.  In  addition,  repetition  priming  was  found  when 
distractors  were  disrupted  with  high  frequency  noise  or  contrast  inverted2.  Others 
also  report  some  long  term  negative  priming  effects  with  unfamiliar  faces  in  more 
conventional  priming  designs  (Ellis  et  al,  1990,  Experiment  2;  Young,  McWeeney, 
Hay  &  Ellis,  1986b,  Experiment  4),  which  provides  further  evidence  that 
information  from  unfamiliar  faces  is  represented  at  some  level  in  the  visual 
system.  Moreover,  negative  priming  and  repetition  priming  have  recently  been 
observed  with  novel  object  shapes,  for  which  subjects  could  not  possess  stored, 
pre-existing  representations  (DeSchepper  &  Treisman,  1996).  This  provides  at 
least  some  suggestive  evidence  that  same-image  priming  might  occur  at  a  general 
processing  stage,  operating  independent  of  the  face  recognition  system.  Even  if 
face  distractors  are  not  subject  to  cross-image  priming  during  face  target 
processing,  they  might  therefore  still  produce  some  same-image  priming.  This  was 
the  focus  of  the  present  experiment.  As  before,  subjects  performed  a  nationality 
2  Note  that  these  results  do  not  contradict  present  claims  for  face  processing  limits,  as  displays 
were  presented  for  a  substantial  duration,  until  a  response  was  made.  Under  those  conditions,  the 
faces  may  have  been  processed  sequentially. 
123 categorization  task  onto  famous  faces  and  images  of  flags  while  trying  to  ignore  a 
flanking  famous  face  distractor,  and  any  face  processing  at  this  stage  was  then 
assessed  via  speeded  familiarity  judgements  to  primed  and  unprimed  faces.  In 
contrast  to  Experiment  9,  identical  face  sets  were  now  used  at  prime  and  at  test 
phase. 
Method 
Subjects  Thirty-six  British  undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  aged  18-30  years,  were  paid  a  small  fee  to  participate  in  the  experiment. 
All  reported  normal  or  corrected  vision  and  had  not  participated  in  the  previous 
experiment. 
Stimuli&  Procedure  Apparatus,  stimuli  and  procedure  were  the  same  as  those  in 
Experiment  9,  except  that  the  face  images  used  in  the  prime  phase  were  now  the 
same  as  those  used  in  the  test  phase.  As  in  Experiment  1,  the  participants 
completed  a  practice  block  of  16  trials  and  an  experimental  block  of  40  trials  in  the 
priming  phase.  This  was  followed  by  an  unexpected  test  phase  consisting  of  4 
blocks  of  40  familiarity  judgements. 
Priming  Phase  Incorrect  responses  to  face  targets  were  discarded  and  mean  correct 
RTs  and  error  rates  were  then  calculated  for  responses  to  face  and  flag  targets.  The 
average  of  these  means  across  subjects  for  each  target  type  were:  face  targets  959 
msec  (error  rates  16.6%),  flag  targets  811  msec  (error  rates  10.4%). 
124 Test  Phase  Incorrect  responses  and  RTs  exceeding  2  seconds  were  excluded  from 
analysis  (less  than  1%  of  all  correct  `famous'  responses).  The  mean  RTs  and  error 
rates  across  subjects  are  shown  in  Figure  4.3  as  a  function  of  experimental 
condition. 
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Figure  4.3  Mean  correct  responses  (n=36)  to  famous  faces  in  the  test  phase  of  Experiment 
10.  Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  prime  type;  Target  Face,  Flag-Face,  Face- 
Face,  and  Unprimed.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  (Target  Face  versus  Face-Face  versus 
Flag-Face  versus  Unprimed)  showed  an  effect  of  prime  type,  F(3,105)=30.46, 
p<.  01.  As  in  Experiment  9,  Tukey's  HSD  test  (p<.  01)  showed  more  priming  in  the 
Target  Face  condition  than  in  the  Face-Face  condition,  the  Flag-Face  condition 
and  the  Unprimed  condition.  This  time  however,  peripheral  faces  produced 
significant  repetition  priming  whether  presented  with  a  flag  target  or  a  face  target 
(Flag-Face  versus  Unprimed,  p<.  01;  Face-Face  versus  Unprimed,  p<.  05).  As 
125 expected,  these  priming  effects  were  numerically  larger  in  the  Flag-Face 
condition,  but  this  difference  (of  10  msec)  did  not  reach  significance. 
Error  rates  were  analysed  as  for  the  M.  Incorrect  responses  were  made  on  6.0% 
of  Target  Face  trials,  9.9%  of  Flag-Face  trials,  10.3%  of  Face-Face  trials,  and  on 
11.3%  of  Unprimed  trials.  ANOVA  showed  a  main  effect  of  prime  type, 
F(3,105)=6.05,  p<.  01,  reflecting  fewer  errors  in  the  Target  Face  condition  in 
comparison  with  each  of  the  other  conditions  (versus  Flag-Face,  p<.  05;  versus 
Face-Face,  p<.  01;  versus  Unprimed,  p<.  01).  No  other  comparisons  were 
significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment  9  sought  to  determine  whether  famous  face  distractors  are  subject  to 
cross-image  repetition  priming  while  a  fixated  target  is  classified.  The  results 
showed  that  distractor  faces  produce  priming,  but  only  during  nonface  target 
processing.  By  contrast,  distractor  priming  was  eliminated  during  face  target 
processing.  Experiment  10  repeated  this  design  with  identical  stimuli  at  prime  and 
test.  As  before,  repetition  priming  was  obtained  for  face  targets.  However,  unlike 
Experiment  9  reliable  repetition  priming  was  now  also  observed  for  face 
distractors  regardless  of  target  type.  These  results  have  several  implications. 
Although  repetition  priming  is  a  well-researched  area,  these  experiments 
demonstrate  a  dissociation  between  cross-image  and  same-image  repetition 
priming  of  distractor  faces.  Moreover,  despite  converging  claims  from 
Experiments  4-9  that  face  processing  is  capacity  limited  to  just  a  single  face,  from 
the  present  data  it  appears  that  a  second  face  in  a  display,  in  the  form  of  a  task- 
irrelevant  distractor,  is  nonetheless  processed  by  the  visual  system  during  face 
126 target  processing.  How  can  these  different  results  be  reconciled?  The  finding  that 
repetition  priming  survives  changes  in  image  has  repeatedly  been  attributed  to 
changes  within  the  system  that  processes  the  perceptual  identity  of  a  face.  This 
system  is  clearly  capable  of  a  great  degree  of  generalization,  since  familiar  faces 
are  recognized  even  under  difficult  conditions  (see  e.  g.  Bruce,  Henderson, 
Newman  &  Cowan,  2001).  Therefore,  the  absence  of  cross-image  distractor 
priming  during  face  target  processing  in  Experiment  9,  suggests  that  the  distractor 
faces  were  not  recognized.  As  the  same  design  was  applied  in  the  present 
experiment,  one  can  assume  that  the  face  distractors  of  this  condition  were  not 
recognized  here  either.  However,  since  these  faces  did  show  same-image  priming, 
the  question  remains  to  what  extent  they  were  processed. 
Repetition  priming  is  consistently  greatest  when  identical  face  images  are  used.  In 
the  introduction  to  this  experiment,  it  was  suggested  that  a  same-image  priming 
advantage  might  at  least  partially  arise  from  additional  facilitation  at  a  general 
processing  stage  prior  to  face  recognition.  However,  the  existence  of  such  a  stage 
is  a  contentious  issue.  On  the  one  side,  negative  priming  effects  have  been 
observed  for  unfamiliar  faces  (Khurana,  2000;  Ellis  et  al,  1990;  Young  et  al, 
1986b),  and  for  novel  object  shapes  (DeSchepper  &  Treisman,  1996).  Because 
subjects  could  not  have  maintained  stored  representations  of  these  stimuli  prior  to 
the  experiments,  it  seems  unlikely  that  these  effects  occurred  within  the 
recognition  system.  Yet,  if  the  face  distractors  of  the  Face-Face  condition  were 
processed  similarly  to  unfamiliar  faces  and  novel  objects,  then  should  they  not  also 
have  produced  negative  rather  than  repetition  priming?  Crucially,  Khurana  (2000) 
found  that  unfamiliar  faces  produce  repetition  priming  when  the  face  stimuli  are 
contrast-inverted  or  disrupted  with  high  frequency  noise  between  prime  and  test. 
127 DeSchepper  &  Treisman  (1996)  also  observed  facilitation  when  the  size  of  novel 
object  shapes  was  changed  between  prime  and  test.  Moreover,  these  priming 
effects  were  long-lived,  indicating  that  they  did  not  simply  reflect  transient 
activation  patterns  within  early  visual  pathways,  but  that  shape  information  was 
stored  long  term.  Note  that  stimulus  size  was  also  manipulated  in  the  present 
experiments  (3.6  x  4.5  cm  at  prime  versus  6.0  x  7.5  cm  at  test),  and  that  the  same- 
image  priming  effects  survived  across  a  considerable  number  of  intervening  trials 
between  the  presentation  of  the  faces  at  prime  and  at  test  phase.  The  observation  of 
repetition  priming  in  the  Face-Face  condition  in  Experiment  10  therefore  appears 
consistent  with  previous  experiments  using  unfamiliar  faces  and  novel  shapes,  and 
suggests  that  these  effects  might  be  located  at  a  general  processing  stage,  perhaps 
akin  to  a  pictorial  memory  store  outside  the  face  recognition  system. 
A  potential  problem  for  this  explanation  is  the  observation  that  repetition  priming 
is  not  observed  onto  sex  or  expression  decisions  when  the  same  faces  are  used  at 
prime  and  test  (Ellis  et  al,  1990).  However,  since  repetition  priming  enhances  the 
speed  at  which  stimuli  are  processed  over  successive  presentations,  visual  stimuli 
that  are  frequently  encountered  should  operate  closer  to  the  limit  at  which  a 
stimulus  can  be  processed.  Sex  and  expression  decisions  to  faces  are  categorical, 
and  the  number  of  these  categories  is  extremely  limited  in  comparison  to  the 
seemingly  infinite  number  of  faces  encountered  in  everyday  life  (e.  g.  Etcoff  & 
Magee,  1992).  Moreover,  due  to  the  dynamic  nature  of  faces,  expression 
judgements  may  be  made  with  much  greater  frequency  than  identity  and  sex 
decisions.  Thus  one  might  expect  less  priming  for  expression  than  for  sex 
information,  and  less  priming  for  both  these  types  of  information  than  for  face 
identity.  In  line  with  this  reasoning,  sex  and  expression  judgements  are  already 
128 relatively  fast,  and  although  repetition  priming  is  usually  not  found  onto  these 
decisions  (but  see  Goshen-Gottstein  &  Ganel,  2000;  McNeill  &  Burton,  2003), 
more  often  than  not  sex  decisions  show  small  non-significant  priming  patterns 
(Ellis  et  al,  1990;  McNeill  &  Burton,  2003).  Consequently,  the  absence  of 
repetition  priming  onto  sex  and  expression  decisions  does  not  rule  out  the 
existence  of  a  general  processing  component  in  same-image  priming.  The 
experiments  in  this  chapter  indicate  that  such  same-image  priming  might  be 
dissociable  from  priming  within  the  face  recognition  system.  However,  at  present 
Experiment  9  provides  the  only  evidence  that  processing  a  face  eliminates  cross- 
image  repetition  priming  of  another  face.  Therefore,  before  reaching  this  strong 
conclusion  it  is  necessary  to  replicate  the  key  findings  from  Experiment  9,  in 
particular  the  absence  of  cross-image  repetition  priming  in  the  Face-Face 
condition.  This  is  the  purpose  of  the  next  experiment. 
Experiment  11 
The  purpose  of  the  final  experiment  of  this  chapter  was  two-fold.  The  first  aim 
was  to  replicate  the  extinction  of  cross-image  distractor  priming  that  was  observed 
during  face  target  processing  in  Experiment  9.  The  second  aim  was  to  explore  the 
visual  properties  that  may  be  required  to  elicit  face  processing  limits.  A  striking 
aspect  of  the  preceding  experiments,  including  Chapter  3,  is  that  classifying 
nonface  targets  was  never  sufficient  for  eliminating  distractor  processing  at  and 
beyond  the  level  at  which  faces  are  recognized.  However,  although  the  preceding 
experiments  used  nonface  targets  for  which  an  equivalent  face  classification  task 
could  be  made,  none  of  these  stimuli  resembled  any  of  the  physical  attributes  of 
faces.  Therefore,  these  findings  do  not  imply  that  other  `face-like'  visual  stimuli 
are  not  capable  of  eliciting  face  processing  limits. 
129 A  number  of  researchers  have  shown  that  even  simple  face-like  schema  may 
automatically  activate  face  processing.  For  example,  Suzuki  &  Cavanagh  (1995) 
observed  a  cost  in  feature  search  for  a  single  up-turned  arc  among  down-turned 
arcs,  when  the  arcs  were  arranged  in  sets  of  three  in  a  face-like  configuration. 
Similarly,  Mack,  Pappas,  Silverman  &  Gay  (2002)  found  that  a  happy  face  icon, 
consisting  of  an  outer  circle  and  two  round  dots  above  an  upwards-arched  line,  is 
detected  more  frequently  in  a  crowded  display  than  a  scrambled  stimulus 
consisting  of  the  same  features.  If  these  properties  are  sufficient  for  engaging  face 
processes,  then  face-like  stimuli  might  also  be  capable  of  eliminating  cross-image 
face  distractor  priming.  As  a  consequence,  it  might  be  possible  to  isolate  some  of 
the  visual  properties  that  determine  face  processing  limits. 
To  examine  this  possibility,  the  current  experiment  used  images  of  frontal  and 
three-quarter  rear  and  full  rear  view  photographs  of  American  and  British  cars  as 
targets.  Human  faces  have  two  horizontally  separated  eyes  positioned  vertically 
above  a  wide  central  mouth,  in  the  context  of  a  general  left-right  symmetry. 
Similarly,  car  fronts  possess  two  horizontally  separate  and  often  circular 
headlamps  above  a  wide  central  grille,  again  in  the  context  of  a  general  left-right 
symmetry.  Like  the  schematic  stimuli  of  previous  studies  (e.  g.  Mack  et  al,  2002; 
Suzuki  &  Cavanagh,  1995),  these  features  occasionally  provide  a  striking 
resemblance  to  faces.  Therefore,  similar  to  photographs  of  genuine  face  targets, 
cross-image  priming  of  distractor  faces  could  be  greatly  reduced  or  extinguished 
by  photographs  of  car  fronts.  On  the  other  side,  three-quarter  rear  views  and  full 
back  views  of  cars  often  possess  similar  features  to  car  fronts,  such  as  rear-lights, 
and  full  car  backs  also  exhibit  a  great  degree  of  symmetry,  but  these  views  usually 
do  not  appear  to  resemble  faces  to  the  same  extent.  Thus,  car  fronts  might  engage 
130 face  processing  limits  when  car  backs  do  not.  Experiment  11  addressed  this 
possibility  by  measuring  cross-image  face  priming  under  four  conditions:  i)  from 
task-relevant  face  targets  (the  Face  Target  condition);  ii)  from  face  distractors 
presented  alongside  a  relevant  face  target  (the  Face-Face  condition);  iii)  from  face 
distractors  presented  alongside  images  of  car  fronts  (the  Front-Face  condition); 
and  iv)  from  face  distractors  presented  alongside  images  of  three-quarter  and  full 
rear  views  of  cars  (the  Back-Face  condition).  As  before,  an  Unprimed  condition 
was  also  included  as  a  baseline. 
Method 
pilot  Study  Before  describing  the  main  experiment,  the  perceived  nationality  and 
the  perceived  faceness  of  car  images  was  examined  directly  in  two  rating  tasks. 
One  aim  of  this  preliminary  study  was  to  ensure  that  the  car  images  provided  an 
intuitive  analogue  in  terms  of  nationality  to  the  famous  face  stimuli  at  prime  phase, 
even  for  participants  with  limited  knowledge  about  cars.  The  second  more 
important  aim  was  to  verify  the  hypothesis  that  the  perceived  faceness  of  car  fronts 
is  greater  than  car  backs.  In  the  nationality  rating  tasks,  10  participants  (all 
undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow)  were  instructed  to  sort 
decks  of  40  car  images  into  two  piles.  These  images  consisted  of  20  typical 
American  cars  and  20  typical  British  cars,  exactly  half  of  which  depicted  car  fronts 
with  the  other  half  depicting  cars  from  three-quarter  and  full  rear  view  (see  Figure 
4.4  overleaf). 
131 Figure  4.4  Example  displays  of  the  car  stimuli  used  in  Experiment  11.  The  stimuli 
consisted  of  photographs  of  face-like  car  fronts  and  photographs  of  face-unlike  three- 
quarter  and  full  back  views  of  American  and  British  automobiles. 
The  sorting  criterion  was  whether  cars  looked  American  or  British.  As  a 
classification  strategy,  participants  were  encouraged  to  guess  when  uncertain 
regarding  the  correct  answer,  but  were  told  that  American  cars  generally  look 
bulkier  and  had  big  chrome  grills  and  tail  fins,  in  comparison  to  the  more  modest, 
sportier  looking  British  cars.  These  instructions  proved  successful  as  85%  of  all 
cars  fronts  (American,  85.3%  versus  British,  83.8%)  and  73%  of  other  car  images 
(American  73.5%  versus  British,  73.3%)  were  categorized  correctly. 
Subsequently,  these  images  were  ranked  according  to  faceness,  with  a  rank  of  1 
given  to  the  most  and  40  to  the  least  face-like  looking  car.  Results  were  consistent 
with  the  hypothesis  that  car  fronts  possess  greater  faceness  than  other  car  images, 
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Fronts  Backs  Frnnts  Big  cks with  average  rankings  of  10.6  for  car  fronts  (std  3.9)  and  of  30.1  (std  3.9)  for  the 
remaining  images. 
ub'ec  In  the  main  experiment,  45  British  students  from  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  aged  18-30  years,  volunteered  to  participate  for  a  small  fee.  All  subjects 
reported  normal  or  corrected  vision  and  had  not  participated  in  any  of  the  previous 
experiments. 
Design  &  Stimuli  In  the  prime  phase,  the  40  car  images  and  photographs  of  100 
celebrities  (50  American  &  50  British,  see  Appendix  C)  were  used  to  construct 
stimulus  displays  consisting  of  a  central  target  and  a  flanking  face  distractor, 
presented  1.0  cm  (1.0°  of  VA)  to  the  left  or  right  of  the  nearest  target  contours.  All 
images  were  presented  in  greyscale  on  a  black  background  at  a  size  of  3.6  cm  x  4.5 
cm  (3.4°  x  4.3°  of  VA).  Target-distractor  pairings  were  counterbalanced  so  that 
they  were  equally  likely  to  be  of  same  or  different  nationality.  Combining  20  car 
fronts,  20  car  backs,  and  20  famous  faces  with  a  famous  face  distractor  resulted  in 
60  target-distractor  displays.  Overall,  this  involved  80  of  the  100  face  images.  The 
remaining  celebrities'  faces  were  reserved  as  unprimed  controls  for  the  test  phase. 
As  before,  all  faces  were  rotated  across  these  conditions  over  the  course  of  the 
experiment,  so  that  each  face  appeared  in  each  of  the  conditions  an  equal  number 
of  times. 
At  test  phase,  100  novel  images  of  the  same  celebrities'  faces  and  100  unfamiliar 
faces  were  used  in  a  familiarity  task  (famous  vs.  unfamiliar).  Images  were 
presented  at  a  size  of  6.0  cm  x  7.5  cm  (5.7°  x  7.3°  of  VA),  one  at  a  time,  on  a  black 
background.  The  experiment  was  run  and  responses  were  recorded  on  an  Apple 
133 Macintosh  computer  using  PsyScope  1.2.5  software.  Viewing  distance  was  fixed 
at  60  cm  by  a  chinrest. 
Procedure  The  procedure  for  the  prime  phase  was  almost  identical  to  the  preceding 
experiments,  with  each  trial  consisting  of  a  fixation  cross  for  750  ms,  a  target- 
distractor  display  for  200  ms,  and  a  blank  screen  until  a  response  was  registered. 
Subjects  again  made  speeded  judgements  concerning  the  targets'  nationality  by 
pressing  the  "D"  key  for  American  targets  or  the  "L"  key  for  British  targets.  If  no 
response  was  made  within  2.5  seconds  of  stimulus  onset,  the  next  trial  was 
initiated.  For  car  targets,  participants  were  not  expected  to  possess  particular  car 
expertise,  but  were  instructed  to  classify  bulky-looking  models  with  large  chrome 
grills  or  tail  fins  as  American  and  more  modest,  sportier  looking  cars  as  British. 
Subjects  were  encouraged  to  guess  if  they  were  uncertain  regarding  the  correct 
answer.  All  subjects  underwent  a  short  example  block  of  18  trials,  made  up  from 
an  additional  6  car  and  12  face  images,  which  were  not  encountered  in  the 
experimental  block.  This  was  followed  by  a  critical  block  of  60  randomly 
intermixed  trials. 
The  test  phase  was  the  same  as  for  the  preceding  experiments,  except  that  each 
subject  now  completed  four  blocks  of  50  randomly  intermixed  trials.  Thus,  each 
block  consisted  of  10  more  faces  (5  famous,  5  unfamiliar),  to  accommodate  the 
face  stimuli  from  the  additional  priming  condition. 
Results 
riming  Phase  Incorrect  responses  were  discarded  and  the  mean  correct  RTs  and 
error  rates  were  then  calculated  for  responses  to  face  and  car  targets.  The  averages 
134 of  these  means  across  subjects  for  each  target  type  were:  face  targets  946  msec 
(error  rates  10.1%),  car-fronts  882  msec  (error  rates  17.7%),  and  car-backs  906 
msec  (error  rates  21.9%). 
Test  Phase  Incorrect  responses  and  RTs  exceeding  2  seconds  were  excluded  from 
the  analysis  (less  than  1%  of  all  correct  responses).  The  mean  RTs  and  error  rates 
across  subjects  are  shown  in  Figure  4.5  as  a  function  of  experimental  condition. 
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Figure  4.5  Mean  correct  responses  (n=45)  to  famous  faces  in  the  test  phase  of  Experiment 
11.  Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  prime  type;  Target  Face,  Back-Face,  Front- 
Face,  Face-Face,  and  Unprimed.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  of  these  conditions  (Face  Target  versus 
Back-Face  versus  Front-Face  versus  Face-Face  versus  Unprimed)  showed  an 
effect  of  prime  type,  F(4,176)=13.60,  p<.  01.  Target  Faces  showed  significant 
repetition  priming  in  comparison  with  the  Front-Face  condition,  the  Face-Face 
condition,  and  the  Unprimed  condition  (all  Tukey's  HSD,  p<.  O1).  Although  RTs  to 
135 Target  Faces  were  also  faster  than  to  Back-Face  primes,  this  difference  did  not 
reach  significance.  Face  distractors  in  the  Back-Face  condition  also  showed 
reliable  priming  in  comparison  with  the  Front-Face  and  the  Face-Face  condition 
and  the  Unprimed  faces  (Tukey's  HSD,  p<.  05).  However,  the  Front-Face 
condition  and  the  Face-Face  condition  showed  no  repetition  priming  in 
comparison  with  the  Unprimed  condition. 
Error  rates  were  analyzed  in  the  same  way  as  the  RTs.  Errors  were  made  on  10.8% 
of  Target  Face  trials,  17.2%  of  Back-Face  trials,  13.9%  of  Front-Face  trials, 
17.0%  of  Face-Face  trials,  and  on  16.3%  of  Unprimed  trials.  A  one-factor  within- 
subjects  ANOVA  showed  an  effect  of  prime  type,  F(4,176)=5.58.  p<.  01,  reflecting 
lower  percentage  errors  to  Face  Target  primes  than  to  Back-Face  primes,  Face- 
Face  primes  and  Unprimed  faces  (Tukey's  HSD,  p<.  05).  No  other  comparisons 
were  significant. 
Discussion 
Significant  repetition  priming  was  obtained  from  target  faces  and  from  distractor 
faces  that  flanked  a  car  back.  Since  the  prime  phase  and  the  test  phase  presented 
different  images  of  the  famous  faces,  these  effects  imply  that  the  faces  were 
processed  to  the  point  of  identification  in  these  conditions.  In  contrast,  peripheral 
faces  presented  alongside  a  face  target  did  not  give  rise  to  repetition  priming.  This 
replicates  the  main  finding  of  Experiment  9,  again  indicating  that  processing  the 
target  face  blocks  identification  of  the  accompanying  flanker  face,  and  also 
provides  a  further  conceptual  replication  of  the  face  processing  limits  that  were 
first  specified  in  Chapter  3.  However,  the  most  important  finding  of  this 
experiment  is  that  priming  from  a  peripheral  face  was  also  eliminated  when  the 
136 target  was  a  car  front.  In  other  words,  the  car  fronts,  which  were  rated  as  face-like 
by  observers,  behaved  like  face  targets  in  blocking  identification  of  a  peripheral 
face.  In  contrast,  the  car  backs,  which  did  not  resemble  faces,  behaved  like  the  flag 
targets  in  Experiment  9,  allowing  processing  of  the  distractor  faces  to  proceed 
unfettered.  Thus  this  pattern  appears  consistent  with  the  notion  that  any 
sufficiently  face-like  stimulus  engages  limited  face  processing  resources,  whether 
it  is  a  genuine  face  or  a  `false  positive'. 
However,  there  might  be  alternative  explanations  for  these  results.  For  example, 
although  car  fronts  and  car  backs  presumably  possessed  similar  levels  of  visual 
complexity  and  homogeneity,  they  were  not  matched  for  low-level  image 
characteristics,  such  as  their  component  spatial  frequencies.  Yet,  given  the  sheer 
number  of  car  stimuli  used,  it  would  seem  extraordinary  if  low-level  features  could 
account  for  this  dissociation.  Another  possibility  is  that  subjects  perceive  transient 
displays  of  car  fronts  as  an  oncoming  threat.  Threatening  words,  pictures,  and 
faces  have  all  been  shown  to  capture  processing  resources  in  trait-  and  state- 
anxious  individuals  to  the  detriment  of  other  stimuli,  in  comparison  to  their  non- 
threatening  counterparts  (e.  g.  Amir,  Elias,  Klump  &  Przeworski,  2003;  Fox, 
Russo,  Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001;  Yiend  &  Mathews,  2001).  If  images  of  oncoming 
cars  are  perceived  as  equally  threatening,  this  might  contribute  to  distractor  face 
extinction.  However,  the  car  stimuli  did  not  contain  motion  cues  and  it  seems 
unlikely  that  the  participants,  all  undergraduate  volunteers,  were  clinically 
anxious.  Moreover,  there  is  now  considerable  evidence  that  task-relevant  nonface 
processing  does  not  affect  the  perception  of  irrelevant  face  distractors  (e.  g.  Boutet 
et  al,  2002;  Jenkins  et  al,  2003;  Lavie  et  al,  2003).  Consequently,  it  seems  most 
plausible  that  the  present  findings  require  an  explanation  in  terms  of  the  perceived 
137 faceness  of  the  car  stimuli.  In  addition  to  the  interference  data  from  Chapter  3, 
where  analogous  capacity  limits  were  never  observed  for  nonface  comparisons 
(forenames,  famous  names,  flags)  or  for  any  of  the  face-nonface  pairings, 
Experiment  11  thus  provides  some  further,  innovative  support  for  a  unique  role  of 
faceness  in  the  processing  limits  described  in  this  thesis. 
Overall,  the  results  of  Chapter  4  are  consistent  with  the  notion  of  a  limited  face 
processing  capacity,  such  that  only  a  single  face  can  be  processed.  When  face 
processing  resources  are  loaded  by  a  task-relevant  face  target,  identification  of  a 
task-irrelevant  distractor  face,  as  indicated  by  cross-image  repetition  priming,  is 
prevented.  Access  to  these  limited  resources  is  only  granted  to  distractor  faces 
during  the  processing  of  nonface  targets,  provided  that  they  are  sufficiently  face- 
unlike  to  leave  face  processing  resources  relatively  intact.  In  fact,  the  present 
findings  suggest  that  even  seemingly  artificial  face  stimuli,  such  as  car-fronts 
possess  the  ability  to  elucidate  face  processing  limits.  Although  the  data  provide 
no  clues  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  face  information  portrayed  by  car  fronts,  it 
seems  implausible  that  it  consists  of  more  than  a  general  "eye-mouth" 
configuration.  Future  variations  of  this  paradigm,  such  as  manipulations  of  the 
visual  attributes  of  the  target  stimulus,  have  the  potential  to  further  clarify  the  fate 
of  face-like  stimuli  in  the  visual  system,  and  hence  the  selectivity  of  the  face 
processing  system.  Finally,  Chapter  4  also  found  same-image  priming  of 
distractors  faces  when  they  were  alongside  a  face  target,  which  suggests  that  these 
distractors  were  still  subject  to  early  image  processing.  Note  that  this  could  still 
include  processes  such  as  face  detection,  which  appears  to  be  dissociable  from 
face  recognition  (de  Gelder  &  Rouw,  2001).  This  possibility  is  not  ruled  out  by  the 
present  experiments  and  is  another  subject  for  future  research.  For  now,  I  turn  to 
138 an  issue  that  may  be  implicated  in  the  results  of  Chapters  3&4,  namely  attention 
biases  to  faces. 
139 Chapter  5  Disengagement  and  Engagement  of 
Attention  from  Faces  and  Nonface  Objects 
Introduction 
This  final  empirical  chapter  continues  from  face  processing  limits  to  a  related 
theme,  namely  factors  that  might  influence  face  processing  in  multiple-item 
displays.  The  experiments  in  Chapters  3&4  found  that  while  distractor  face 
processing  was  eliminated  during  the  classification  of  a  face  target,  the  same  face 
distractors  seemed  to  be  unaffected  by  nonface  targets.  In  fact,  whenever  a  solitary 
distractor  was  used  in  Chapter  3,  the  largest  interference  effects  were  consistently 
observed  in  the  condition  in  which  a  nonface  target  was  flanked  by  a  face 
distractor  (Experiments  4-6).  Moreover,  although  nonface  distractors  interfered 
with  face  and  nonface  targets  alike,  these  effects  were  generally  smaller  in  the 
face-nonface  condition.  Thus,  faces  seemed  to  interfere  more  with  task-relevant 
processing  than  other  stimuli  in  these  experiments,  but  were  also  subject  to  less 
interference.  The  question  addressed  in  the  current  chapter  is  whether  these 
differences  could  be  attributed  to  an  attentional  bias  for  faces,  which  might  allow 
faces  to  maintain  a  processing  advantage  in  comparison  with  other  visual  stimuli. 
Attention  researchers  have  identified  at  least  two  processes  during  which  a  face 
bias  could  arise,  disengagement  of  attention  from  one  stimulus  and  engagement  of 
attention  by  another  (see  e.  g.  Posner,  1980;  Posner  &  Petersen,  1990;  Posner, 
Snyder  &  Davidson,  1990;  Theeuwes,  1991;  Theeuwes,  de  Vries  &  Godijn,  2003). 
A  disengagement  bias  refers  to  the  ability  of  a  focused-on  stimulus  to  retain  or  to 
hold  attentive  resources.  This  occurs  after  the  initial  orienting  to  that  stimulus  and 
140 is  characterized  by  less  efficient  processing  of  other  stimuli  within  the  visual  field. 
Engagement,  on  the  other  hand,  increases  alertness  to  the  spatial  location  of 
another  stimulus  and  enhances  its  processing.  This  distinction  between  the  ability 
to  retain  and  to  engage  attention  certainly  seems  consistent  with  Experiments  4-6, 
where  faces  appeared  to  have  an  advantage  as  both  relevant  targets  and  irrelevant 
distractors  whenever  they  were  paired  with  a  nonface  object,  but  has  not  always 
been  applied  to  the  face  domain.  Studies  that  have  ignored  this  distinction 
generally  argue  that  faces  may  have  a  propensity  to  engage  or  to  capture  attention 
(e.  g.  Mack,  Pappas,  Silverman  &  Gay,  2002;  Ro,  Russell  &  Lavie,  2001; 
Vuilleumier,  2000),  whereas  others  have  attributed  attention  biases  to  a  difficulty 
in  disengagement,  although  this  may  only  occur  under  specific  conditions  (e.  g. 
Fox,  Russo  &  Dutton,  2002;  Fox,  Russo,  Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001). 
A  variety  of  sources  have  suggested  that  faces  may  have  an  advantage  in  capturing 
or  engaging  attention.  For  example,  Vuilleumier  (2000)  reports  three 
neuropsychological  patients  suffering  from  left-sided  spatial  neglect  following 
brain  damage  to  the  right  hemisphere,  who  were  presented  with  line-drawn  faces, 
scrambled  faces,  names,  and  meaningless  shapes  in  either  the  left  or  the  right  or 
both  visual  hemifields.  Remarkably,  patients  were  less  likely  to  report  left-sided 
shapes,  scrambles,  and  names  when  they  were  accompanied  by  a  face  stimulus  in 
the  right  hemifield.  Moreover,  left-sided  faces  were  reported  more  frequently  than 
any  other  type  of  stimuli,  suggesting  that  faces  not  only  have  an  advantage  in 
capturing  attention  when  competing  with  other  stimuli,  but  also  in  overcoming 
visual  extinction.  However,  because  Vuilleumier's  (2000)  findings  are  based  on 
just  three  visual  neglect  patients  and  on  fairly  artificial  face  stimuli,  the 
generalizability  of  these  results  is  somewhat  limited.  In  a  study  of  neurologically 
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that  happy  face  icons  are  reported  more  often  from  a  stream  of  visual  stimuli, 
presented  at  a  rate  of  75ms/item,  than  outlines  of  Christmas  trees  and  inverted 
faces  (see  also  Mack  &  Rock,  1998).  Notably,  Ro  et  al  (2001)  also  observed  a 
detection  advantage  for  photographs  of  real  faces,  with  a  flicker  paradigm.  In  such 
tasks,  participants  are  typically  shown  displays  containing  several  stimuli, 
alternating  with  blank  screens,  and  are  asked  to  detect  a  change  in  one  of  them.  Ro 
et  al  (2001)  found  that  changes  were  detected  more  quickly  in  faces  than  in 
nonface  objects  from  a  range  of  categories  (food,  clothes,  musical  instruments, 
appliances  and  plants),  which  indicates  that  real  faces  may  also  have  a  special 
capacity  to  attract  attention. 
However,  these  findings  have  not  gone  unchallenged.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2003) 
re-examined  Ro  et  al's  (2001)  claims,  to  determine  whether  their  results  could  be 
explained  in  terms  of  an  "odd-one-out"  rather  than  a  face  processing  advantage. 
This  was  based  on  the  observation  that  Ro  et  al  (2001)  only  ever  presented  one 
face  among  a  range  of  nonface  objects,  which  could  have  differed  from  faces  in  a 
number  of  ways  (e.  g.  living  versus  non-living  stimuli).  In  support  of  this  line  of 
reasoning,  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2003)  found  a  similar  change-detection  advantage 
for  a  single  nonface  target  when  embedded  among  several  faces,  leading  them  to 
suggest  that  uniqueness  may  be  more  important  than  faceness  in  change  detection. 
However,  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2003)  were  unable  to  produce  a  clear  replication  of 
the  change  detection  advantage  for  faces  reported  by  Ro  et  al  (2001),  even  under 
seemingly  identical  conditions.  Either  way,  these  results  suggest  that  faces  are  no 
more  able  to  attract  attentional  resources  in  a  change  detection  task  than  other 
objects. 
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with  happy  face  schema,  as  these  were  presented  in  a  stream  of  nonface  objects 
with  little  social  or  biological  meaning  (e.  g.  line-drawn  sailing  boats,  heart  shapes, 
telephones).  Indeed,  in  a  separate  experiment  Mack  et  al  (2002)  found  that 
observers  were  also  more  likely  to  detect  their  own  name  in  a  stream  of  letter 
strings  than  words,  leading  them  to  suggest  that  the  ability  to  capture  attention 
might  actually  depend  on  meaningfulness,  rather  than  faceness.  In  line  with  this 
reasoning,  several  other  studies  indicate  that  people  may  be  particularly  slow  to 
disengage  from  a  range  of  visual  stimuli,  including  faces,  depending  on  their 
emotional  connotation  and  the  emotional  state  of  the  observer.  In  one  such  study, 
Fox  et  al  (2001)  asked  subjects  to  detect  a  dot  probe,  the  onscreen  location  of 
which  could  be  correctly  or  incorrectly  cued  by  emotionally  threatening  or  neutral 
stimuli,  consisting  of  either  faces  or  words.  While  cue  validity  influenced 
responses  in  normal  subjects,  with  slower  responses  on  incorrectly-cued  trials, 
threat  value  had  no  effect  on  dot  probe  detection  times.  However,  responses  were 
markedly  slowed  in  highly  anxious  people  on  invalidly-cued  threatening  trials, 
suggesting  a  disengagement  bias  to  threatening  material.  Others  have  shown 
similar  attention  biases  for  negatively  charged  emotional  faces  in  normal 
individuals  (e.  g.  Eastwood,  Smilek  &  Merikle,  2003)  and  anxious  individuals  (see 
e.  g.  Bradley,  Mogg,  Falla  &  Hamilton,  1998;  Fox  et  al,  2002;  Van  Honk,  Tuiten, 
Van  den  Hout,  De  Haan  &  Stam,  2001),  but  also  for  threatening  pictures  (Yiend  & 
Mathews,  2001)  and  threatening  words  (Amir,  Elias,  Klumpp  &  Przeworski, 
2003).  Overall,  these  findings  are  at  least  partially  consistent  with  claims  that  an 
attentional  bias  might  depend  on  the  meaning  of  a  stimulus.  However,  it  should  be 
noted  that  none  of  these  studies  can  address  whether  a  general  attentional  bias  for 
143 faces  still  exists,  independent  of  any  emotional  connotations,  as  faces  were  never 
compared  with  other  classes  of  stimuli  within  the  same  experiment. 
In  all,  existing  evidence  that  faces  may  be  particularly  strong  competitors  for 
attention  is  not  convincing.  Moreover,  it  is  unclear  whether  any  advantage  might 
reflect  an  ability  to  engage  or  to  maintain  attentional  resources,  or  even  both.  In 
order  to  address  these  issues,  I  devised  a  simple  classification  task  in  which 
subjects  were  required  to  attend  to  the  colour  of  a  central  go/no-go  signal  before 
responding  to  the  location  of  a  vertical  line  target  (i.  e.  left  versus  right  of  fixation) 
within  the  display.  In  the  first  three  studies  (Experiments  12-14)  the  go/no-go 
signal  was  either  presented  on  a  blank  background,  or  superimposed  on  to-be- 
ignored  face  images  or  nonface  distractors,  and  the  line  targets  were  positioned  in 
the  periphery  of  the  displays,  clearly  separated  from  fixation.  Note  that  identifying 
the  colour  of  the  go/no-go  signal  is  a  task  thought  to  place  minimal  demands  on 
attention  (e.  g.  Treisman,  1993),  which  should  make  it  impossible  not  to  process 
other  information  presented  at  fixation  (e.  g.  Lavie,  1995,2000).  Therefore,  if  faces 
are  capable  of  retaining  attention  then  this  should  result  in  an  increase  in  target 
classification  times  on  trials  in  which  a  face  is  presented  in  comparison  with  trials 
on  which  other  stimuli  are  shown.  In  addition,  if  faces  are  also  proficient  at 
engaging  attention  then  they  should  increase  classification  times  even  when  they 
never  appear  in  a  task-relevant  location.  This  was  examined  in  a  fourth  study 
(Experiment  15),  in  which  the  line  targets  were  moved  within  close  proximity  of 
fixation,  and  the  to-be-ignored  face  and  nonface  objects  now  appeared  clearly 
separated  from  the  targets  within  the  periphery  of  the  displays. 
144 Experiment  12 
In  Experiment  12,  subjects  were  shown  displays  consisting  of  a  coloured  central 
go/no-go  signal  and  two  black  lines,  a  vertical  and  a  horizontal  line,  which  were 
presented  in  the  periphery,  one  to  the  left  and  one  to  the  right  of  fixation.  The 
subjects'  task  was  to  classify  the  position  of  the  vertical  line  (left  or  right)  on  go 
trials,  in  which  a  green  fixation  dot  appeared.  These  trials  were  complemented 
with  occasional  no-go  trials,  designated  by  a  red  fixation  dot,  in  which  a  target- 
neutral  response  was  required  (to  initiate  the  next  trial).  This  go/no-go  distinction 
was  included  to  confirm  that  subjects  were  attending  to  the  centre  of  the  displays. 
Response  times  were  measured  under  four  conditions.  In  the  Blank  condition,  the 
lines  and  fixation  dot  were  presented  alone  on  an  otherwise  blank  background.  In 
addition,  these  displays  could  contain  to-be-ignored  photographs  of  (1)  upright 
faces,  presented  in  the  centre  of  screen  behind  the  go/no-go  signal  (the  Upright 
Face  condition),  (2)  inverted  faces  (the  Inverted  Face  condition),  or  (3) 
meaningful  nonface  objects,  in  this  case  items  of  fruits  (the  Object  condition).  The 
latter  two  conditions  were  intended  to  serve  as  nonface  controls  for  the  upright 
face  stimuli.  Inverted  faces  provide  a  perfect  match  for  their  upright  equivalents  in 
terms  of  spatial  frequency,  complexity,  and  stimulus  homogeneity,  but  are 
perceived  and  recognized  so  poorly  in  comparison  that  it  has  repeatedly  been 
suggested  that  they  may  be  processed  more  similarly  to  objects  than  to  face  stimuli. 
(see  e.  g.  Farah,  Wilson,  Drain  &  Tanaka,  1995;  Moscovitch,  Winocur  & 
Behrmann,  1997).  In  contrast  to  inverted  faces,  the  fruit  stimuli  were  not  equated 
to  the  low-level  visual  properties  of  the  face  stimuli,  but  were  included  to  provide 
a  meaningful  object  comparison.  If  faces  are  particularly  proficient  at  retaining 
attention,  orienting  attentive  resources  from  the  central  go/no-go  signal  to  the 
peripheral  line  targets  should  be  less  efficient  on  Upright  Face  trials,  as  should  be 
145 seen  from  an  increase  in  target  classification  times.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  no 
more  difficult  to  disengage  from  faces  than  from  other  stimuli,  target  classification 
times  should  be  equivalent  regardless  of  stimulus  type. 
Method 
b'ec  Ten  postgraduates  from  the  University  of  Utrecht,  the  Netherlands, 
volunteered  to  participate  for  free  in  this  experiment,  and  a  further  ten  students 
from  the  University  of  Glasgow  took  part  in  exchange  for  course  credits  or 
volunteered  for  free.  Participants'  ages  ranged  from  18-27  years,  and  all  had 
normal  or  corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Design  &  Stimuli  The  experimental  displays  contained  a  central  go/no-go  signal  in 
the  shape  of  fixation  dot  of  either  green  or  red  colour,  which  measured  0.2  cm  in 
diameter  (0.2°  of  VA  at  a  viewing  distance  of  60  cm)  and  was  flanked  by  a  vertical 
and  a  horizontal  line.  These  lines  were  presented  in  black  at  a  size  of  0.1  cm  x  0.4 
cm  (0.1°  x  0.4°  of  VA),  and  were  positioned  4.8  cm  (4.6°  of  VA)  to  the  left  and 
right  of  fixation  (see  Figure  5.1  overleaf).  The  position  of  these  lines  was 
counterbalanced  throughout  the  experiment,  so  that  each  line  occurred  equally 
often  in  each  location.  Apart  from  the  fixation  dot  and  the  line  targets,  these 
displays  either  remained  blank  or  could  contain  one  of  three  types  of  stimuli 
within  the  centre:  upright  faces,  inverted  faces,  and  images  of  fruits.  The  upright 
face  stimuli  consisted  of  high  quality  digital  photographs  of  three  female 
celebrities  (Pamela  Anderson,  Marilyn  Monroe,  and  Britney  Spears),  which  were 
cropped  to  remove  any  extraneous  background,  rendered  in  greyscale  and  sized  to 
2.4  cm  x  3.0  cm  (2.3°  x  2.9°  of  VA)  using  graphics  software.  These  images  were 
then  duplicated  and  turned  upside-down  to  produce  a  matching  set  of  inverted 
146 faces.  The  fruit  images  consisted  of  three  photographs  of  an  apple,  grapes,  and  a 
plum,  which  were  manipulated  in  the  same  way  as  the  upright  face  stimuli  (see 
Figure  5.1). 
Including  the  blank  displays,  combining  each  of  these  nine  stimuli  under  each 
level  of  target  location  (left  or  right  of  fixation)  and  for  go/no-go  signals  resulted 
in  a  total  of  40  different  stimulus  displays.  These  displays  were  presented  on  an 
Apple  Macintosh  on  a  white  background  and  responses  were  recorded  using 
PsyScope  1.2.5  software. 
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Figure  5.1  Example  displays  from  the  conditions  of  Experiment  1.  On  go  trials, 
designated  by  a  green  fixation  dot,  the  task  was  to  classify  whether  the  vertical  line  target 
appeared  on  the  left  or  right  side  of  the  display.  On  no-go  trials  (red  fixation  dot),  subjects 
were  to  ignore  the  target  and  press  <space>  to  initiate  the  next  trial.  To  assess  attention 
biases  from  faces,  the  go/no-go  displays  could  be  Blank,  or  could  contain  a  meaningful 
nonface  item  (the  Object  condition),  an  upside-down  face  (the  Inverted  Face  condition), 
or  a  matching  upright  face  (the  Upright  Face  condition). 
147 Procedure  Subjects  were  seated  at  a  viewing  distance  of  60  cm  from  the  screen, 
which  was  kept  constant  by  means  of  a  chinrest.  Each  trial  began  with  a  black 
fixation  dot  for  750  ms,  followed  by  a  stimulus  display,  which  appeared  for  200 
ms  (i.  e.  too  briefly  to  permit  a  stimulus-responsive  eye-saccade),  and  a  blank 
screen  until  a  response  registered.  Subjects  were  instructed  to  focus  on  the  centre 
of  the  screen  at  the  start  of  each  trial,  and  if  the  experimental  display  contained  a 
green  fixation  dot  (on  go  trials)  to  make  speeded  judgements  regarding  the 
location  of  the  vertical  line.  Responses  were  made  by  pressing  the  "D"  key  on  a 
standard  computer  keyboard  to  indicate  when  the  target  appeared  on  the  left  and 
the  "K"  key  when  it  appeared  on  the  right  side  of  the  display.  For  no-go  displays, 
designated  by  a  red  fixation  dot,  subjects  were  told  to  ignore  the  line  stimuli  and  to 
press  <SPACE>  bar  to  initiate  the  next  trial.  Subjects  were  requested  to  respond  as 
quickly  and  as  accurately  as  possible  throughout  the  experiment.  In  addition,  they 
were  emphatically  instructed  to  ignore  any  stimuli  that  might  appear  at  fixation. 
Following  a  practice  block  of  36  blank  trials  (i.  e.  with  no  face/nonface  image 
present),  each  subject  underwent  one  critical  block  of  36  trials  of  each  of  the  four 
conditions.  Trial  order  was  randomized  within  each  block,  but  go  trials  were  twice 
as  likely  to  occur  as  no-go  trials.  Subjects  were  able  to  rest  between  blocks,  and 
could  initiate  the  next  block  by  pressing  the  "Enter"  key.  To  counterbalance 
presentation  of  the  experimental  conditions,  the  order  of  the  critical  blocks  was 
rotated  across  subjects  over  the  course  of  the  experiment. 
Results 
Incorrect  responses  were  discarded  and  the  median  correct  response  times  and 
error  rates  were  calculated  for  all  subjects.  Performance  for  go/no-go  trials  was 
important  to  confirm  that  subjects  were  attending  to  the  centre  of  the  displays. 
148 Overall  accuracy  was  high  (97.0%  for  go  trials  versus  92.9%  for  no-go  trials), 
indicating  that  subjects  had  complied  with  these  task  demands.  Data  from  no-go 
trials  was  not  analyzed  further.  For  go  trials,  the  median  correct  RTs  and  error 
rates  were  computed  as  a  function  of  the  experimental  conditions  (Blank,  Object, 
Inverted  Face,  and  Upright  Face).  The  intersubject  means  of  these  RTs  are  shown 
in  Figure  5.2. 
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Figure  5.2  Mean  correct  responses  (n=20)  to  line  targets  on  go  trials  in  Experiment  12. 
Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  experimental  condition;  Blank,  Object,  Inverted 
Face,  and  Upright  Face.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  (Blank  versus  Object  versus  Inverted  Face 
versus  Upright  Face)  revealed  a  main  effect  of  experimental  condition, 
F(3,57)=16.58,  p<.  01.  Tukey's  HSD  test  showed  that  RTs  were  significantly  faster 
in  the  Blank  condition,  in  which  no  additional  stimulus  was  present,  in  comparison 
with  each  of  the  other  conditions  (p<.  01).  More  importantly,  RTs  were  also 
149 significantly  faster  in  the  Object  condition  and  in  the  Inverted  Face  condition  than 
in  the  Upright  Face  condition  (p<.  05).  In  addition,  no  difference  between  the 
Object  condition  and  the  Inverted  Face  condition  was  found.  Thus,  upright  faces 
delayed  target  classification  most,  followed  by  inverted  faces  and  objects. 
Errors  were  made  on  1.3%  of  Blank  trials,  3.5%  of  Object  trials,  4.2%  of  Inverted 
Face  trials,  and  3.1%  of  Upright  Face  trials.  In  contrast  to  the  RT  data,  a  one- 
factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  of  the  percentage  errors  showed  that  these  were 
evenly  matched  across  the  experimental  conditions,  F(3,57)=2.16.  Errors  were  not 
analyzed  further. 
Discussion 
Responses  to  the  peripheral  targets  were  fastest  in  the  Blank  condition  in 
comparison  with  each  of  the  other  conditions.  More  important,  responses  were 
evenly  matched  on  trials  on  which  inverted  faces  and  objects  (in  this  case  images 
of  fruits)  were  shown,  but  were  slowest  when  upright  faces  were  displayed.  This 
pattern  does  not  appear  to  reflect  a  speed-accuracy  trade  off,  as  error  rates  were 
evenly  matched  across  all  conditions.  Indeed,  the  error  pattern  indicates  that 
presenting  upright  faces,  inverted  faces,  and  fruits  did  not  affect  whether  the  line 
targets  were  processed  (see  e.  g.  Lavie,  1995,2000),  but  only  delayed  responses  to 
these  targets.  There  are  two  potential  explanations  for  these  results.  First,  it  is 
conceivable  that  the  increase  in  RTs  might  reflect  the  reduced  salience  of  the 
coloured  go/no-go  signal,  when  it  is  superimposed  on  a  more  complex  visual 
image  than  a  plain  background.  Although  this  is  possible,  it  cannot  explain  why 
responses  were  slowest  for  upright  faces,  which  matched  their  inverted 
counterparts  in  almost  every  aspect  except  orientation.  A  more  plausible 
150 explanation  is  that  subjects  took  longer  to  disengage  attention  from  these  stimuli, 
which  in  turn  delayed  target  classification,  but  particularly  so  from  images  of 
upright  faces.  This  latter  interpretation  would  not  only  be  consistent  with  previous 
findings  suggesting  an  attentional  bias  to  faces  (Mack  et  al,  2002;  Ro  et  al,  2001; 
Vuilleumier,  2000),  but  also  with  claims  that  inverted  faces  are  subject  to  object 
rather  than  typical  face  processes  (e.  g.  Farah  et  al,  1995;  Haxby  et  al,  1999; 
Moscovitch  et  al,  1997).  However,  at  present  these  findings  provide  only  initial 
evidence  of  a  general  face  bias,  as  only  famous  faces  were  used.  In  addition  to 
low-level  physiognomic  face  information,  known  faces  also  provide  higher-level 
information  such  as  identity  and  semantic  knowledge  about  a  person  to  an 
observer.  If  this  contributes  to  attentional  retainment  then  the  present  face  bias 
might  only  reflect  face  familiarity.  This  possibility  was  examined  in  the  next 
experiment. 
Experiment  13 
The  main  finding  of  Experiment  12  is  that  response  times  to  a  peripheral  target 
increase  when  faces  are  presented  at  fixation.  This  increase  cannot  simply  be  due 
to  the  low-level  properties  of  face  stimuli,  as  equivalent  increases  were  not  found 
when  these  faces  were  inverted.  Similarly,  target  classification  was  less  affected 
by  meaningful  objects  than  by  upright  faces.  In  addition  to  existing  claims  that 
threatening  face  stimuli  hold  attention  in  highly  anxious  people  (e.  g.  Fox  et  al, 
2001,2002),  these  findings  provide  some  initial  evidence  that  it  might  also  be 
generally  difficult  to  disengage  from  faces.  To  provide  a  further  test  for  this  claim, 
the  next  experiment  examined  whether  these  effects  are  still  observed  when 
unfamiliar  faces  are  used,  which,  unlike  the  famous  face  stimuli  of  Experiment  12, 
rule  out  any  possible  influence  of  higher-level  identity  and  semantic  information. 
151 Method 
Subjects  Stimuli  &  Procedure  Eight  postgraduate  students  from  the  University  of 
Utrecht,  The  Netherlands,  and  twenty-one  students  from  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  whose  ages  ranged  from  19  to  31  years,  participated  in  the  experiment 
on  a  voluntary  basis  or  for  course  credits.  All  had  normal  or  corrected  to  normal 
vision.  The  famous  face  stimuli  from  Experiment  11  were  replaced  with 
equivalently  prepared  face  stimuli  of  three  unfamiliar  female  models  (see  Figure 
5.3).  In  all  other  respects,  the  design  and  procedure  were  identical  to  the  previous 
experiment. 
Go  Trials  No-go  Trials 
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Figure  5.3  Example  displays  from  the  four  experimental  conditions  (Blank,  Object, 
Inverted  Face,  and  Upright  Face)  and  for  go  and  no-go  trials  in  Experiment  13. 
152 Results 
Incorrect  responses  and  data  from  one  subject  whose  response  latencies  were 
exceptionally  slow  (3.3  SD  from  the  group  mean)  were  discarded  from  analysis. 
Go/no-go  accuracy  was  high  (93.8%  for  go  trials  vs.  90.0%  for  no-go  trials), 
which  confirms  that  subjects  were  attending  to  the  centre  of  the  displays.  For  go 
trials,  the  median  correct  RTs  and  error  rates  were  computed  for  each  of  the 
experimental  conditions  (Blank,  Object,  Inverted  Face,  and  Upright  Face).  The 
averages  of  the  median  RTs  across  subjects  are  shown  in  Figure  5.4. 
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Figure  5.4  Mean  correct  responses  (n=28)  to  line  targets  on  go  trials  in  Experiment  13. 
Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  experimental  condition;  Blank,  Object,  Inverted 
Face,  and  Upright  Face.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  on  the  RT  data  revealed  an  effect  of 
condition,  F(3,81)=33.16,  p<.  01.  As  before,  Tukey's  HSD  test  showed 
significantly  faster  RTs  in  the  Blank  condition  than  in  any  of  the  other  conditions 
153 (p<.  01).  More  important,  target  RTs  were  again  significantly  faster  in  both  the 
Object  condition  and  in  the  Inverted  Face  condition  than  in  the  Upright  Face 
condition  (p<.  05),  but  there  was  no  difference  between  the  Object  and  the  Inverted 
Face  condition. 
Errors  were  made  on  3.7%  of  Blank  trials,  9.4%  of  Object  trial,  5.7%  of  Inverted 
Face  trials,  and  6.3%  of  Upright  Face  trials.  A  one-factor  ANOVA  of  the  error 
data  revealed  a  main  effect  of  condition,  F(3,81)=4.06,  p<.  05,  reflecting  higher 
percentage  errors  in  the  Object  condition  than  in  the  Blank  condition.  No  other 
differences  were  significant. 
Discussion 
The  results  are  strikingly  similar  to  Experiment  12.  As  before,  response  times  were 
fastest  in  the  condition  in  which  a  blank  background  was  used,  slower  when 
inverted  faces  or  objects  were  added  at  fixation,  but  slowest  when  upright  faces 
were  displayed.  This  pattern  is  consistent  with  the  notion  of  a  general  attentional 
bias  such  that  it  may  be  particularly  difficult  to  disengage  from  upright  face 
stimuli,  and  extends  the  results  of  Experiment  12  from  famous  to  unfamiliar  faces. 
Therefore,  these  findings  rule  out  the  possibility  that  a  face  bias  reflects  processes 
that  can  only  be  engaged  by  familiar  faces. 
Experiment  14 
To  strengthen  the  claim  that  it  may  be  particularly  difficult  to  disengage  from 
faces,  Experiment  14  examined  whether  a  face  bias  is  still  observed  when  the 
inverted  famous  faces  and  fruits  of  Experiment  12  are  replaced  with  famous  names 
and  images  of  flags.  Peoples'  names  provide  virtually  no  resemblance  to  their 
154 faces  but  just  like  them  are  recognised  with  little  difficulty.  Moreover,  names  give 
the  same  status  as  persons  as  faces.  If  famous  faces  are  more  proficient  at 
maintaining  attention  than  the  same  person's  names,  this  would  therefore  provide 
further  evidence  that  faces  maintain  attention  more  effectively  than  other  classes 
of  stimuli.  In  addition  to  substituting  famous  names  for  inverted  famous  faces,  the 
fruit  distractors  were  also  replaced  with  images  of  national  flags.  One  particular 
reason  for  choosing  flags  in  addition  to  names  was  to  provide  an  analogue  to  the 
face-nonface  conditions  of  Experiments  4-6,  where  faces  were  subject  to  less 
distractor  interference  than  flag  and  name  targets.  If  faces'  ability  to  hold  attention 
surpasses  that  of  names  and  flags,  then  this  could  provide  one  conceivable 
explanation  for  these  effects. 
Method 
Subjects  Eight  postgraduates  from  the  University  of  Utrecht  and  a  further  sixteen 
undergraduate  students  from  the  University  of  Glasgow,  aged  18-28,  participated 
in  the  experiment  on  a  voluntary  basis  or  for  course  credits.  All  had  normal  or 
corrected  to  normal  vision. 
Stimuli  &  Procedure  The  stimuli  and  procedure  were  identical  to  Experiment  1, 
except  as  follows.  The  inverted  famous  faces  were  replaced  by  the  names  of  the 
same  celebrities  (Pamela  Anderson,  Marilyn  Monroe,  and  Britney  Spears).  These 
were  printed  in  black  18-point  Arial  font,  with  forenames  printed  above  and 
surnames  below  the  go/no-go  signal,  and  measured  between  1.3  cm  and  1.8  cm 
(1.3°-1.7°  of  VA)  in  width.  In  addition,  the  images  of  fruits  were  replaced  with  a 
set  of  national  flags  (the  Greek  flag,  the  South  African  flag,  and  the  Swiss  flag). 
The  flag  stimuli  were  derived  from  photographs,  which  were  rendered  to 
155 greyscale,  cropped  to  remove  extraneous  background,  and  sized  to  2.4  cm  x  3.0 
cm  (2.3°  x  2.9°  of  VA).  As  before,  the  names  and  flags  were  then  copied  onto  the 
go/no-go  displays,  behind  the  fixation  dot,  for  the  Name  and  Object  conditions 
(see  Figure  5.5). 
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Figure  5.5  Example  displays  from  the  four  experimental  conditions  (Blank,  Object,  Name, 
and  Face)  and  for  go  and  no-go  displays  in  Experiment  14. 
Results  As  for  the  previous  experiments,  incorrect  responses  were  discarded  from 
analysis.  Accuracy  for  go/no-go  trials  was  high  once  again,  averaging  at  93.7%  for 
go  trials  and  86.7%  for  no-go  trials.  The  means  of  the  median  correct  RTs  for  the 
go  conditions  are  shown  in  Figure  5.6. 
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Figure  5.6  Mean  correct  responses  (n=24)  to  line  targets  on  go  trials  in  Experiment  14. 
Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  experimental  condition;  Blank,  Object,  Name,  and 
Face.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
A  one-factor  within-subjects  ANOVA  (Blank  versus  Object  versus  Name  versus 
Face)  of  the  mean  RT  data  revealed  a  main  effect  of  condition,  F(3,69)=33.48, 
p<.  01.  Comparisons  on  this  effect  with  Tukey's  HSD  test  showed  significantly 
faster  classification  times  for  the  Blank  condition  in  comparison  with  each  of  the 
other  three  conditions  (p<.  01).  In  addition,  RTs  were  significantly  faster  for  the 
Object  condition  and  the  Name  condition  than  for  the  Face  condition  (p<.  05). 
However,  the  Object  and  the  Name  condition  did  not  differ  from  each  other. 
Errors  were  made  on  3.1%  of  Blank  trials,  8.0%  of  Object  trial,  6.9%  of  Name 
trials,  and  7.3%  of  Face  trials.  An  analogous  one-factor  ANOVA  of  the  error  data 
revealed  an  effect  of  condition,  F(3,69)=4.76,  p<.  01,  reflecting  fewer  errors  in  the 
157 Blank  condition  than  in  the  Object,  the  Name,  and  the  Face  conditions  (p<.  05).  No 
other  comparisons  were  significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment  14  reveals  several  important  findings.  First,  a  person's  face  again 
appeared  more  potent  in  delaying  target  classification  than  other  classes  of  stimuli, 
in  this  case  famous  names  and  images  of  flags.  This  provides  further  evidence  that 
faces  are  particularly  persistent  in  holding  attention.  In  addition  to  the  findings 
from  Experiments  12  &  13,  these  results  also  suggest  that  the  interference  effects 
of  Experiments  4-6,  specifically  the  observation  that  faces  were  subject  to  less 
interference  than  name  and  flag  targets,  might  at  least  partially  reflect  an 
attentional  bias  for  faces.  There  are,  of  course,  a  number  of  differences  between 
those  experiments  and  the  present  studies.  Perhaps  most  important,  the  target 
stimuli  in  Experiments  4-6  were  always  task-relevant,  whereas  the  faces  and  object 
comparisons  here  were  presented  in  a  task-relevant  location  but  were  not  explicitly 
implicated  in  target  classification.  To  determine  the  relationship  between  attention 
and  face  processing,  however,  this  has  the  advantage  of  diminishing  the  potential 
influence  of  any  ongoing  task-demands. 
The  present  results  may  also  serve  to  resolve  one  recurring  aspect  of  Experiments 
12-14,  namely  that  target  RTs  were  still  significantly  slowed  by  inverted  faces  and 
nonface  stimuli,  albeit  less  so  than  by  upright  faces,  in  comparison  with  trials  in 
which  a  blank  background  was  presented.  In  Experiment  12  it  was  already 
suggested  that  this  might  reflect  the  reduced  salience  of  the  coloured  go/no-go 
signal,  when  it  is  superimposed  on  complex  visual  stimuli.  However,  the  present 
effects  with  name  stimuli  do  not  favour  this  explanation,  as  the  names  were 
158 presented  above  and  below  the  go/no-go  signal,  thus  leaving  its  salience  relatively 
intact  (see  Figure  5.5).  Rather,  these  findings  suggest  that  names,  inverted  faces, 
and  images  of  fruits  and  flags  also  retain  attention  in  this  design,  but  less  so  than 
faces. 
Experiment  15 
The  previous  experiments  show  that  participants  are  slower  to  classify  a  peripheral 
target,  when  a  face  is  displayed  at  fixation  in  the  location  of  a  task-relevant  go/no- 
go  signal,  but  are  less  affected  by  inverted  faces,  names,  or  meaningful  objects. 
These  findings  appear  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  it  may  be  particularly 
difficult  to  disengage  attention  from  faces.  The  purpose  of  the  next  experiment 
was  to  examine  whether  a  similar  face  bias  still  exists  when  the  targets  are 
presented  in  close  proximity  to  the  go/no-go  signal  and  the  faces  and  nonface 
distractors  appear  clearly  separated,  to  the  side  of  the  target.  Thus,  the  face  and 
nonface  stimuli  always  appeared  in  a  task-irrelevant  location  in  this  design.  If 
faces  disrupt  target  classification  more  than  printed  names  and  images  of  flags 
here,  then  this  would  support  the  idea  that  they  are  also  particularly  adept  at 
engaging  attentive  resources  (e.  g.  Mack  et  al,  2002;  Ro  et  al,  2001;  Vuilleumier, 
2000). 
Method 
Subjects  The  thirty-two  subjects  were  postgraduates  and  undergraduates  from  the 
University  of  Glasgow  whose  ages  ranged  from  18-25  years.  All  reported  normal 
or  corrected  to  normal  vision  and  volunteered  to  participate  for  free  or  for  course 
credits. 
159 Stimuli  &  Procedure  The  stimuli  and  procedure  were  the  same  as  for  Experiment 
14,  except  that  the  line  targets  were  now  positioned  just  0.7  cm  (0.7°  of  VA)  from 
the  centre  of  the  display,  and  the  face  and  nonface  stimuli  were  presented  in  the 
periphery  to  the  left  or  right  of  fixation,  with  a  horizontal  distance  of  1.0  cm  (1.0° 
of  VA)  between  the  nearest  line  (horizontal  or  vertical)  and  the  face/nonface 
stimuli  (see  Figure  5.7).  As  before,  subjects  completed  a  practice  block  of  Blank 
trials,  followed  by  an  experimental  blocks  of  each  of  the  four  conditions  (Blank, 
Name,  Object,  and  Face).  Each  of  these  blocks  consisted  of  36  randomly  ordered 
trials,  and  block  order  was  counterbalanced  across  the  experiment. 
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Figure  5.7  Example  display  from  Experiment  15.  The  vertical  line  (the  target)  and  the 
horizontal  line  were  now  presented  in  the  centre  of  the  display,  and  the  faces  and  nonface 
comparisons  were  moved  to  a  task-irrelevant,  peripheral  location. 
160 Results 
Incorrect  responses  were  excluded  from  analysis  and  overall  accuracy  for  go/no-go 
trials  was  computed  by  pooling  the  number  of  correct  responses  across  the 
experimental  conditions.  As  in  all  of  the  preceding  experiments,  accuracy  was 
high  for  go  trials  (97.2%  correct)  and  no-go  trials  (88.3%  correct),  indicating  that 
subjects  were  attending  to  the  go/no-go  signals.  For  go  trials,  the  median  correct 
RTs  and  error  rates  were  computed  separately  for  the  experimental  conditions 
(Blank,  Name,  Object,  and  Face).  The  intersubject  means  of  the  medians  RTs  are 
displayed  in  Figure  5.8. 
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Figure  5.8  Mean  correct  responses  (n=32)  to  line  targets  in  the  go  displays  of  Experiment 
15.  Performance  is  shown  as  a  function  of  experimental  condition;  Blank,  Object,  Name, 
and  Face.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
Comparisons  across  the  experimental  conditions  A  one-factor  within-subjects 
ANOVA  (Blank  versus  Object  versus  Name  versus  Face)  on  the  mean  RT  data 
161 showed  the  usual  main  effect  of  condition,  F(3,93)=11.48,  p<.  01.  Comparisons 
between  each  of  these  conditions  with  Tukey's  HSD  test  revealed  significantly 
faster  RTs  in  the  Blank  condition  than  in  each  of  the  other  conditions  (p<.  05). 
More  important,  RTs  were  evenly  matched  in  the  Name  condition  and  the  Object 
condition,  but  significantly  slower  in  the  Face  condition  than  in  the  Blank,  Name, 
and  Object  conditions  (p<.  01).  Errors  were  made  on  2.9%  of  Blank  trials,  3.3%  of 
Name  trials,  3.0%  of  Object  trials,  and  2.9%  of  Face  trials.  ANOVA  showed  no 
effect  of  condition,  F(3,93)<1,  and  errors  were  not  analyzed  further. 
Comparisons  of  spatial  congruency  effects  within  conditions  A  separate  3  (Object 
versus  Name  versus  Face)  x2  (congruent  versus  incongruent)  ANOVA  was 
conducted  to  compare  performance  on  trials  on  which  face  and  nonface  stimuli 
were  presented  on  the  same  side  as  the  vertical  line  target  (spatially  congruent 
trials)  in  comparison  to  when  these  images  were  presented  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  display  (on  spatially  incongruent  trials),  closer  to  the  horizontal  line  and 
further  from  the  vertical  line  target.  The  RTs  for  these  conditions  are  shown  in 
Figure  5.9  (see  overleaf).  If  face  and  nonface  images  engage  visual  attention,  as 
was  indicated  by  significant  comparisons  with  the  Blank  condition,  then  RTs 
should  also  vary  as  a  function  of  spatial  congruence,  with  slower  responses  on 
incongruent  compared  to  congruent  trials.  This  was  confirmed  by  the  statistical 
analysis,  which  showed  a  main  effect  of  condition,  F(2,62)=9.027,  p<.  01,  again 
reflecting  slower  RTs  for  the  Face  condition  than  the  Name  and  Object  conditions, 
and  a  main  effect  of  spatial  congruency,  F(1,31)=25.74,  p<.  01,  reflecting  slower 
responses  on  incongruent  than  congruent  trials. 
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Figure  5.9  Means  of  the  median  reaction  times  for  the  Object,  Name  and  Face  conditions 
as  a  function  of  spatial  congruency  with  the  line  target.  Standard  error  bars  are  shown. 
As  Figure  5.9  suggests,  analysis  of  simple  main  effects  revealed  significant 
congruency  effects  for  each  of  the  three  conditions:  Name  condition, 
F(1,32)=12.37,  p<.  01,  Object  condition,  F(1,32)=5.01,  p<.  05,  and  Face  condition, 
F(1,32)=9.19,  p<.  01.  However,  no  interaction  between  condition  and  spatial 
congruency  was  found,  F(2,62)<1,  indicating  that  these  congruency  effects  were 
equivalent  across  the  experimental  conditions. 
The  results  of  Experiment  15  show  that  classification  of  a  centrally  presented 
target,  which  occurred  either  just  to  the  left  or  right  of  fixation,  was  affected  by  the 
peripheral  presentation  of  simultaneously  presented  names  and  images  of  flags, 
but  even  more  so  by  images  of  faces.  These  results  converge  with  those  of  the 
preceding  experiments,  in  which  target  classification  was  also  more  affected  by 
faces  than  a  range  of  other  stimuli.  However,  in  contrast  to  those  experiments, 
163 where  participants  were  required  to  attend  to  the  location  of  these  stimuli,  the  face 
and  nonface  objects  here  were  never  presented  in  a  task-relevant  location.  Thus, 
whereas  Experiments  12-14  provide  a  measure  of  disengagement  from  one  spatial 
location,  the  present  study  suggests  that  faces  are  also  particularly  efficient  at 
engaging  attention  at  another. 
Both  of  these  processes  may  of  course  be  influenced  by  the  same  mechanisms. 
Given  the  relative  simplicity  of  the  target  classification  task,  it  seemed  inevitable 
that  any  spare  processing  capacity  would  spill  over  to  the  peripheral  face  and 
nonface  objects  (e.  g.  Lavie,  1995,2000).  In  addition,  because  of  their  sudden  onset 
these  stimuli  may  have  acted  as  exogenous  cues,  immune  to  any  higher  cognitive 
influences  and  capable  of  reflexively  attracting  attentive  resources  (e.  g.  Briand  & 
Klein,  1987;  Posner,  1980),  and  other  stimuli  might  have  done  so  too.  The 
engagement  bias  for  faces  that  was  observed  in  this  experiment  thus  most  likely 
reflects  an  increase  in  attentional  dwell  time,  not  unlike  that  observed  in 
Experiments  12-14,  rather  than  an  initial  orienting  bias  towards  faces.  Whether 
faces  are  particularly  likely  to  attract  attentive  resources  to  themselves  in  the  first 
place  or  can  do  so  very  rapidly  needs  to  be  resolved  in  future  research.  To  this 
point,  it  should  be  noted  that  there  is  some  evidence  that  threat-related  information 
from  emotional  stimuli,  such  as  faces,  might  be  detected  pre-attentively  through  a 
process  implicating  the  amygdala,  and  could  contribute  to  an  orienting  bias  for 
some  emotional  faces  (Vuilleumier,  Armony,  Driver  &  Dolan,  2001).  Nonetheless, 
Vuilleumier  and  associates  also  report  that  subsequent  face  processing  requires 
attention  (Vuilleumier  et  al,  2001;  Holmes,  Vuilleumier  &  Eimer,  2003).  This  is 
consistent  with  the  results  of  Chapters  3&4,  which  indicate  that  faces  are  not 
processed  automatically  or  even  mandatory  (for  such  claims  see  e.  g.  Farah,  1995; 
164 Lavie,  Ro  &  Russell,  2003),  but  are  subject  to  capacity  limits  just  like  other  classes 
of  stimuli.  Any  attention  bias  for  faces  might  therefore  depend  on  similar  variables 
as  the  processing  of  other  objects.  In  line  with  this  reasoning,  it  is  worth  recording 
that  attentional  biases  have  now  been  observed  for  many  types  of  stimuli, 
including  substance  related  pictorial  cues  in  smokers  and  cannabis  and  alcohol 
users  (e.  g.  Jones,  Jones,  Smith  &  Copley,  2003;  Waters,  Shiffman,  Bradley  & 
Mogg,  2003). 
However,  those  findings  do  by  no  means  contradict  the  current  evidence  for  a 
general  attention  bias  for  faces.  The  present  results  indicate  that  this  bias  reflects 
both  faces'  ability  to  retain  attention  at  locations  of  task-relevance  but  also  to 
engage  attentional  resources  at  irrelevant  locations,  and  when  it  might  actually  be 
beneficial  to  ignore  them.  Although  the  comparison  stimuli  displayed  similar 
patterns,  none  of  them  were  capable  of  matching  or  outperforming  faces  in  any  of 
the  experiments.  This  is  particularly  striking  as  the  comparisons  included  inverted 
faces  with  identical  low-level  image  characteristics  to  these  faces  (Experiments  12 
&  13),  famous  names  giving  the  same  status  as  persons  as  faces  (Experiments  14 
&  15),  and  meaningful  nonface  objects  (Experiments  12-15).  In  addition,  virtually 
identical  results  were  obtained  for  unfamiliar  faces,  for  which  participants  could 
not  possess  any  higher-level  identity  or  semantic  knowledge,  and  for  famous  faces 
(cf.  Experiments  12  &  13).  Note  also  that  previous  studies  investigating  attention 
biases  to  faces  may  be  criticized  for  using  artificial  face  stimuli  (e.  g.  Vuilleumier, 
2000;  Mack  et  al,  2002),  and  for  presenting  only  a  single  face  alongside  several 
nonface  objects  (Ro  et  al,  2001)  or  within  a  visual  stream  of  nonface  objects 
(Mack  et  al,  2002),  which  may  have  produced  an  "odd-one-out"  effect  rather  than 
a  face  advantage  (see  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2003).  By  contrast,  the  current 
165 experiments  used  high  quality  photographs  of  real  faces  and  were  designed  to 
eliminate  odd-one-out  effects  by  grouping  stimuli  from  the  same  category  (i.  e. 
faces,  names,  flags)  into  blocks.  The  present  findings  thus  provide  perhaps  the 
strongest  evidence  yet  of  a  general  attentional  bias  for  faces. 
Such  a  bias  might  provide  a  plausible  explanation  for  some  of  the  interference 
effects  that  were  observed  in  Experiments  4-6.  In  these  experiments,  faces 
interfered  more  with  nonface  targets,  which  could  be  names  (Experiment  4), 
famous  names  (Experiment  5),  or  flags  (Experiment  6),  than  nonface  distractors, 
but  were  generally  also  subject  to  less  interference  as  targets.  This  could  be 
explained  in  terms  of  a  disengagement  bias  for  face  targets  and  an  engagement 
bias  for  face  distractors,  whereby  the  processing  of  these  stimuli  was  enhanced  in 
each  case  to  the  detriment  of  the  nonface  comparisons.  However,  target-distractor 
interference  tasks  provide  a  more  complex  scenario  than  the  current  experiments, 
as  the  explicit  processing  demands  of  these  stimuli  must  also  be  considered.  Thus, 
Young  et  al  (1986)  found  that  names  actually  interfere  more  with  faces  than  faces 
with  names  in  target  naming  tasks.  Although  this  accentuates  the  potentially 
intricate  relationship  between  attention  and  other  ongoing  task  demands,  it  also 
illustrates  the  benefit  of  the  relative  simplicity  of  the  present  paradigm,  where 
subjects  did  not  have  to  produce  a  response  to  the  face  and  nonface  stimuli. 
Finally,  in  preceding  chapters  it  has  already  been  discussed  whether  faces  and 
other  objects  might  have  their  own  specific  processing  resources.  Although  some 
attention  biases  appear  strikingly  similar  across  different  stimulus  categories, 
including  faces  (cf.  Ro  et  al,  2001  versus  Palermo  &  Rhodes;  Fox  et  al,  2001 
versus  Yiend  &  Mathews,  2001),  a  face  bias  might  arise  at  least  partly  from  such  a 
division.  All  these  points  are  considered  further  in  the  concluding  chapter. 
166 Chapter  6  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  research  carried  out  in  this  thesis  investigated  the  relation  of  attention  and  face 
processing  with  emphasis  on  face  encoding,  capacity  limitation,  and  attention 
biases.  The  introduction  reviewed  previous  studies  that  are  of  relevance  to  these 
topics  and  identified  a  number  of  shortcomings.  The  first  of  these  was  a  failure  to 
examine  the  influence  of  attention  on  the  encoding  of  different  types  of  facial 
information,  such  as  identity  and  expression.  Although  several  studies  have 
investigated  the  role  of  attention  in  face  encoding,  these  have  focused  exclusively 
on  identity  information  (Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2002;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002; 
Reinitz,  Bartlett  &  Searcy,  1997;  Reinitz,  Morrissey  &  Demb,  1994).  This  issue 
was  complicated  further  by  controversial  reports  of  an  asymmetric  processing 
dependency  between  identity  and  expression  (Schweinberger,  Burton  &  Kelly, 
1999;  Schweinberger  &  Soukup,  1998).  Another  shortcoming  concerned  the 
number  of  faces  that  can  be  processed  simultaneously.  There  is  good  evidence  that 
faces  are  processed  even  under  conditions  that  should  make  this  difficult,  provided 
that  only  a  single  face  is  presented  at  a  time.  Consequently,  it  has  been  argued  that 
face  processing  proceeds  independent  of  general  capacity  limits,  but  that  it  may  be 
subject  to  its  own  processing  limits  (e.  g.  Jenkins,  Lavie  &  Driver,  2003;  Lavie,  Ro 
&  Russell,  2003).  However,  even  though  a  considerable  number  of  studies  have 
examined  face  processing  in  multiple-face  displays,  none  of  these  apply  a  direct 
test  for  such  limits  (e.  g.  Boutet  &  Chaudhuri,  2001;  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002; 
Jenkins  et  al,  2003).  The  final  shortcoming  that  was  targeted  in  this  thesis 
concerned  attention  biases  in  visual  processing.  It  has  repeatedly  been  suggested 
that  faces  may  have  an  advantage  in  capturing  processing  resources  over  other 
stimulus  categories.  This  evidence  is  not  completely  compelling  as  it  is  based  on 
167 artificial  stimuli  (e.  g.  Mack,  Pappas,  Silverman  &  Gay,  2002;  Vuilleumier,  2000) 
and  paradigms  that  are  open  to  alternative  explanations  (e.  g.  Ro,  Russell  &  Lavie, 
2001;  see  Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2003).  Moreover,  although  some  classes  of  stimuli, 
including  faces,  appear  particularly  adept  at  retaining  attention,  often  depending  on 
their  emotional  connotation  and  the  emotional  state  of  the  observer  (e.  g.  Amir, 
Elias,  Klump  &  Przeworski,  2003;  Fox,  Russo,  Bowles  &  Dutton,  2001;  Yiend  & 
Mathews,  2001),  it  is  presently  unknown  whether  a  general  disengagement  bias  for 
faces  exists  relative  to  other  classes  of  stimuli.  This  thesis  offered  novel 
approaches  to  each  of  these  topics  over  a  series  of  15  experiments,  by  measuring 
task-relevant  and  irrelevant  face  processing  in  response-competition  and  priming 
tasks. 
Chapter  2  began  by  examining  the  functional  independence  of  facial  identity  and 
expression  information.  Previous  work  provides  substantial  evidence  for  this 
independence  (e.  g.  Bruce,  1986;  Calder,  Young,  Keane  &  Dean,  2000;  Campbell, 
Brooks,  de  Haan  &  Roberts,  1996;  Etcoff,  1984;  Young,  McWeeney,  Hay  &  Ellis, 
1986a).  Recently  however,  this  idea  has  been  challenged  by  two  studies  reporting 
an  asymmetric  dependency  in  a  Garner  paradigm,  such  that  expression  decisions 
are  influenced  by  task-irrelevant  variations  in  identity  information  but  not  vice 
versa  (Schweinberger  &  Soukup,  1998;  Schweinberger  et  al,  1999).  In  Chapter  2,  a 
number  of  asymmetric  treatment  effects  'were  identified  that  could  have  accounted 
for  this  pattern.  These  included  picture-based  strategies  and  the  use  of  unreliable 
facial  cues  for  decision-making,  and  effects  of  face  familiarity. 
Picture-based  effects  could  have  resulted  from  superficial  image  similarities  such 
as  brightness  or  colour  contrasts,  perhaps  reflecting  the  conditions  under  which 
168 different  stimuli  were  produced.  Unreliable  facial  cues,  on  the  other  hand,  could 
reflect  the  use  of  external  features,  such  as  hairstyle,  which  in  many  instances 
provide  only  a  vague  means  of  person  identification.  Both  of  these  are  less  likely 
to  correlate  with  expression  than  identity,  but  could  have  affected  expression 
decisions  even  if  these  can  usually  be  made  without  interference  from  identity. 
The  influence  of  such  cues  might  have  been  enforced  particularly  by  the  use  of  an 
extremely  small  stimulus  set  and  a  great  number  of  trial  repetitions  (as  in 
Schweinberger  &  Soukup,  1998;  Schweinberger  et  al,  1999).  Face  familiarity,  not 
explicitly  specified  by  Schweinberger  and  associates  (1998,1999),  might  also 
relate  to  the  potential  influence  of  external  features,  which  tend  to  contribute  more 
to  the  recognition  of  unfamiliar  than  familiar  faces.  Alternatively,  identity  might 
not  interfere  with  expression  classification  of  unfamiliar  faces  if  participants  are 
incapable  of  distinguishing  different  stimulus  identities.  Thus,  an  asymmetric 
relationship  might  reflect  only  specific  processes  associated  with  either  familiar  or 
unfamiliar  face  processing. 
To  address  these  concerns,  I  used  a  variation  of  Schweinberger  et  al's  (1998, 
1999)  task  but  with  a  substantially  larger  and  more  varied  stimulus  set,  and  by 
using  participants  who  were  unfamiliar  (Experiment  1)  and  personally  familiar 
(Experiment  2)  with  the  stimulus  identities.  Both  experiments  generated  virtually 
identical  results:  Identity  decisions  were  completely  unaffected  by  facial 
expression.  Although  expression  decisions  were  generally  slower  than  identity 
decisions,  they  were  also  unaffected  by  facial  identity  information.  These  results 
therefore  contradict  claims  of  an  asymmetric  dependency  between  expression  and 
identity  processing.  Furthermore,  expression  classification  times  were  faster  when 
identity  and  expression  information  was  correlated,  than  when  both  dimensions 
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were  making  use  of  task-irrelevant  identity  information  to  facilitate  the  expression 
task.  The  results  are  therefore  not  only  consistent  with  the  idea  that  identity 
processing  and  expression  processing  are  dissociable  cognitive  functions,  but  also 
support  the  view  that  they  are  processed  in  parallel  (see  e.  g.  Bruce  &  Young, 
1986). 
While  Experiments  1&2  examined  how  expression  and  identity  are  deciphered 
from  faces,  rather  little  is  known  about  how  these  different  types  of  facial 
information  are  integrated  within  the  same  face  percept  during  visual  encoding.  A 
few  studies  have  implicated  visual  attention  in  the  holistic  encoding  of  facial 
identity  (Palermo  &  Rhodes,  2002;  Reinitz  et  al,  1994).  Experiment  3  therefore 
examined  whether  attention  is  required  to  encode  expression  and  identity  within 
the  same  face.  This  was  done  by  measuring  response-competition  from  two 
distractor  faces  during  the  categorization  of  a  face  target,  which  was  classified 
according  to  particular  expression-identity  conjunctions.  The  distractors  were 
composed  so  that  they  contained  expression  and  identity  information  from  the 
same  or  the  opposite  response  category  as  the  target.  These  two  types  of  facial 
information  were  either  combined  in  one  of  the  distractors  (with  the  second 
distractor  composed  of  response-neutral  expression  and  identity  information)  or 
distributed  across  both.  It  was  hypothesized  that  distractor  interference  should  be 
equivalent  for  these  conditions  if  information  about  the  correct  expression-identity 
conjunctions  is  unavailable  from  the  distractors.  Additionally,  a  few  conditions 
were  included  in  which  the  distractors  only  contained  one  type  of  response-critical 
information  (i.  e.  identity  or  expression)  or  only  response-neutral  information.  This 
170 was  done  to  examine  whether  any  target-distractor  interference  effects  were  due  to 
expression  and  identity,  or  just  one  of  these  types  of  facial  information. 
The  results  were  unexpected  as  Experiment  3  failed  to  produce  reliable  response- 
competition  effects  in  all  conditions.  Of  course,  this  means  that  this  experiment 
fell  short  of  its  objective  to  investigate  the  encoding  of  expression  and  identity 
information.  However,  these  results  were  particularly  perplexing  as  reliable 
response-competition  effects  have  been  obtained  previously  from  nonface 
conjunction  objects  in  a  similar  design  (Lavie,  1997),  and  also  in  letter-letter  (e.  g. 
Eriksen  &  Hoffman,  1972,1973;  Eriksen  &  Eriksen,  1974),  picture-word  (e.  g. 
Smith  &  Magee,  1980)  and  face-name  response-competition  tasks  (e.  g.  Jenkins  et 
al,  2003;  Lavie  et  al,  2003;  Young  et  al,  1986).  This  contrast  between  previous 
studies  and  the  present  result  suggested  that  it  might  be  worthwhile  to  investigate 
the  absence  of  distractor  interference  in  Experiment  3  further. 
Consequently,  Chapter  3  examined  response-competition  between  face  targets  and 
face  distractors  under  conditions  that  normally  allow  for  distractor  interference. 
Thus  the  studies  here  compared  speeded  responses  to  target  faces  and  nonface 
comparisons,  which  could  be  flanked  by  a  face  distractor  or  a  nonface  stimulus. 
Experiment  4  showed  that  face  distractors  interfere  with  forenames  as  targets,  and 
that  forenames  also  interfere  with  face  targets  and  forename  targets  in  a  sex 
classification  task.  By  contrast,  no  interference  effects  were  found  when  a  face 
distractor  flanked  a  target  face.  Subsequent  experiments  generally  replicated  this 
pattern  of  results  with  famous  faces  and  famous  names  (Experiment  5)  and  with 
famous  faces  and  national  flags  (Experiment  6)  in  semantic  classification  tasks- 
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Experiments  7&8.  In  Experiment  7  participants  again  performed  a  semantic 
classification  task  on  famous  faces  and  national  flags  but  the  number  of  task- 
irrelevant  distractors  was  now  increased  from  one  to  four  to  boost  the  total  of  the 
potentially  distracting  information  in  each  display.  As  before,  the  results  showed 
response-competition  from  flag  distractors  with  face  and  flag  targets.  However, 
distractor  faces  were  still  unable  to  influence  responses  to  face  targets.  In  fact, 
multiple  distractors  even  failed  to  produce  interference  with  nonface  targets. 
Experiment  8  then  explored  the  temporal  conditions  under  which  interference  from 
task-irrelevant  face  distractors  is  eliminated.  The  specific  aim  was  to  determine 
whether  the  ongoing  processing  of  a  face  is  sufficient  to  eliminate  interference 
from  a  face  distractor  in  a  subsequent  interference  display.  To  this  end, 
participants  made  occupational  decisions  to  a  name  target  (i.  e.  pop-star  vs. 
politician)  while  ignoring  a  flanking  face  distractor,  but  only  if  the  target-distractor 
display  was  preceded  by  a  British  (contrary  to  a  non-British)  face  or  flag  cue.  The 
results  showed  that  distractor  interference  was  not  eliminated  by  processing  a 
preceding  flag  cue,  even  when  the  flags  were  presented  very  briefly  and 
immediately  prior  to  the  name-face  displays.  Name-face  interference  was  also 
found  following  the  relatively  long  presentation  of  a  face  cue.  However,  this 
interference  was  completely  eliminated  following  a  short-lived  face  cue.  Chapter  3 
thus  provides  considerable  evidence  that  distractorface  processing  is  eliminated  in 
interference  tasks  by  another  face.  This  other  face  may  take  the  form  of  a 
concurrently  presented  target  (Experiments  4-6),  or  of  additional  face  distractors 
(Experiment  7),  or  of  a  face  that  immediately  precedes  an  interference  display 
(Experiment  8).  By  contrast,  the  same  faces  were  subject  to  reliable  interference 
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comparisons  were  subject  to  analogous  within-category  effects. 
Despite  the  absence  of  face-face  interference  in  Chapter  3,  visual  stimuli  may  still 
undergo  substantial  processing,  as  indicated  by  priming  effects,  even  when  they  do 
not  give  rise  to  response-competition  (Driver  &  Tipper,  1989).  Moreover,  Chapter 
3  only  examined  distractor  processing  with  sex  decisions  (Experiment  4)  and 
semantic  decisions  (Experiments  5-8).  However,  sex  and  identity  information  can 
be  extracted  independently  from  faces,  and  the  retrieval  of  personal  semantic 
information  is  relatively  deep  and  follows  face  recognition.  Thus,  the  possibility 
remained  that  distractor  faces  were  processed  at  some  level,  perhaps  even 
involving  access  to  facial  identity.  For  these  reasons,  Chapter  4  employed 
repetition  priming  to  examine  the  processing  of  face  distractors  in  two-item 
displays.  In  Experiments  9&  10,  subjects  were  shown  displays  of  either  a  face  or  a 
flag  target  and  a  face  distractor  in  a  priming  phase,  followed  by  a  familiarity  task 
to  primed  and  unprimed  faces.  Experiment  11  then  presented  face  distractors 
alongside  face  targets  and  face-like  and  -unlike  nonface  targets  in  a  similar  task,  to 
explore  the  influence  of  `faceness'  on  distractor  priming. 
Experiment  9  found  repetition  priming  for  face  distractors  when  they  were 
presented  alongside  flag  targets.  This  priming  effect  evidently  involved  access  to 
the  distractors'  identities,  surviving  a  change  in  image  between  prime  and  test 
phase.  By  contrast,  processing  a  target  face  eliminated  face  distractor  priming. 
Experiment  10  then  found  that  distractor  priming  can  be  obtained  in  this  condition 
when  identical  images  are  used  at  prime  and  test.  Thus  Experiment  10 
demonstrated,  for  the  first  time,  that  face  distractors  undergo  some  processing 
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that  cross-image  face  distractor  priming  is  not  only  eliminated  during  face  target 
processing,  but  also  by  nonface  objects  that  were  rated  as  face-like  prior  to  the 
experiment.  Conversely,  distractor  priming  was  still  obtained  alongside  face- 
unlike  stimuli.  Chapter  4  therefore  provided  the  first  instance  of  face  distractor 
extinction  in  a  nonface-face  display  (Experiment  11),  but  importantly,  this 
appeared  to  reflect  the  perceived  faceness  of  the  target  stimuli. 
The  findings  of  Chapters  3&4  may  be  explained  if  face  processing  is  subject  to 
capacity  limits,  such  that  only  a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time.  If  demand 
of  processing  resources  cannot  be  met,  for  example,  during  the  classification  of  a 
task-relevant  face  target,  processing  of  another  (distractor)  face  suffers  as  a  result. 
This  conclusion  converges  with  a  number  of  recent  reports  hinting  at  face 
processing  limits,  although  none  of  these  studies  have  examined  this  limit  directly. 
Boutet  &  Chaudhuri  (2001)  used  displays  consisting  of  two  overlapping  face 
stimuli,  a  rather  artificial  situation  that  our  perceptual  system  is  not  usually 
confronted  with,  and  found  that  participants  have  difficulty  in  delineating  more 
than  one  face  at  exposure  times  of  less  than  2  seconds.  Palermo  &  Rhodes  (2002) 
also  used  relatively  long  exposure  times  of  Z  1.5  seconds  for  three-face  displays  in 
a  divided  attention  paradigm.  This  may  have  permitted  the  serial  processing  of 
these  faces,  again  making  it  difficult  to  specify  an  exact  limit.  On  the  contrary, 
Jenkins  et  al  (2003)  used  short  display  times,  but  only  measured  task-irrelevant 
face  processing.  Without  taking  task-relevant  resources  into  account,  this  also 
makes  it  difficult  to  draw  a  direct  inference  about  face  processing  limits  from  this 
study.  Consequently,  the  present  data  provides  arguably  the  most  direct  evidence 
for  face  processing  limits  yet. 
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examine  whether  faces  may  have  their  own  dedicated  processing  capacity,  they 
also  bear  some  relevance  to  the  controversial  issue  of  face-specificity.  Several 
researchers  have  argued  for  the  existence  of  face-specific  neural  mechanisms, 
which  are  held  to  operate  to  some  extent  independently  of  a  more  general  object 
recognition  system  (e.  g.  Farah,  1995;  Farah,  Levinson  &  Klein,  1995;  Farah, 
Wilson,  Drain  &  Tanaka,  1995;  Haxby  et  al,  1999;  Kanwisher,  McDermott  & 
Chun,  1997;  McNeill  &  Warrington,  1993).  This  dichotomy  between  face 
processing  and  nonface  processing  also  receives  support  from  response- 
competition  and  distractor  priming  studies.  Lavie  et  al  (2003)  found  that  face 
distractors  even  interfere  with  name  targets  under  an  attentional  load  that  is  more 
than  sufficient  of  eliminating  response-competition  from  nonface  distractors. 
Jenkins,  Burton  &  Ellis  (2002)  obtained  conceptually  similar  results  in  a  repetition 
priming  task.  Jenkins  et  al  (2003)  also  showed  that  interference  from  face 
distractors  with  name  classification  could  be  diluted  by  the  presence  of  another 
face,  but  not  by  general  competition  from  other  stimulus  classes.  By  the  same 
token,  face  distractor  processing  proceeded  seemingly  unaffected  by  nonface 
targets  in  Chapters  3&4.  The  only  exception  comes  from  Experiment  11,  in 
which  face-like  nonface  targets  behaved  similarly  to  photographs  of  real  faces. 
Moreover,  nonface  stimuli  generally  also  interfered  with  face  targets  (Experiments 
4,6  &  7),  and  none  of  the  nonface  comparisons  produced  analogous  within- 
category  processing  limits  (Experiments  4-8).  This  could  be  interpreted  as  further 
evidence  that  face  processing  involves  it  own  specific  resources. 
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homogeneous  category  of  stimuli  that  is  simply  more  demanding  of  general 
processing  resources  than  printed  names,  and  images  of  flags  and  (face-unlike) 
cars.  In  that  case,  comparable  processing  limits  could  be  obtained  for  more 
complex  nonface  stimuli.  However,  the  target  RTs  and  error  rates  in  Experiments 
4-6  suggest  that  the  processing  of  faces  was  generally  no  more  difficult  than  that 
of  other  stimuli.  Furthermore,  the  same-image  priming  effects  of  Experiment  10 
showed  that  face  distractors  undergo  some  processing  even  when  they  appear 
alongside  a  task-relevant  face.  On  its  own,  this  finding  might  contradict  the  notion 
of  face  processing  limits  and  also  of  a  face-specific  capacity.  However,  in  the 
absence  of  cross-image  priming  in  Experiment  9,  this  same-image  face  priming 
effect  suggests  that  the  distractors  did  not  gain  access  to  any  putative  face 
recognition  system  in  Experiment  10,  but  perhaps  only  registered  at  a  more 
general  processing  stage.  This  conclusion  receives  some  support  from  same-image 
priming  effects  with  unfamiliar  faces  (Khurana,  2000)  and  novel  shapes 
(DeSchepper  &  Treisman,  1996),  for  which  no  recognizable  descriptions  could 
have  existed  prior  to  the  priming  phase.  In  addition,  Experiment  11  showed  that 
face  distractor  processing  was  only  extinguished  by  face-like  stimuli,  the  car 
fronts,  but  not  their  face-unlike  opposites.  These  two  categories  presumably 
possess  similar  levels  of  visual  complexity  and  homogeneity,  although  they  were 
not  matched  for  low-level  characteristics,  such  as  their  component  spatial 
frequencies.  Yet,  given  the  sheer  number  of  car  stimuli  used,  it  would  be 
remarkable  if  low-level  features  could  account  for  this  dissociation.  Until  further 
work  is  conducted,  it  thus  seems  most  plausible  that  the  processing  limits  from 
Chapters  3&4  were  elicited  by  the  face-ness  of  the  stimuli. 
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bearing  only  a  remote,  albeit  measurable,  resemblance  to  real  faces.  This  is  not 
unusual  amid  abundant  claims  that  even  artificial  face  stimuli,  sometimes 
consisting  of  only  a  few  lines,  are  capable  of  engaging  face  processes  (e.  g. 
Eastwood,  Smilek  &  Merikle,  2001,2003;  Mack  et  al,  2002;  Suzuki  &  Cavanagh, 
1995;  Vuilleumier,  2000).  Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  any  dedicated  face 
mechanism  may  have  no  choice  but  to  process  other  stimuli  with  geometrical 
features  that  are  characteristically  face-like  (e.  g.  Pinker,  1997;  see  also  Sperber, 
1994).  Nonetheless,  face-like  stimuli  should  at  least  be  excluded  from  some  face 
processing  stages,  such  as  identity  analysis.  To  this  point,  DeGelder  &  Rouw 
(2001)  recently  proposed  a  dual-route  model  of  face  recognition.  According  to  this 
account,  face  recognition  entails  a  face  detection  system  and  a  functionally  distinct 
identification  system.  Whereas  the  latter  system  requires  extensive  learning  to 
distinguish  between  different  face  exemplars,  face  detection  is  a  cruder,  innate 
mechanism.  But  are  face-processing  limits  then  located  at  a  face  detection  stage  or 
do  they  only  affect  subsequent  processing  stages? 
On  the  one  hand,  the  present  face  processing  limits  are  of  surprising  severity.  This 
is  particularly  so  as  face-face  interference  was  even  eliminated  in  a  sex 
classification  task,  in  which  the  faces  preserved  external  cues  such  as  hairstyle 
(Experiment  4).  These  salient  cues  could  have  been  used  to  categorize  the 
distractors  without  processing  actual  face  information.  The  absence  of  cross-image 
distractor  priming  in  Experiments  9&  11,  a  seemingly  highly  sensitive  measure  of 
face  processing  (e.  g.  Bruce,  Carson,  Burton  &  Kelly,  1997;  Brunas,  Young  & 
Ellis,  1990;  Jenkins  et  al,  2002),  also  serves  to  strengthen  this  impression.  Of 
course,  similar  limits  might  not  apply  in  tasks  that  measure  the  ability  to  process 
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(1995,2000)  perceptual  load  theory  of  selective  attention  states  that  spare  capacity 
not  consumed  by  relevant  processing  should  automatically  spill  over  to  irrelevant 
distractor  processing.  As  this  was  the  case  in  all  but  the  face-face  conditions,  the 
target-distractor  paradigms  of  Chapters  3&4  should  provide  an  accurate  measure 
of  face  processing  capacity,  at  least  subsequent  to  face  detection. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  indications  that  several  faces  might  be  subject  to  some 
parallel  processing.  Jenkins  et  al  (2003)  found  that  an  additional,  unfamiliar  face 
distractor  reduced  interference  from  a  famous  face  distractor  during  the 
occupational  classification  of  a  target  name.  These  dilution  effects  were  face- 
specific,  which  suggests  that  both  distractors  were  registered  as  faces  at  some 
level.  This  notion  also  receives  some  tentative  support  from  the  finding  that  four 
face  distractors  not  only  failed  to  interfere  with  the  classification  of  face  targets 
but  also  the  nonface  targets  (images  of  flags)  in  Experiment  7.  At  first  sight,  it  is 
hard  to  see  why  this  might  have  happened.  After  all,  when  available,  face- 
processing  capacity  always  seemed  to  spill  over  to  the  distractors  in  two-item 
displays  (Experiments  4-6,8-11).  Moreover,  if  participants  had  recognized  just  a 
single  of  the  four  distractors,  then  they  might  have  produced  the  same  strong 
nonface-face  interference  effects  of  other  experiments.  However,  it  may  be  that  the 
four  face  distractors  were  competing  for  limited  processing  resources.  This 
competition  could  have  remained  unresolved  due  to  their  equally  task-irrelevant 
status,  thereby  preventing  the  recognition  and  necessary  semantic  analysis  of  any 
of  the  distractors.  Intriguingly,  this  would  imply  that  the  present  processing  limits 
do  not  extend  to  face  detection.  Of  course,  this  reasoning  is  clearly  speculative, 
being  largely  post-hoc.  Future  work  should  therefore  assess  capacity  limits  in  face 
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alongside  a  nonface  target. 
Nonetheless,  Experiments  4-6  provide  some  indication  that  faces  really  may  be 
strong  competitors  for  processing  resources,  if  only  in  displays  that  contain  a 
single  face  stimulus.  In  each  of  these  experiments,  faces  interfered  more  with 
nonface  targets  than  nonface  distractors  interfered  with  faces.  This  pattern  could 
be  explained  if  faces  are  encoded  into  a  form  that  particularly  suits  sex  and 
semantic  categorization  tasks.  Names,  for  instance,  are  notoriously  difficult  to 
retrieve  from  faces,  and  previous  studies  that  have  shown  this  face  advantage  in 
semantic  tasks  have  also  found  the  reverse  pattern  in  naming  tasks  (Young  et  al, 
1986).  However,  this  explanation  is  not  entirely  satisfactory  as  solitary  face 
distractors  still  interfered  more  with  national  flags  during  nationality  decisions 
than  flags  interfered  with  faces  (Experiment  6).  Surely,  flags  should  be  coded 
more  readily  into  nationality  than  faces,  which  provide  much  more  information 
than  a  person's  nationality.  Consequently,  the  final  empirical  chapter  examined  an 
alternative  explanation  for  these  interference  patterns,  namely  whether  faces  are 
particularly  adept  at  engaging  and  retaining  attentional  resources  in  comparison 
with  other  stimuli. 
In  Experiments  12-14,  participants  performed  a  simple  classification  task,  in  which 
they  were  required  to  focus  on  a  central  go/no-go  signal  before  responding  to  the 
onscreen  location  of  a  peripheral  line  target  (i.  e.  left  versus  right).  The  task  thus 
required  an  attentional  shift  from  the  location  of  the  go/no-go  signal  to  that  of  the 
target.  The  results  showed  that  target  classification  was  delayed  by  the  presence  of 
a  visual  stimulus  in  the  location  of  the  go/no-go  signal,  such  as  an  upside-down 
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when  upright  faces  were  used  and  occurred  regardless  of  face  familiarity  (cf. 
Experiment  12  &  13).  Experiment  14  replicated  this  face  disadvantage  in 
comparison  with  another  class  of  meaningful  nonface  stimuli,  in  this  case  images 
of  national  flags,  and  showed  that  these  results  also  cannot  be  attributed  to  the 
personhood  of  faces,  as  performance  with  the  same  person's  names  was 
indistinguishable  from  the  flag  condition.  A  variation  of  this  paradigm  was  then 
carried  out  in  which  the  target  was  always  presented  at  fixation,  directly  beside  the 
go/no-go  signal,  and  the  face  and  nonface  stimuli  appeared  in  the  periphery 
(Experiment  15).  In  this  study,  the  face  and  nonface  stimuli  thus  never  appeared  in 
a  task-relevant  location.  As  in  the  three  preceding  experiments,  it  was  found  that 
faces  delayed  target  RTs  more  than  other  classes  of  stimuli. 
It  is  clear  from  these  findings  that  faces  are  particularly  efficient  in  retaining 
(Experiments  12-14)  and  engaging  attention  (Experiment  15)  in  comparison  to 
other  stimuli.  This  may  have  contributed  to  response-competition  effects  in  single- 
distractor  displays  (Experiments  4-6),  and  also  with  multiple  distractors 
(Experiment  7).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  these  effects  are  qualitatively 
different  from  those  of  the  response-competition  tasks,  in  which  distractor 
congruency  was  manipulated  to  assess  any  task-irrelevant  processing.  Thus,  to  the 
extent  that  the  distractors  were  processed,  these  effects  arose  from  conflicting 
information  during  response  production.  In  Chapter  5,  on  the  other  hand,  the  faces 
(and  nonface  stimuli)  were  always  response-neutral  and  presented  in  the  context  of 
a  simple  perceptual  task.  These  tasks  therefore  assessed  faces'  ability  to  vie  for 
outright  control  with  the  subjects'  intentions,  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the 
required  response. 
180 According  to  one  theory  already  highlighted  in  this  discussion,  faces  may  draw  on 
a  specific  capacity  with  its  own  limits.  The  findings  from  Chapter  5  also  raise  the 
question  whether  faces  have  their  own  dedicated  attentional  resources.  If  faces 
draw  on  a  separate  processing  capacity,  then  this  might  produce  something  akin  to 
a  capture  advantage  in  multi-item  displays,  which  contain  several  nonface  items 
and  only  a  single  face  (as  in  Ro  et  al,  2001).  However,  this  cannot  explain  the  face 
biases  in  Chapter  5,  in  which  the  face  and  nonface  comparisons  were  never 
presented  within  the  same  display.  This  also  cannot  account  for  the  interference 
patterns  that  were  obtained  when  only  a  single  face  and  a  single  nonface  item  were 
paired  (Experiments  4-6).  Moreover,  there  is  some  evidence  that  faces  and  other 
types  of  visual  stimuli  are  subject  to  a  common  selection  mechanism  at  some 
stage,  as  Jenkins  et  al  (2002)  observed  impaired  explicit  memory  for  face 
distractors  under  high  compared  to  low  task-relevant  nonface  load.  Crucially,  this 
occurred  in  a  context  in  which  face  distractors  showed  equivalent  repetition 
priming,  regardless  of  task  load.  Similarly,  the  error  patterns  in  Chapter  5  indicate 
that  presenting  the  faces  did  not  affect  the  extent  to  which  the  line  targets  were 
processed,  but  rather,  only  the  timing  of  the  responses  to  these  targets.  Perhaps 
then  face  processing  itself  occurs  independent  of  a  general  capacity,  but  there  are 
some  stages  involved  in  controlling  responses  to  and  awareness  of  perceived 
stimuli,  and  hence  explicit  memory,  that  are  not. 
So  far,  this  discussion  has  largely  been  concerned  with  face  processing  limits  and 
attention  biases  to  faces.  I  return  now  to  the  encoding  of  facial  information,  which 
is  another  question  that  this  work  originally  set  out  to  explore  (see  Experiment  3). 
The  specific  aim  was  to  determine  how  functionally  dissociable  types  of  facial 
181 information,  such  as  expression  and  identity,  are  combined  within  one  face 
without  being  confused  with  those  from  another  face.  Although  Experiment  3 
produced  little  apparent  success,  the  results  of  subsequent  experiments  are  perhaps 
more  decisive,  despite  not  being  motivated  directly  by  this  issue.  Under  the 
processing  limits  of  Chapters  3&4,  correctly  integrating  different  types  of 
information  would  be  a  natural  consequence  of  available  face  processing 
resources.  To  this  point,  Experiment  4  demonstrates  that  face-face  interference 
was  even  absent  when  face  distractors  preserved  salient  face-related  response  cues 
for  a  sex  categorization  task.  In  view  of  this  particular  result,  but  also  the  findings 
of  Experiments  3-11  in  general,  it  seems  unlikely  that  facial  information  relating  to 
expression,  sex  or  identity  was  registered  from  distractors  in  face-face  displays. 
Note  that  this  reasoning  does  not  contradict  earlier  claims  that  the  face  processing 
limits  of  Chapters  3&4  might  not  extend  to  face  detection.  Some  prosopagnosics, 
for  example,  show  impaired  face  identification  but  have  normal  face  detection  (de 
Gelder  &  Rouw,  2000).  Moreover,  Lewis  &  Edmonds  (2003)  showed  that  the  eyes 
appear  to  form  the  single  most  important  part  of  face  detection.  Lewis  &  Edmonds 
(2003)  suggest  that  the  eyes  might  constitute  a  characteristic  pair  of  equally  sized 
luminance  regions  that  can  be  extracted  quickly  from  an  image.  It  is  conceivable 
that  this  could  occur  even  when  processing  limits  make  finer  types  of  facial 
information  unavailable. 
In  conclusion,  this  thesis  applies  a  range  of  attentional  paradigms  to  establish 
several  new  facts  about  face  processing.  Most  importantly,  the  research  carried  out 
here  provides  evidence  that  face  processing  is  subject  to  capacity  limits,  such  that 
only  a  single  face  can  be  processed  at  a  time.  It  also  demonstrates  attention 
retention  and  engagement  biases  for  faces,  in  comparison  with  other  stimulus 
182 classes.  In  doing  so,  the  present  findings  raise  several  theoretical  issues  that  need 
to  be  confirmed  by  future  research.  For  instance,  it  may  be  that  the  current  face 
processing  limits  do  not  extend  to  face  detection.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to 
find  out  whether  attention  biases  to  a  limited  set  of  faces  (as  in  Chapter  5)  are 
long-lived  or  diminish  with  increasing  repetition.  Finally,  on  a  more  integrative 
level,  one  way  to  extend  this  research  could  be  to  explore  possible  interactions 
between  processing  limits  and  attention  biases.  It  is  conceivable,  for  example,  that 
a  face  bias  could  be  aimed  at  resolving  competition  between  several 
simultaneously-presented  faces,  at  facilitating  the  retrieval  of  identity  and  semantic 
information  from  a  fixated  face,  or  at  monitoring  faces  for  changes  in  transient 
information  such  as  expression  and  facial  speech. 
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204 Appendix  A 
FACE  STIMULI  USED  IN  EXPERIMENT  7 
Americam 
Woody  Allen 
Groucho  Marx 
British: 
Billy  Connolly 
John  Cleese 
Tom  Cruise 
Robert  de  Neiro 
Elvis  Presley 
Eminem 
George  W.  Bush 
Bill  Clinton 
Pete  Sampras 
Andre  Agassi 
Hugh  Grant 
Sean  Connery 
Liam  Gallagher 
Mick  Jagger 
John  Major 
Tony  Blair 
David  Beckham 
Tim  Henman 
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FACE  STIMULI  USED  IN  EXPERIMENTS  9&  10 
American: 
Al  Pacino 
Angelina  Jolie 
Ben  Affleck 
Brad  Pitt 
Britney  Spears 
Bruce  Willis 
Cameron  Diaz 
Courtney  Cox 
Leonardo  Di  Caprio 
Drew  Barrymore 
Eminem 
George  Clooney 
Halle  Berry 
Harrison  Ford 
Jack  Nicholson 
Janet  Jackson 
Jennifer  Aniston 
Jennifer  Lopez 
Jim  Carrey 
Josh  Hartnett 
Julia  Roberts 
Keanu  Reeves 
Kevin  Costner 
Kevin  Spacey 
Mariah  Carey 
Marilyn  Monroe 
Matt  Damon 
Matt  LeBlanc 
Mel  Gibson 
Mike  Myers 
Nicolas  Cage 
Penelope  Cruz 
Richard  Gere 
Robert  Redford 
British: 
Ali  G 
Catherine  Zeta-Jones 
Chris  Evans 
Chris  Tarrant 
Cilia  Black 
Craig  David 
David  Beckham 
Davina  McCall 
Lady  Di 
Duncan  James 
Emma  Bunton 
Ewan  McGregor 
George  Michael 
Geri  Halliwell 
Graham  Norton 
Hugh  Grant 
Jarvis  Cocker 
Jonathan  Ross 
Judy  Dench 
Kate  Winslet 
Liam  Gallagher 
Liz  Hurley 
Michael  Owen 
Michael  Caine 
Michael  Palin 
Paul  McCartney 
Pierce  Brosnan 
Robbie  Coltrane 
Robbie  Williams 
Roger  Moore 
Ronan  Keating 
Ross  Kemp 
Rowan  Atkinson 
Sean  Connery 
206 Sandra  Bullock 
Sarah  Jessica-Parker 
Sarah  Michelle  Gellar 
Tom  Cruise 
Val  Kilmer 
Will  Smith 
Appendix  C 
Sporty  Spice 
Stephen  Gately 
Victoria  Beckham 
Vinnie  Jones 
Zoe  Ball 
Will  Young 
FACE  STIMULI  USED  IN  EXPERIMENT  11  WERE  THE  SAME  AS  FOR 
EXPERIMENTS  9&  10  IN  ADDITION  TO  THE  FOLLOWING: 
David  Schwimmer 
JohnTravolta 
Justin  Timberlake 
Liv  Tyler 
Madonna 
Mark  Wahlberg 
Pamela  Anderson 
Paul  Newman 
Tom  Hanks 
Woody  Allen 
Anne  Robinson 
Elton  John 
Gareth  Gates 
Jamie  Oliver 
John  Major 
Mick  Jagger 
Prince  Charles 
Richard  Branson 
Sting 
Tony  Blair 
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